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CONTENTS

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ALBANIA

Commission Views Response to Illegal Immigrants *[Tirana TV]* 1

BULGARIA

Zhelev Holds News Conference 12 May *[Editorial Report]* 2
Pavlov Returns From WEU Lisbon Session *[Sofia Radio]* 3
Cabinet Presents Four-Year Government Program *[Sofia Radio]* 3
Videnov Views NATO Issue in Light of Moscow Visit *[TRUD 11 May]* 3
Hesitancy Criticized *[DEMOKRATSIYA 11 May]* 4
Ex-Prime Minister Assesses Cabinet's Performance *[TRUD 9 May]* 6
Official Views Parliamentary Visit to Belgrade *[DUMA 12 May]* 7

CZECH REPUBLIC

Havel Protest to Parade Conveyed to Russian Envoy *[Prague Radio]* 9
Klaus: U.S. 'Reckoning on' Expansion of NATO *[DENNI TELEGRAF 12 May]* 9
Holan Comments on WEU Meeting, NATO Ties *[Prague Radio]* 9
Zieleniec Assumes CE Ministerial Committee Chair *[DENNI TELEGRAF 12 May]* 10
Annual Report on Security Situation Reviewed *[MLADA FRONTA DNES 11 May]* 10

SLOVAKIA

Kovac Affirms Determination Not To Resign *[NARODNA OBRODA 12 May]* 12
Support From Religious Leaders *[Bratislava Radio]* 13
Parliament Passes Bill on Conflict of Interests *[SME 12 May]* 13
Meciar Preparing Ground for Treaty Ratification *[PRAVDA 13 May]* 14
HZDS: Secret Service Affair, Watergate Similar *[PRAVDA 12 May]* 14
Comment: U.S. Reaction to Claim *[PRAVDA 13 May]* 15
Czech Koruna Not Acceptable as Accounting Unit *[NARODNA OBRODA 12 May]* 15
Meciar on Czech-Slovak Payments Agreement *[Bratislava Radio]* 16
Meciar Gives More Money to Teachers *[PRAVDA 13 May]* 16
Radicalism of Luptak, Kremnicka Workers Conference *[RESPEKT 26 Mar]* 17
Academy of Sciences Responds to Budget Cuts *[DOMINO EFEKT 30 Mar]* 19
Effect of Transformation on Youth Considered *[NOVE SLOVO BEZ RESPEKTU 3 Apr]* 20

HUNGARY

Spokesman Says Conflict With Romania 'Impossible' *[Budapest Radio]* 23
Editorial Criticizes U.S. Policy *[NEPSZABADSAG 15 May]* 23
Poll Suggests Fall in Horn's, Bokros's Popularity *[HETI VILAGGAZDASAG 13 May]* 24
Kelety on NATO Expansion, Russian Relations *[Groot-Bijgaarden DE STANDAARD 14-15 May]* 25
Horn Interviewed on Current Issues *[Budapest TV]* 26
Reform Aims for Smaller, More Efficient Army *[MAGYAR HIRLAP 15 May]* 29
Founders Describe Association's Goals, Tasks *[UJ MAGYARORSZAG 12 May]* 30

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

UN: Heaviest Fighting in Sarajevo Since 1993 *[AFP]* 32
UN Says Sarajevo Airport Talks 'Postponed' *[Sarajevo Radio]* 33
Silajdzic on UNPROFOR Instructions to NATO *[Sarajevo Radio]* 33
Silajdzic Asks UNHCR To Review Aid Cuts *[Sarajevo Radio]* 33
Banja Luka Bishop Describes 'Ethnic Cleansing' *[Vienna Radio]* 34
Serb Civic Council on Murders of Priest, Nun *[Sarajevo Radio]* 34
Federation Bodies Set Up in Vitez Municipality *[Sarajevo Radio]* 34
Seselj Meets Serb Leaders, Assails Milosevic *[SRNA]* 35
Serbian Radio on Attacks by Bosnians, Croats *[Editorial Report]* 36
Serb General on Situation in Posavina Corridor *[GLAS SRPSKI 10 May]* 37
UN Observers Monitor 'Heavy Shelling' of Orasje *[AFP]* 38
Army 2d Corps: Serbs Reinforcing Brcko Front *[Sarajevo Radio]* 39
HVO Lines Hold Firm Against Serb Attacks *[Zagreb Radio]* 39
Serb, NATO Planes Reported Over Bihac Region *[Sarajevo Radio]* 39
Knin Serbs Demand Fuel From Convoy for Bihac *[Sarajevo Radio]* 39
5th Corps Advances on Mt. Grmec Near Bihac *[Sarajevo Radio]* 40
Serbs Fire Mortars on Mostar, Konjic Fronts *[Sarajevo Radio]* 40
Serb Forces Reportedly Attack Gorazde *[Sarajevo Radio]* 40

CROATIA

UN Says Army 'Largely Withdrawn' From Zone *[AFP]* 41
Czech Peacekeepers Work Normally in Sector South *[LIDOVE NOVINY 15 May]* 41
Tudjman Makes Statement on Departure for Germany *[Zagreb Radio]* 41
Tudjman Grants Amnesty to 47 Persons *[Zagreb Radio]* 41
SDS Official Under House Arrest in Pakrac *[Knin Srpski Radio]* 42
Commentary Views Coming HDZ Elections *[NOVI LIST 11 May]* 42
Croatian Neglect of Banja Luka Region Discussed *[NOVI LIST 11 May]* 43
Muslims on 'Anti-Islamic, Anti-Bosnian Feelings' *[Sarajevo Radio]* 44
Stabilization Program Seen as Successful *[VECERNJI LIST 11 May]* 44
General Spegelj on Changes in Balance of Power *[SLOBODNA DALMACIJA 15-17 Apr]* 47
RSK Assembly Chairman on Western Slavonia *[NASA BORBA 15 May]* 48
Krajina Serbs Replace Military Commander *[AFP]* 48
RSK Assembly To Meet 18 May in Borovo Selo *[TANJUG]* 48
Kozara, Podgrmec SDS Meet in Sanski Most *[Knin Srpski Radio]* 49
Serbian Prince Visits Martic, Discusses Slavonia *[Knin Srpski Radio]* 49

THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

Commentary Calls Greece's OSCE Veto 'Illegal' *[NOVA MAKEDONIJA 13 May]* 50
'Silence' on Gligorov's Reconciliation Call *[NOVA MAKEDONIJA 13 May]* 51
Miljovski Accused of Fraud Involving Money *[VECER 15 May]* 52
MIC Lists Debts to International Agencies 53
Government Issues Decree on Foreign Missions *[MIC]* 53

POLAND

Situation of Presidential Candidates Viewed *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 12 May]* 54
Split in UP Possible Over Support for Kuron *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 12 May]* 55
PSL Dilemmas in Fielding Presidential Candidate *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 12 May]* 56
ZChN To Support Either Strzembosz or Walesa *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 15 May]* 57
Polish-Russian Trade Issues Viewed *[GAZETA BANKOWA 12 Mar]* 58

ROMANIA

Possibility of War With Hungary Viewed *[Budapest Radio]* 61
Tinca Discusses Military Ties to Hungary *[CURIERUL NATIONAL 9 May]* 61
Melescanu Sees Separatism as 'Threatening' Europe *[ADEVARUL 12 May]* 62
Herzog Addresses Joint Parliament Session *[Editorial Report]* 63
'Reforms Have Their Price' *[Berlin DDP/ADN]* 64
Sole Artillery-Manufacturing Plant Shuts Down *[CURIERUL NATIONAL 12 May]* 65
Funar Warns of Action 'To Outlaw' UDMR *[ROMANIA LIBERA 11 May]* 65
PD Leader: Rulers Ruining National Image *[AZI 10 May]* 65

YUGOSLAVIA

Federal

Defense Minister Warns of 'Ustasha Daggers' *[Belgrade TV]* 67
Military Prosecutor Charges 59 With War Crimes *[SRNA]* 67
Bank Governor Upbeat on Economic Prospects *[TANJUG]* 67

Serbia

Milosevic, U.S. Diplomats Discuss Peace Process *[TANJUG]* 68
Milosevic Refuses To Meet Slavonia Refugees *[SRNA]* 68
Refugee Situation *[NASA BORBA 11 May]* 68
Further 'Limited' Action by Croatia Expected *[NASA BORBA 12 May]* 69

Montenegro

Sandzak's Ljajic To Negotiate With Belgrade *[VREME 8 May]* 69

Kosovo

Former Prime Minister Arrested in Pristina *[Belgrade Radio]* 71

Vojvodina

Novi Sad Hungarian Publishing Company Attacked *[Budapest TV]* 71

Commission Views Response to Illegal Immigrants

AU1605105095 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 15 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The People's Assembly Foreign and International Relations Commission held a meeting today presided over by its chairman Eduard Selami. It discussed the current situation in Italy after the deployment of military forces to prevent the entry into Italy of clandestine immigrants from Albania.

The commission assessed the friendly relations with Italy and praised the fact that Italy has particularly assisted and is still assisting Albania at this period, expressing once again its gratitude for the tolerant treatment of Albanian emigrants who have gone to work in Italy.

The commission assessed that, in the framework of the good relations existing between Albania and Italy, it is necessary that the governments of the two countries resolve the problems that have arisen through dialogue, and that they work with special programs to start the step-by-step legalization of Albanians who work and live in Italy. The parliament also needs to pass a bill on Albanian emigrants in Italy.

The commission believes that the deployment of Italian military forces on the Italian coast is not a solution that corresponds to the level of the relations between the two countries. In resolving this problem, the commission judges that an indispensable road is to work to encourage specific Italian investment plans and aspects to enable people to be employed in the country.

The commission also assessed that the Albanian border authorities should increase their efforts to prevent illegal border crossings and apply international norms in this regard.

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Zhelev Holds News Conference 12 May

AU1205134395

[FBIS Editorial Report] Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian at 1100 GMT on 12 May carries a live relay from the Boyana Residence in Sofia of a news conference given by President Zhelyu Zhelev.

Zhelev begins with a detailed statement on his attendance of the V-E Day anniversary celebrations in London, Paris, and Moscow, pointing out the military aspects of the Moscow events and pondering over the philosophical issue of who were actually the real victors in World War II. Zhelev then begins to survey the formation of the East European bloc and the establishment of authoritarian regimes there. "For the East European peoples, World War II ended only in 1989, when the regimes that actually fought against their own people were toppled," Zhelev says.

In the subsequent question and answer part of the news conference, the first question is whether Zhelev met with Prime Minister Videnov or any Russian leaders in Moscow.

Zhelev says the question about meeting Videnov is "ridiculous," because Videnov came to Moscow from Bulgaria, while Zhelev came from Paris, and, in addition, their hotels in Moscow were far from each other. "We can always meet in Bulgaria and, indeed, we have a meeting on Tuesday at noon." As for meetings with Russian leaders, Zhelev that no meetings with Russian leaders had been scheduled. He points out that he met with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin in London, and that in Moscow he received the leaders of the Agrarian Party "at their request" for a 10-15 minute meeting. As to the future development of relations with Moscow, he points out that "this depends on us." "If the cabinet is sincere in saying that association with the European structures is a priority of our foreign policy, this should determine our relations with Moscow," he says.

A second reporter asks Zhelev to dwell on the "spirit of reconciliation" in the V-E Day celebrations and to give his views on the present political situation in Bulgaria.

In his reply, Zhelev points out at the "restoration of communism" as the greatest danger in Bulgaria today. "It is not appropriate for me to assess the performance of the cabinet, because this is the task of parliament," Zhelev says. However, he says that in a future interview or news conference he will discuss "cooperation between the political institutions," which is a "very acute issue" today.

Asked by Petur Bochukov of DUMA whether the "spirit of reconciliation" in Europe could be transferred to Bulgaria, Zhelev dwells upon the "remnants of totalitarianism" in Bulgaria, mentions the Land Bill, and says that "there are no such problems in Europe." "We still have a totalitarian economy," he says.

Asked by a DEMOKRATSIYA reporter to describe his relations with the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS), Zhelev says that he has always seen the SDS as a "democratic alternative" in Bulgaria. "My attitude toward the SDS has always been positive," Zhelev says.

Another reporter again tries to prompt him to assess the performance of the cabinet, but Zhelev again refuses and says that he is prepared to discuss, in the future, separate issues such as "cooperation and relations between the state institutions," but not to assess the performance of the cabinet comprehensively.

A 24 CHASA reporter asks Zhelev whether he intends to address the National Assembly soon and to assess the performance of the cabinet, to which Zhelev replies that he does not intend to assess the cabinet's performance in parliament, "because this is the cabinet of this parliament and it is not my job to assess its performance."

Asked to point out the specific areas in which there is the danger of "recommunization," Zhelev says that his answer would involve an assessment of the cabinet's performance; therefore, he refrains from answering.

A reporter from BULGARSKA ARMIYA asks Zhelev to assess the discussion in Bulgaria regarding joining NATO, against the background of Russia's position on this issue. "Our position on this issue must be determined by our own policy, rather than by agreements between Russia and the United States, because this again stinks of Yalta," Zhelev says. Our position should not be determined by this or that Russian leader, Zhelev says.

To the next question, about Zhelev's attitude toward the possibility of passing constitutional amendments to intensify the struggle against crime, he says that the Bulgarian Constitution offers enough effective ways to fight against crime "if one really wants to do this."

Asked by a PARI reporter to elaborate on his early statement that there should not be two foreign policies in a single state, Zhelev says that his statement should be viewed as a warning against such a phenomenon more than anything else.

A BTA reporter asks Zhelev to react to the statement of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) Supreme Council, criticizing Zhelev for returning bills to the National Assembly for repeated debate. Zhelev points out that this is his prerogative and that he "received in the presidential elections 600,000 more votes than the BSP received in the parliamentary elections." He also says that "a war between the political institutions in any

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state is a very dangerous phenomenon," but that in Bulgaria this is only a war on the part of the BSP and its institutions against the president. "I am always prepared to conduct a dialogue for the sake of state interests," he says.

Zhelev is then asked whether it is not only the Foreign Ministry that is entitled to conduct foreign policy. Zhelev asks the reporter to read the Bulgarian Constitution, which states that "the president also has prerogatives in foreign policy."

Pavlov Returns From WEU Lisbon Session

AU1605064495 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0600 GMT 16 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Defense Minister Dimitur Pavlov and Deputy Foreign Minister Stanimir Aleksandrov returned from Lisbon early this morning. They had taken part in the regular meeting of the West European Union (WEU] ministers of defense and foreign affairs. As is known, Bulgaria obtained the status of an associated WEU partner more than a year ago.

In the aircraft, Pavlov talked with journalists and said that during the Lisbon forum he had met his colleagues from Portugal, Spain, and Greece. The defense ministers of Bulgaria and Spain have agreed to continue their contacts and implement certain parts of the protocol signed recently in Madrid.

Pavlov discussed with his Portuguese colleague his upcoming visit to Sofia.

Certain aspects of bilateral cooperation were discussed with the Greek defense minister.

Cabinet Presents Four-Year Government Program

AU1505202195 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 15 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] At a news briefing today, Prime Minister Zhan Videnov and members of his cabinet presented the government's program for the period until 1998. Our reporter Kalina Stancheva summarizes the main points of the briefing as follows:

[Begin Stancheva recording] Prime Minister Zhan Videnov pointed out that we should regard the presentation of a program for a four-year tenure as an act of courage, showing willingness to assume clear and specific obligations detailing the guaranteed level of the results we can expect by the fourth year: unemployment to be reduced by half; the impoverishment of the population to be stopped; real incomes to rise; inflation to be cut to single digits by the end of the government's term of office; and the share of the private sector in the economy to rise to two-thirds. In addition, our overall economy will be prepared for integration into the united European market.

The prime minister said that the regulative approach is the price of the transition, and declared his understanding for the impatient expectations placed in his team. At the price of further efforts and risks, but without making compromises, we realistically assess that one cannot count on any significant improvement in living standards until a lasting economic recovery takes hold.

In Videnov's view, it is untrue to claim that the world's underworld economy has practically become centered in Bulgarian society, but with the increased control that his government intends to establish, economic groups with criminal inclinations will find it difficult to fly their flags as before. As Videnov said: We hope gradually, if not to tear them out by the roots, to cause them to die off as breeding grounds for crime by applying the appropriate tourniquets.

There can be no war between the institutions. This was another assertion made by the prime minister, who further committed himself to saying that his cabinet's program is prepared to be carried out in conditions of political peace and that it corresponds to the realities in the country and the forecasts for the next four years. As far as the government is concerned, it will insist that the conditions for this peace are observed, Videnov concluded.

According to the views expressed by other cabinet members, Bulgaria does not need an urgent agreement with the IMF, but a more stable one that will cover the next two to three years, which will be especially difficult for our balance of payments. The government has respect for constructive trilateral social partnership, but it will not bow to pressure or accept unsocial claims and demands for personnel changes. To carry out its assumed commitments relating to the economy, finances, ownership, public order, culture, and the other spheres, the Videnov cabinet is counting on a positive partnership with parliament.

Minister Mladen Chervenyakov declared that to carry through the cabinet's program it is necessary to pass 137 new laws and amendments to 23 existing ones. [end recording]

Videnov Views NATO Issue in Light of Moscow Visit

AU1505171895 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 11 May 95 p 9

[Interview with Prime Minister Zhan Videnov by TRUD Moscow correspondent Georgi Traykov in Moscow;

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date not given: "Clinton and I Sat Back to Back, but Our Wives Faced Each Another"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Traykov] Who sat at your table at the official dinner in the Kremlin?

[Videnov] We were seated with the Ukrainians, three veteran marshals, Foreign Ministry officials, and others. Clinton and I sat back to back, but our wives, Hilary and Katalina, faced each another.

[Traykov] You discussed NATO with Ivan Rybkin.... [Russian State Duma chairman]

[Videnov] I was left with the impression that Russia pays more attention to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE] than to NATO.

[Traykov] What is the government's position in principle? Should Bulgaria seek to join NATO?

[Videnov] Regarding this issue, at the moment, NATO has only said that it is expanding. To put it bluntly, this means that they are interested in Poland. It does not mean anything else. In September, October, or November they will consider the question: Why is this expansion being carried out? Evidently they will also consider the question of how it will be done. We will have to see what kind of concept they develop. It seems to me that irrespective of what Albania, Estonia, Sweden, and others want, they will reach some decision about Central Europe and will link this decision with Russia. This is the old argument about the intermediate-range missiles and nothing more. This hullabaloo about the flank states can only do them harm.

[Traykov] You said that Russia pays more attention to the OSCE. Does this include possibly joining the Western European Union?

[Videnov] For us, it does, but for them it does not.

[Traykov] Do you expect certain political forces to bring pressure to bear on the government regarding the issues of security and NATO?

[Videnov] I see no sense in this. First, the kind of dangers that they are talking about will not come about in practice. It is absolutely wrong to adopt a decision at the moment on the basis that our national security is directly threatened. Nothing exists that may provoke any kind of conflict. Second, it will soon become clear that the nature of the dispute is quite different; that at this stage the whole of Europe will not join NATO, as the issue concerns only one or two states. Third and last, it will be seen that things are moving toward a clash in Europe in which nothing will prevent the great powers from calmly making the decisions. It is precisely this that would be a destabilizing factor.

If NATO expands to include Poland, the Baltics, and other countries, what solution remains for them (the Russians—editorial note) apart from the East's economic interests, while the strength lies with the West. [sentence as published] This means that we will have a new division of Europe, and they will think about forming buffer zones like our country. We will derive no particular benefit from this.

[Traykov] Is the West doing anything to find a compromise?

[Videnov] The West is suspending Russia's acceptance into the Council of Europe and the European Union. It does not react at all to the extremely provocative stances adopted by the Poles and the Baltic nations toward the Russians, which is not right. Regarding Chechnya, the West could have emphasized that it is an internal issue and there can be no question of self-determination, so that it is simply and solely an issue of human rights. However, they internationalized the issue. [passage omitted]

[Traykov] What did you arrange about the transit gas pipeline through the Balkans?

[Videnov] The Russians want the section of the pipeline that will pass through Bulgarian territory, from Burgas to Alexandroupolis, to be considered joint property. We are not very keen on this idea. We have to negotiate preferential prices, because at the moment we are paying the highest prices in the Balkans for free deliveries not covered by contract. The competition of our "great" gas companies in Moscow has caused this. Under the Yamburg agreement we pay nothing, but for private deliveries, which are steadily increasing, we pay the highest prices in the Balkans, because Multigroup and Tron must fight it out to establish which of them is (has the appearance of being—editorial note) the more powerful in Moscow. They are fine businessmen....

We have to correct another "great" move that the caretaker government made. We are the only Balkan state that enjoys no preferential customs duties from the Russians at the moment. They established these on 1 February, yet we have not even submitted an application.

Hesitancy Criticized

AU1505130295 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 11 May 95 p 3

[Article by Lyubomir Alamanov: "Fear of NATO"]

[FBIS Translated Text] During the last week Zhan Videnov's government again refused to commit itself to a specific position on the issue of Bulgaria's joining

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NATO structures. In an attempt to find a justification for his behavior, the prime minister, relying on the poor information of the people, points out arbitrary reasons, most of which do not sound serious:

1. Zhan Videnov declares that if we are admitted to NATO we will have to allow foreign troops and bases on our territory—something that is unprecedented, including during the period of the Warsaw Pact. It only is in the fantasy of the prime minister that if Bulgaria joins NATO it would immediately be flooded by thousands of soldiers and hundreds of tanks of other NATO members. However, even if there are foreign bases on Bulgarian territory: so what? Are we not interested in the support of the civilized world against a possible aggressor? Perhaps Videnov wants to repeat the Communist inventions regarding NATO's aggressive character? Let the prime minister not speak about the Warsaw Pact troops. There were no foreign troops in Bulgaria because the Bulgarian Army was a part of the Red Army and used to receive instructions and orders directly from Moscow. It is an unquestionable fact that the Warsaw Pact troops were entirely constructed on an aggressive foundation and that they were guided by the idea of striking the capitalist world. Thus the Warsaw Pact was a purely aggressive construction that cannot be compared at all to NATO's defensive doctrines.

2. Zhan Videnov declared that "we do not want any big brothers any longer," and tried to stress his striving toward protecting our national sovereignty. The attempt to compare NATO and the Warsaw Pact in anything related to their attitude to small states is simply ridiculous. No Warsaw Pact member has ever had the right to hold an opinion different from Moscow's. Bulgaria's sovereignty was violated each time a decision on the activities of the Bulgarian Army was adopted by foreigners in foreign countries. Now NATO member states do not feel threatened any longer. Now a small state like Luxembourg does not think that its national sovereignty is being threatened. It and all other NATO members have an equal right to vote and accept or reject a certain decision. This is not a violation of national sovereignty; it is democracy. The attempt to compare the USSR and the West European countries shows that Zhan Videnov and his ministers continue to think with the stereotypes of the old time. It is impossible to put a totalitarian, aggressive, and openly imperialistic state like the USSR under a common denominator with the civilized Western states. It is impossible to compare the Warsaw Pact, where the Communists used to crush every different thought of their partners with an iron fist, and NATO, in which all members are equal. The Western democracies are not ideal, but they are the only working model of democracy. Since there is no alternative, we must learn from them.

3. In their statements Zhan Videnov and his cabinet members are constantly floating the idea that NATO is useless, and therefore "why should we be members of an organization that cannot even maintain good relations among its members"—meaning the conflict between Greece and Turkey. The problem is not in the fact that the prime minister errs. The problem is that the issue is being posed in the wrong way in order to divert the Bulgarian public's attention. The BSP government is trying to suggest that Bulgaria must prepare for a conflict with Turkey. To insinuate that there is some threat from the south, against the background of the serious war that is being waged in the region, means to increase tension in the Balkan peninsula in an incredible manner. Good relations with Greece and Turkey have been under construction since 1992, while Zhan Videnov's statements return us to the mid-1980's when they used to be two of Bulgaria's basic enemies. One asks oneself whether Zhan Videnov is not deliberately trying to foil the striving toward friendly relations. The real threat does not come from the south. The one who claims this is confusing the issue of ethnic relations with international relations between states, thus giving Turkey a reason for dangerous ideas. An overt and deliberate attempt to ignore the only serious threat—Serbia—is also evident. The wars Serbia used to conduct and is conducting at present in the name of great Serbian chauvinistic ambitions have threatened Bulgaria's territorial integrity many times in the past. At present there is no other real danger for our state. If we conduct a prudent foreign policy and do not commit ourselves to Russia in the event of a conflict between Russia and Turkey, our relations with the southern neighbor will be at a very good level. If a danger for our country emerges it could only come from Serbia. There is an embargo against Serbia not because it has not paid its membership fee to the United Nations but because the international community has declared it an aggressive force in the Balkans. The embargo is costly, but it is the only possible form of committing ourselves to the civilized world. Zhan Videnov calls Serbia a peacemaker and advocates the lifting of the embargo, as if he does not see that this would increase the risk of expanding the war and drawing more and more territory into the madness of destruction.

Zhan Videnov's government is conducting an antinational policy. It does not want to commit itself to specific and decisive steps related to Bulgaria's participation in NATO structures. The stereotype of the old Communist thinking is coming back. Let us hope that this does not

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kindle someone's aggressive ambitions—something that could be fatal for Bulgaria.

Ex-Prime Minister Assesses Cabinet's Performance

AU1205142395 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 9 May 95 p 11

[Interview with former Bulgarian Prime Minister Andrey Lukanov by Svetlana Krusteva in Sofia on 8 May: "I Am Worried About the Restriction of Human Rights in the Name of Fighting Crime"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Krusteva] Mr. Lukanov, you have said that the cabinet could more actively engage in fighting crime. Is this fight going on at all in fact?

[Lukanov] I consider that the government and the so-called law enforcement ministries have made a serious attempt to show the criminal world that the previous attitude of tolerance and the absence of a rigorous legal framework for each citizen's actions will be abandoned.

[Krusteva] You used the word "show." Does this imply that the measures are merely intended as a "demonstration"?

[Lukanov] I think it is important to demonstrate determination. However, determination can only be demonstrated when it is translated into action. Some of the government's actions are a good first step, but society expects much more effective and, in a certain sense, firmer actions. This requires no long preparation. The state of affairs is well known, and the information is available to the competent bodies.... For me, the real problem is different, namely the situation in the judiciary. Cases like the release of Dilyan Doron and the "Baron" illustrate the situation much more clearly. No Bulgarian can believe that this is a matter of respecting human rights. The citizens are in despair.

[Krusteva] The government claims that citizens are prepared to have their rights restricted in the name of bringing crime under control.

[Lukanov] Personally, this worries me. It is true that the majority of people support very harsh measures, which in many cases might come into conflict with the Constitution and human rights, without realizing that this may affect them personally or their relatives and close friends. I disagree with the thesis that one can only combat crime effectively by restricting civic rights.

[Krusteva] Mr. Lukanov, certain economic groupings, such as Multigroup for example, have shown a desire to cooperate with Zhan Videnov's cabinet. Should the government agree to such cooperation?

[Lukanov] In the economic field certainly. I consider that, in the absence of any serious incontrovertible evidence of illegal activities by any of these groups, we should not create an atmosphere of hysteria regarding them because Bulgarian national capital—especially large economic and financial structures—cannot grow and establish itself, themselves, in such conditions.

[Krusteva] Should capital be legitimized at a certain point irrespective of how it was acquired?

[Lukanov] No, I do not support the thesis that "whatever has happened in the past; from now on we must live according to the law." Personally, I find this thesis offensive. However, given that these groups have arisen and are becoming stronger, it would be incomprehensible for the executive to refuse to cooperate with them in connection with certain social tasks.

[Krusteva] Do you realize that some people are saying: "Lukanov talks like this because he has connections with these groups"?

[Lukanov] I have no connection with any grouping and am not one of their dependents, nor do they depend on me. However, I do seek to get to know the new Bulgarian private businessmen, and do not avoid these contacts. Here, of course, I am thinking of legitimate business structures, not those from the twilight zone. As an economist and National Assembly deputy, I believe that we must harness the capabilities of the private economic structures to achieve national economic goals. [passage omitted]

[Krusteva] Which aspects of the budget do you regard as unrealistic?

[Lukanov] I would not call it unrealistic, but the weakest aspect of the budget is the revenue side. It cannot be fulfilled, and requires a tightening of financial discipline and a crackdown on nonpayment of taxes. In addition, more internal sources of revenue have to be found. One way is to increase special taxes. For example, we cannot allow Bulgaria's roads to fall into ruin. Since it is impossible to maintain them from the budget, why not do the same as Greece? There, people have to pay much higher taxes on luxury cars and second cars, and part of the proceeds go into a special road fund.

[Krusteva] Let us discuss our foreign policy. The president claims that the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] opposes our joining NATO.

[Lukanov] The BSP is not against joining NATO. The party's most authoritative spokesmen—Prime Minister Videnov and Foreign Minister Pirinski—have declared this officially. This is a fabricated dispute, because it is clear that NATO is not ready to accept us during the next few years, and it has told us this quite frankly. Evidently, someone wants to make us kneel down and

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beg to be accepted, so that we receive a refusal. There is no sense in humiliating our nation in this manner.

Second, there is a another problem, which is Russia. The issue is not the notorious Russian "veto." "We cannot forbid you," Russia says, "but we cannot remain indifferent to the development of a military alliance in the direct vicinity of our borders. We will be compelled to take certain measures to guarantee our own national security." In other words, on the one hand, we gain some security, but on the other, create a new source of insecurity. If, instead of asking the Bulgarian "Do you want us to join NATO?" we ask him "Do you want Russia to be our potential enemy one day?" I think that the overwhelming majority of citizens will say no. The ideal solution for us is that the expansion of NATO should proceed in parallel with the building up of an all-European collective security system, of which Russia is a member. [passage omitted]

Official Views Parliamentary Visit to Belgrade

AU1505120495 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 12 May 95 p 3

[Interview with National Assembly Foreign Commission chairman Nikolay Kamov by Tanya Geneva; place and date not given: "Parliamentary Visit to Belgrade Was Successful"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Geneva] How do you assess the results of the parliamentary delegation's visit to Belgrade? Completely different assessments were made after your return.

[Kamov] In this case I prefer to let the facts speak for themselves. Both here and in Belgrade, our delegation was as one in its assessment that the contacts in Belgrade were exceptionally important. Unfortunately, the political dialogue between Bulgaria and Serbia is rather poor in comparison with what is possible in this area. This is a neighboring state and our relations must develop. Naturally, this should happen within the framework of the possible, because the sanctions restrict a great part of this spectrum.

When there is no political dialogue problems emerge whose importance is assessed somewhere else rather than in Sofia and Belgrade. At all meetings it was agreed that this should not be allowed. Personally, I am glad that we have at least one specific result: the agreement of Mrs. Margit Savovic, minister of human and minority rights of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY], to visit Bulgaria. The future will show the practical usefulness of this result, but this already is outside our possibilities as parliamentarians.

[Geneva] Do you think that the commitment she assumed is sufficiently firm? The commitment has been obtained in an informal atmosphere, and so far such a visit has been repeatedly postponed for various reasons.

[Kamov] We were assured by Prime Minister Radoje Kontic, who said that he has the power to send the minister to Sofia.

[Geneva] Actually, what was this sharp exchange of words at the beginning of your meeting with Kontic? The opposition said that his reaction bordered on cynicism and that it was incompatible with the diplomatic tone.

[Kamov] I would say that the issue is related to the tone and style in which a political dialogue should be conducted. As a leader of the delegation I said that we would like to see that the appropriate importance is attributed to the issues we pose to our partners, as well as to the issue they pose to us—no more and no less.

[Geneva] Did the refusal of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] to participate in the delegation in any way affect the way it was treated in Belgrade?

[Kamov] No, the delegation was sufficiently representative. The fact that the SDS decided to not participate is their problem. Personally, I do not understand why they missed the chance to pose their questions in Belgrade, after posing them here. I think we defended Bulgaria's position in a sufficiently categorical and dignified manner.

The specific problem of the Bulgarian minority in Serbia can in practice only be resolved by the Serbian organs and no one else. We have no claims regarding the constitutional treatment of their rights, and we are not raising the issue in a confrontational manner as interference in their internal affairs. We are seeking a dialogue and means of implementing the rights incorporated in their laws. In this context I think that the visit was useful.

[Geneva] According to some people, if this attitude persists, the problems of the Bulgarian minority in the Western Outlands will continue to be resolved "piece by piece."

[Kamov] In the final analysis it depends on the executive power what agreements would be reached with Mrs. Savovic here, in Sofia. Perhaps one of the important aspects would be to significantly increase the level of the information Bulgaria received—not only from the citizens themselves and their organizations, but also from the Serbian authorities.

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[Geneva] The SDS also invoked the argument that this visit was untimely and it could be dangerous for Bulgaria's national security.

[Kamov] I categorically reject such a view. I repeat: I categorically reject it. This was a parliamentary visit, included in the working plan of the Commission on Foreign Policy, and adopted by consensus. It was an element of our program on actively developing parliamentary relations with the Balkan countries. One month ago our colleagues visited Greece. Soon we will develop relations with the Romanian Parliament's Commission on Foreign Policy. In a reply to an invitation we received from Turkey, we will invite our Turkish colleagues to visit Bulgaria.

On the contrary, the results of the visit indeed conform out national interests. In my conversations with diplomats—not only our diplomats and those from the neighboring countries, but even diplomats from other countries—I have never sensed even a hint of a doubt regarding the fact that Bulgaria must talk to its neighbors. Furthermore, our own assessment of our relations with the neighboring states is sufficiently authoritative, and it must guide our actions.

[Geneva] What is the Serbian attitude toward the initiative of the five states on resolving the economic problems related to the embargo?

[Kamov] Their attitude is exceptionally positive. This was one of the central issues. Satisfaction with the Bulgarian initiative was pointed out everywhere. One cannot speak in this case about a coincidence in the positions. Bulgaria is a country that is applying the sanctions, and Serbia the country against which the sanctions have been imposed. However, there is a total understanding on the part of Serbia that Bulgaria is strictly implementing its obligations as a member of the United Nations. Simultaneously, in accordance with its national interests, Bulgaria is seeking possibilities of making sanctions compatible with the development of the process in the Balkans. Lifting the sanctions in the sphere of culture and sports is evidence of making the sanctions compatible with the Balkan process.

Incidentally, during the visit we also discussed documents that are being prepared by the two countries, and which should take effect immediately after the sanctions are lifted. The Bulgarian draft of an agreement on trade-economic cooperation has also been coordinated to a large degree. Draft agreements on mutually encouraging investments, avoiding double taxation, and so forth, have also been prepared.

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Havel Protest to Parade Conveyed to Russian Envoy

LD1505154295 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1400 GMT 15 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The head of the Czech Presidential Office today conveyed President Vaclav Havel's protest to Aleksandr Lebedev, Russian ambassador to the Czech Republic. Presidential spokesman Ladislav Spacek spoke to Czech radio about this:

[begin Spacek recording] On the basis of the information provided by our embassy over the weekend, Lubos Dobrovsky, head of the Office of the President of the Republic, today conveyed to Aleksandr Lebedev, ambassador of the Russian Federation, President Vaclav Havel's indignation over the fact that soldiers from units fighting in Chechnya have taken part in the Moscow military parade of veterans. The promise that this will not happen was thus broken, and the president strongly protests against this conduct.

At the same time, Lubos Dobrovsky briefed Ambassador Lebedev about the president's profound alarm over a new Russian military offensive in Chechnya. Vaclav Havel calls on President Yeltsin to use all of his authority to seek an immediate halt to military operations in Chechnya, and he will send him a personal letter on this matter. [end recording]

Klaus: U.S. 'Reckoning on' Expansion of NATO

AU1505153295 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 12 May 95 p 3

["Regular" interview with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Tomas Chalupa in Prague on 11 May: "Agreement on NATO Could Not Have Been Expected"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Chalupa] At your meeting with President Clinton, did you notice any shift in U.S. opinion on the integration of Central Europe into the North Atlantic alliance?

[Klaus] It would be too strong to refer to a shift. I believe that the United States is reckoning on an expansion of NATO, and a meeting could not change this. A meeting could bring some additional arguments, and I believe that President Clinton clearly responded to my emphasis that there are actually two issues. On the one hand, it is a matter of actual security guarantees and safeguards, and, on the other, it is a symbolic, psychological phenomenon for the citizens of this country, who certainly would like to have been in NATO from the very beginning. It is a signal to all that the past is definitely gone. He was very responsive and commented very vigorously on this. Hence, it was more of adding arguments than changing views.

[Chalupa] During your visit to the United States, you met with some of the world's top economists. How do they assess the development in the Czech Republic?

[Klaus] It would be better to ask these economists directly because, when I interpret their comments, we are reproached for bragging. Perhaps the only thing I can say is that they are apparently all well aware that the Czech Republic is moving on in a really problem-free manner. [passage omitted]

[Chalupa] There has been a vote of no confidence in the president in Slovakia. How would you assess this step?

[Klaus] I am not passing any judgment. It is completely and exclusively an internal affair of the Slovak Republic, and I do not have the least authority to comment on it. The idea that we have such a right because we used to be a part of the same state I do not believe to be a justification. It is just as impossible for me as to comment on the report that President Walesa wants to sue Prime Minister Oleksy for going to Moscow. It is not proper for us to comment on it. I believe it is an erroneous perception on the part of some people here to imagine that we can pass judgment on Slovak internal affairs. [passage omitted]

[Chalupa] What hopes do you attach to the creation of the new conservative Prague-Berlin-Paris-London axis?

[Klaus] It is a tremendous exaggeration to speak about an axis, and I would not dream of referring to it by this term. Of course, I must say that I know President Chirac personally and have spoken with him many times. I believe we have the same or similar opinions on many issues. So, his election certainly is for me something for which I was hoping.

Holan Comments on WEU Meeting, NATO Ties

LD1505193195 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1600 GMT 15 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Council of the Western European Union [WEU] held its meeting in Lisbon today. The Czech Republic, which became an associate member last fall, was represented by Defense Minister Vilem Holan and First Deputy Foreign Minister Alexandr Vondra. Our special correspondent Martin Dorazin phoned in from Lisbon.

[Dorazin] The extended status of the WEU partners from Central and East Europe will enable us to create a genuine European basis for Partnership for Peace and transfer a great deal of responsibility in that direction, Czech Defense Minister Holan said in his speech. Holan went on to say that the Czech Republic in no case intends to weaken its relations with NATO, which will

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continue to determine security policy in the years to come.

According to Holan, associate membership in the WEU carries two important points for the Czech Republic. First, it is a step toward closer integration and full membership in NATO. Second, it is preparation for the integration into the European Union.

Minister Holan added that the Czech Republic was prepared to go beyond its obligations of its associate membership in the WEU, for instance, in direct military representation in the planning unit of the WEU and arms cooperation during modernization of weapons.

We would also welcome the possibility to take part in military exercises supervised by the WEU. Prague is currently preparing a comprehensive document on the possibility of allocating Czech troops and funds to humanitarian, rescue, and peacekeeping operations carried out on behalf of the WEU, Defense Minister Vilem Holan stated.

Overall, the Lisbon meeting of the Council of the WEU was a step toward realizing that the operational possibilities of the WEU created a flexible complement to NATO activities in Europe.

Zieleniec Assumes CE Ministerial Committee Chair

AU1505153395 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 12 May 95 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec Chairs the Ministerial Committee of the Council of Europe"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Strasbourg—In the seat of the Council of Europe yesterday, Czech Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec assumed for the Czech Republic the chairmanship of the Ministerial Committee of the Council of Europe. Individual countries chair the Ministerial Committee for a period of six months, according to the alphabetical order.

Upon the conclusion of the 96th Session of the committee, outgoing chairman Cypriot Foreign Minister Alexandros Mikhilidis passed on to the Czech minister the key symbolizing the chairmanship of this supreme body of the Council of Europe.

In a short address during the festive ceremony, Josef Zieleniec expressed the hope that, during the coming period, the gates of the Council of Europe will open to other countries that satisfy the admission criteria. Minister Zieleniec said that the expansion of the Council is in the interest of the Czech Republic, but this issue must be approached with the full awareness of the need for preserving the values of this organization.

Although it is necessary to expand the Council of Europe, it is imperative that the countries share the values of the organization and are really prepared for membership, a ministerial spokesman added.

Annual Report on Security Situation Reviewed

AU1205184795 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 11 May 95 p 2

[Article by Sabina Slonkova: "The Intelligence Services Consider an Attack Against the State Improbable"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Even despite numerous military conflicts around the world, the state intelligence services consider the possibility of a military attack against the state rather improbable. That is the gist of the information from the Defense Ministry and the civilian intelligence service contained in the annual report on the security situation.

As opposed to last year's document, the Ministry does not even point out any specific military conflicts that could possibly represent a danger for the state.

"The internal security may affect the political development in Europe and the risks of an anticivilization character—the danger of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; the illicit trade in arms and narcotics; terrorism; the rise of militant nationalism; and illegal migration," Interior Minister Jan Ruml says in the document.

Ruml's office recommends that increased attention be paid, above all, to the arms trade, in which organized crime participates. The Interior Ministry specifically points out the danger for the state of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Despite the secret services and the police not having observed any activity by international terrorists in the state last year, they do not rule out the possibility of the Republic's entering the sphere of their interest. The annual report of the Interior Ministry does not, however, give any details. Its authors only observe that, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, many terrorist groups are endeavoring to find alternative methods of financing their activities—for instance, by narcotics dealing.

Last week, the government identified with the view of the Interior Ministry that, last year, for the first time in the past five years, the security situation began to stabilize. Crime declined by almost 7 percent, but, at the same time, the damage caused by the criminals dramatically rose. The damage was 100-percent higher in comparison with 1993.

In connection with organized crime, the authors of the annual document particularly warn against serious eco-

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nomic crimes that, according to them, can jeopardize the economic stability of the country. Similarly, according to the Interior Ministry, an increase in corruption can be expected in society.

The ever-increasing classified information leaks to criminal organizations also began to present a certain risk for the state. According to the Interior Ministry, it is necessary to prevent the information leaks also because of the cooperation with foreign enterprises and entry into NATO.

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Kovac Affirms Determination Not To Resign

AU1505175095 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 12 May 95 pp 1-2

["Exclusive interview" with Slovak President Michal Kovac by Julius Gembicky in Bratislava on 11 May: "Michal Kovac: It Is Another Black Stain on the Activity of the Slovak Parliament"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Immediately after leaving parliament, President Michal Kovac gave an exclusive interview to NARODNA OBRODA:

[Gembicky] Mr. President, has the idea to resign occurred to you, even after what happened in parliament yesterday, so that all the political ill-wishers from your former maternal movement will finally leave you in peace?

[Kovac] I must admit that it has not. A long time ago, I resolved not to yield to such pressures, also because destabilization could set in in our country and many people would resign themselves to the situation, which might result in a long-term domestic political crisis. Another reason is that I feel a responsibility that I cannot shirk just because someone is bringing pressure to bear upon me. I must act according to the Constitution. While the Constitution does permit me to resign, my conscience, oath, and sense of responsibility do not allow me to do so in this situation.

[Gembicky] How do you assess the work of the preceding Slovak Information Service [SIS] leadership? Did it supply you with information preferentially?

[Kovac] I would like to say, first of all, that I received the proposal to appoint Mr. Mitro as SIS director from Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar after his proposal to appoint Ivan Lexa had not passed. Prior to this, I did not know Mr. Mitro personally. The working relations with Mr. Mitro were normal; I trusted him. I kept stressing to him that the SIS must proceed in accordance with the law and I was always convinced that the SIS did so under all circumstances. This is my internal conviction, based on the information that I received, which was always in conformity with the law on the SIS. Only parliament's Special Supervisory Body [OKO] avails itself of other means of checking on this. That is why I think that the former SIS leadership will succeed in defending itself. I have never learned about anything unlawful that might be going on in the SIS.

[Gembicky] During Meciar's second government, you refused to appoint Ivan Lexa as SIS director. At that time, you cited only general reservations about his person, however. Could you be more specific today?

[Kovac] I cannot be more specific even after this lapse of time because each specific objection could be interpreted in various ways. But the sum of findings about him and experiences with him that I had was enough for me responsibly to judge that he was not qualified for such a high state office. Not even for the post of a minister.

[Gembicky] What are your relations with Ivan Lexa now that the government has appointed him SIS director? Do you cooperate or avoid each other?

[Kovac] Personal contact between us is not inevitable. We have not had any and I do not expect to have any in the future. Under the law, the SIS is obliged to supply information to the president, the prime minister, and parliament. I receive this information in written form. Closer cooperation is not required, especially now that parliament has deprived the president of the right to appoint and recall the SIS director at the recommendation of the government or parliament. The government or the prime minister have assumed full responsibility for how the SIS will work.

[Gembicky] How do you, immediately after your speech in parliament, view the verbal fire on the part of the coalition that preceded it? Deputies for the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] and the Slovak National Party [SNS] did not want to acknowledge your right to deliver your opinion on the National Council of Slovak Republic [NRSR] resolution in which 80 deputies expressed their lack of confidence in you.

[Kovac] This is another black stain on the activity of Slovak parliament. Every person who is at least a little judicious and who was there must have concluded that such behavior in parliament is undignified, damages the good name of the Slovak Republic, and is not required by the coalition's voters of their deputies.

Voters who watched the coalition deputies' conduct on television must have been disappointed by it.

But such are the rules of democracy. The voters will be able to correct their mistake at the next elections. Apparently, in the short time of the existence of democracy, we have not yet learned to elect decent and morally irreproachable people as deputies. Right now, each deputy is perhaps writing his own future report card.

[Gembicky] How do you personally put up with the constitutional officials ignoring the head of state? No one comes to the airport to see you off, or to welcome you, for example, and during a two-and-one-half-hour flight [to Moscow on 8 May] Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar does not exchange even one word with you. Are

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you sufficiently strong mentally to withstand such open expressions of disrespect and hostility?

[Kovac] Yes, I am sufficiently strong to withstand such expressions. I find it disappointing that some people are incapable of realizing what they are causing by such behavior.

[Gembicky] After such bitter recent experience, are you thinking of terminating your suspended membership of the HZDS, from which the most severe attacks on you originate? Is the scenario from Zlata Idka [site of a Meciar speech to HZDS officials in October 1993] being implemented in relation to you?

[Kovac] Indeed, the scenario from Zlata Idka is being implemented to the last iota, also in relation to myself. Unfortunately, however, and this is more alarming, it is being implemented in relation to others as well. The latest events—particularly the call by the HZDS Political Board for my resignation and yesterday's events in parliament, where I saw with my own eyes how HZDS deputies behave towards me—all this makes me start seriously considering the termination of my suspended membership of the HZDS.

[Gembicky] When will you, Mr. President, make a comprehensive and public statement on the case of your son [who, according to newspaper allegations, is being investigated by Bavarian authorities for a $2.3-million fraud]?

[Kovac] When my efforts are successfully concluded at giving my son the chance to testify. When this procedure is over, and its result becomes known, which, I am convinced, will be positive for my son, I am determined to inform our public in detail about everything. Meanwhile, my son's lawyers consider it inappropriate for my son or others to react to the attacks and provocations in any way, as it would complicate the course of the investigations. For this reason I, too, am silent. In the final analysis, my son is an adult and must defend himself. I am convinced that he will succeed and that the truth will be revealed about how his name could appear in the testimony of the real offender, who has himself admitted his crime.

[Gembicky] You are being deprived of your powers one by one. What can be the final outcome of this open hostility toward you on the part of the HZDS and the SNS?

[Kovac] My powers are not so important in terms of my personal power of resistance. I am encouraged by the feeling that I am on the side of truth, law, the Constitution of the Slovak Republic, and democracy. My conscience is absolutely clear in these matters. I have a clear conscience and clean hands, which gives me enough courage to resist various pressures for my resignation. Had it been otherwise, had I been involved in various dirty practices, I would not resist. Once my adversaries exhaust all the possibilities, the situation will calm down.

[Gembicky] How do you assess the statement by the Bishops' Conference of Slovakia in support of you as head of state?

[Kovac] This statement has gratified me very much. It has given me new strength to resist the pressure for my resignation and not to let myself be disgusted by ordinary human grudge. It is our church hierarchy's firm statement on how to prevent the emergence of an all-social crisis. I welcome the calm tone with which it rejected political and social confrontation.

Support From Religious Leaders

LD1505142795 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1300 GMT 15 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Alarm over the expressions of intolerance on the Slovak political scene and over the tension between the parliamentary majority and the president is expressed in a statement issued by non-Catholic Christians associated in the Ecumenical Council of Churches and given to TASR.

The statement is signed by Julius Filo, chairman of the Ecumenical Council and bishop general of the Evangelical Church of the Augsburg Denomination; Eugen Miko, bishop of the Reformed Christian Church; Jan Hradil, vicar general of the Czech-Slovak Hussite Church; Pavel Prochazka, chairman of the Slovak region of the Evangelical Methodist Church; and Ondrej Krekrety, secretary of the Council of the Brethern Church.

The Central Union of the Jewish Religious Communities also subscribes to the statement by the Ecumenical Council of Churches.

Parliament Passes Bill on Conflict of Interests

AU1505195695 Bratislava SME in Slovak 12 May 95 pp 1-2

[Article by "bog, pt": "The Coalition Did Not Want To Permit Michal Kovac To Speak in the National Council of the Slovak Republic and Left the Hall During His Speech"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bratislava—A scandalous situation occurred in parliament yesterday when coalition deputies did not want to allow President Michal Kovac to speak in the National Council of the Slovak

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Republic [NRSR]. After more than 30 minutes of factual remarks, NRSR Chairman Ivan Gasparovic finally called on Michal Kovac to deliver his speech. The coalition deputies immediately left the hall—with the exception of I. Rapaicova from the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], a few Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS] deputies, and B. Kunc and J. Prokes from the Slovak National Party [SNS]. [passage omitted]

Yesterday morning, Deputy Ivan Simko from the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] submitted to the NRSR meeting the draft of a so-called ordinary law on conflict of interests, the passage of which requires a simple majority of votes of the deputies present. As Simko said, his draft "in a certain way gives final shape to the November revolution. It is a legislative norm that should, in a systemic way, halt the process of the population's loss of confidence in their representatives in public life." I. Simko emphasized the differences between his draft and the draft put forward jointly by HZDS and Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] deputies. The differences lie, in particular, in sanctions for noncompliance with the law on conflict of interests. [passage omitted] The draft of the constitutional law on conflict of interests worked out by HZDS and SDL representatives opens, according to I. Simko, "another constitutional reason for the termination of a deputy's mandate, which concerns the most neuralgic point of representative democracy." Simko's draft of the law on conflict of interests was endorsed by 44 of the 137 deputies present; 46 were against, and 47 deputies abstained.

In the debate on the draft constitutional law on conflict of interests submitted by the HZDS and the SDL, R. Kovac (Democratic Union) proposed that deputies who are medical workers be allowed to perform their job so as not lose their expertise. [passage omitted] M. Dzurinda (KDH) proposed that the conflict between public and personal interests in executing a state post or a deputy's mandate embrace also a ban on the "conclusion of agreements on silent partnerships." L. Pittner proposed that the mandate of a deputy who was elected director of the Slovak Information Service [SIS] not rest, as provided for in the draft of the constitutional law, but that the mandate be terminated and that the vacated seat be filled by a substitute elected from the same constituency. [passage omitted]

In voting on individual proposals for modification of the draft, deputies did not accept L. Pittner's proposal that the mandate of a deputy who was elected SIS director not rest, but be terminated. The passage of the constitutional law required at least 90 votes. Of the 130 deputies present, 92 voted in favor, three against, 33 abstained, and two did not participate in the vote.

A deputy or state office holder who violates the constitutional law on conflict of interests can be deprived of his mandate or his office. The NRSR must approve a decision to this effect by a three-fifths majority (that is, by a minimum of 90 votes) at the recommendation of the NRSR Committee for the Incompatibility of State Office Holders' Posts [Vybor pre Nezluciteinost Funkcii Statnych Funkcionaroch], which will be newly established. The committee will be elected from representatives of all clubs of deputies.

The deputies then approved the cabinet's proposal to appoint Jozef Mudrik as vice governor of the National Bank of Slovakia.

The meeting continues today.

Meciar Preparing Ground for Treaty Ratification

AU1505122395 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 13 May 95 p 1

[CTK report: "Ground for Ratification"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The ratification of the agreement with Hungary will be preceded by the adoption of general agreements on ethnic minority rights and also by political consultations with coalition and opposition parties. This statement was made on Slovak Radio yesterday by Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar. He did not specify more precisely the date for the agreement's ratification in parliament. V. Meciar is, obviously, preparing the ground for ratification of the Slovak-Hungarian agreement. According to him, Slovakia took the first steps when it made concessions in the issue of the water project on the Danube. It is still negotiating with Hungarian and Romanian representatives in the Council of Europe, he said. He conceded that the negative stance of the SNS [Slovak National Party], a member of the governing coalition, now stands in the way of ratification. The prime minister wants to win support for the agreement's ratification in parliament by negotiation and clarification. "We need the kind of conditions that ensure there will be no government crisis."

HZDS: Secret Service Affair, Watergate Similar

AU1505173795 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 12 May 95 p 2

[TASR report: "Parallel With Watergate Seen"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—In a statement provided to TASR yesterday by Olga Keltosova, deputy chairwoman of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] for international relations and public opinion, the HZDS qualified Slovak President Michal

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Kovac's speech yesterday to the National Council of the Slovak Republic as unworthy of the head of state. As the statement points out, Michal Kovac once again devoted his speech to his personal problems instead of mentioning the state of the Slovak Republic in at least one word. "Moreover, in the part of his tearful speech [uslzeny prejav] in which he tried to refute the suspicion of his son's criminal activity, he resorted to methods that the public remembers well from an analogous situation in 1991 when he was interrogated over the sellout of the High Tatra. Tears are no proof. In the speech he even recalled the fifties, a period he apparently remembers well, albeit not as one of its victims because, as a former member of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, he was working abroad, in Cuba and in London," the statement says.

According to the HZDS statement, on the one hand, Michal Kovac quotes the Constitution of the Slovak Republic, only to presently challenge it by denying deputies the right to pass a resolution on their [loss of] confidence in him. However, unlike his words, the latter act does have a backing in the constitution—namely, in Article 86, Section 1, which states that the powers of the National Council include discussion of basic domestic political issues.

"The only fact that Michal Kovac noted correctly was that the decision had been made by voters in the elections. However, the president should be the first to subordinate himself to their decision and, hence, resign. The report by the special supervisory body [for supervising the Slovak Information Service] showed that the situation is identical with that which the democratic world knows from the Watergate affair, on the basis of which U.S. President Richard Nixon resigned," the HZDS statement says.

Comment: U.S. Reaction to Claim

AU1505173895 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 13 May 95 p 1

[Commentary by Leopold Moravcik: "When the Comparison Is Lame"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is unusual for other countries to react to statements by our politicians on domestic political issues through their own representative offices. If the U.S. Embassy in Bratislava contravened this principle yesterday, obviously, it had reason to do so. Namely, some politicians from the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] tried on Thursday [11 May] to compare their accusations against President Michal Kovac with the Watergate scandal, which ousted President Richard Nixon from the White House.

It is not the first time that some of our politicians have apologized for their behavior by seeking a suitable example abroad. Yesterday's blunt reaction from the U.S. Embassy has implied to them that, if every comparison is lame, then it is afflicted by all the signs of dilettantism.

So, only after an affair is investigated by a parliamentary committee composed of representatives from the government and the opposition, if they all have access to all of the information available, if there is a guarantee that those amassing the facts and evidence are impartial professionals unburdened by party interests to one side and hatred to the other side in the dispute, and if the resulting report, to which the media will also have access, does not read like a fable about a hunter, a wolf, and a fox [reference to the code names of Slovak Information Service agents], then we will be able to talk about an investigation conducted according to the law and the constitution, while the outcome still does not have to be concordant with that of the Watergate scandal.

Following Nixon's resignation, the well-known dictum "the system works" reverberated throughout the United States. The political system founded on a division of power among the President, Congress, and courts made it possible to bring the investigation of the affair to an end. The problem is that an investigation "to the end" in our country would lead to the very liquidation of such a division of power.

But, then, this is not about democracy, but something else.

Czech Koruna Not Acceptable as Accounting Unit

AU1505195595 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 12 May 95 p 1

[Report on interview with Sergej Kozlik, deputy prime minister and minister of finance, by Zita Sujova; place and date not given: "S. Kozlik: We Will Not Allow the Czech Koruna To Become Accounting Unit"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—"The Slovak Government's basic approach will be proposing to the Czech side that we return, after all, to the possibility of amending in some way the payments agreement between the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. This is the easiest possibility," Sergej Kozlik, deputy prime minister and minister of finance, told NARODNA OBRODA in connection with Vaclav Klaus's letter to his Slovak counterpart Vladimir Meciar, in which the Czech prime minister explains the reasons that made his cabinet propose the abolition of the payments agreement.

According to Sergej Kozlik, Article 8 of the European Union does not rule out a priori the possibility of certain

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nonstandard payment relations, it only does not permit the existence of a clearing basis and limits the possibility of exchange rate deviation to a maximum of 2 percent (compared with the present 5 percent). In this context, Sergej Kozlik considers Vaclav Klaus's statement that the clearing payment system is incompatible with the regime of the Czech koruna's full convertibility as stylized [stylizovane].

Sergej Kozlik confirmed Prime Minister Meciar's words that the Slovak Republic is in a position to take simultaneously with the Czech side steps analogous to the introduction of the convertibility of the koruna. He noted, however, that full convertibility is not involved even on the Czech side. Even though the state of foreign exchange reserves and of the banking system permits transition to the convertibility of the Slovak koruna, Sergej Kozlik favors greater caution and does not think that this process should be expedited. "We definitely do not consider allowing the Czech koruna to become the accounting unit," he stressed, adding that even such a proposal had been made.

Sergej Kozlik expects the payments agreement to be one of the topics of the anticipated meeting between the prime ministers of the two states. The date of the meeting is not yet known, however.

Meciar on Czech-Slovak Payments Agreement

LD1505174795 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1000 GMT 15 May 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The letter by Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus suggesting the abolition of the payments agreement between the Czech and Slovak Republics, as well as the still unclear date of the meeting between the two prime ministers raise many questions. However, there are other issues in our internal political scene that the public is interested in. Magda Pospisilova asked Prime Minister Meciar about these issues.

[Begin recording] [Pospisilova] What is going to be the impact of the cancellation of clearing on Slovakia's economy? According to some views, we should prepare for the devaluation of the Slovak crown as it is likely that the Czech crown will be revalued in order to reflect its relation to the German mark in a more realistic way?

[Meciar] The opposite is true. During our discussions, the Czech partners requested that we revalue the Slovak crown by 5 percent because the value of the Slovak crown, according to checkups, is stabilized and good. In the background of all this there is not the fight about clearing. In the background, there is a fight for the Central European market and for which currency shall dominate it—Czech or Slovak.

The Slovak Republic, just like the Czech Republic, strives to make its currency externally convertible. We are also getting ready for this step. But certainly, if we were at the stage of preparations as the Czech Republic is now, we would not try to resolve the situation by a unilateral abrogation of agreements and by giving our partner an alternative in the form of either-or.

To summarize, there will be no devaluation. In the first stage this will mean that there will be pressure on the National Bank of Slovakia in that it will have to make payments in U.S. dollars. This in turn will result in some decrease in trade and slower payments. Second, it will mean that the state and its financial structure will be out of these relations and the ministry will have its hands free. Next, if we have a positive balance of payments, it will mean a permanent flow of foreign currency into the budget of the National Bank of Slovakia.

In view of the fact that this is not the first instance of such attitude taken by the Czech side when agreements are being unilaterally abrogated or violated—let us recall the border controls, customs checkpoints which were not to become reality, the currency that was to last until 30 June 1993, and other examples—in this case, Slovakia will find a way to respond to such a unilateral abrogation. For the time being, it is too early to talk about it. We are engaged in consultations on the matter. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Meciar Gives More Money to Teachers

AU1505201895 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 13 May 95 pp 1, 3

[Article by Lydia Vyborna: "Some 230 Million More Than the Unionists Asked For"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bratislava—Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar held talks in the Government Office yesterday with representatives from universities, secondary and elementary schools, and the Slovak Academy of Sciences. [passage omitted] The talks were attended by Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Sergej Kozlik and Education Minister Eva Slavkovska. When it was over, we asked the prime minister about the outcome of the meeting. He replied as follows:

"We discussed an option for the 1995 program. Its center of gravity is based on an immediate solution to the economic problems in the wages sphere in education. There is complete agreement here that 30 percent more will be provided in performance-related pay for university staff, 20 percent for secondary school teachers, and 15 percent for elementary school teachers—this amounts to 530 million korunas [Sk]. That is Sk230 million more than the trade unions were

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asking for. Another group of agreements concerned dealing with the completion—within the framework of comprehensive housing construction for 1995—of several schools, for which the sum of approximately Sk100 million will be earmarked. We are freeing Sk60-80 million from the government's budgetary reserves for further investment and establishing new departments." [passage omitted]

Asked why representatives from the education unions were not present at yesterday's meeting, Meciar said: "I am able to negotiate with everyone interested in solving the problems in education. The unions made several grave mistakes. First, they did not accept the General Agreement. After all, we are bound by the General Agreement and our partnership is given by it. They cannot consider themselves to be a partner, but not accept the partnership agreement. They are outside it; that is their business. Their second mistake: Their proposals were not oriented toward structural changes in education, but toward preserving the status quo. [passage omitted] Their third mistake: their ultimative method of negotiation. Their fourth mistake: their more or less propaganda work and playing on the feelings of the public instead of adopting a matter-of-fact stance on the issues. After all, they more or less distanced themselves; they are interested in nothing other than wages and are not responsible for anything else. Naturally, if the issue of wages is to be resolved, then there have to be discussions on what to do with the teachers when the number of pupils is declining, that is, whether we will continue to raise their salaries and maintain the same number. What to do with the specialist training institutions when there are approximately 8,000 fewer pupils in them than in previous years. How to encourage teachers of Slovak, Slovaks, so that they go to teach in schools where the language of instruction is Hungarian. This was of no interest to the unions. Therefore, I regret their conduct, but life does not stop and will go on without them. Let them assess their own attitudes and stop name-calling and begin solving the problems facing people and education in a matter of fact way."

Radicalism of Luptak, Kremnicka Workers Conference

95CH0212A Prague RESPEKT in Czech 26 Mar 95 p 16

[Article by Peter Schutz: "Revolution Is an Extreme Solution"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "It is no secret that none of the current parties of the Slovak political spectrum has as wide and mainly as authoritative a partnership abroad as we do." This sentence was not spoken by Jan Carnogursky, or by Jozef Moravcik, or even Peter Weiss. It was written in HLAS ROBOTNIKOV, the weekly issued by the Association of Workers of Slovakia, by the chairman of the association itself, Jan Luptak.

His words attested to the second March weekend in the community of Kremnicka near Banska Bystrica. More than 180 delegates from 44 countries met there at the World Conference of Worker Parties and Labor Organizations. At the behest of the International Agreement of Working People, the conference was organized specifically by the Association of Workers of Slovakia: The association happens to be a member of this "agreement" and Jan Luptak personally is a member of its secretariat.

"Anyone who claims that we are separating workers from the intelligentsia is lying. At the conference, workers, doctors, mathematicians, engineers, farmers, publicists, historians, and others will be confronting theory with practice in leftist affairs and in regard to worldwide events," wrote Jan Luptak a few days prior to the "worldwide" event in the above source. It is possible that such people even showed up at Kremnicka. But eyewitnesses testified that the gathering was sometimes reminiscent more of a happening among supporters of some kind of alternative culture. Some exotic black-skinned delegates, attired in national or tribal costumes, attracted the astonished gaze of natives.

However, it was not only the external signs that were "alternative." At Kremnicka, the meeting also included Luxembourg Russians, Trotskyites, and followers of Bakunin from around the end of the 20th century. The International Agreement of Working People happens to be a sort of extremely free umbrella organization for various marginal trade union factions and ultraleftist political groupings which, for some reason, do not carry the attribute "communist" in their title.

The terminology and vocabulary used says more than any political definition regarding the ideological anchoring of the participants: "union of the exploited and oppressed," "world privatization campaign," "devastation of the public sector through privatization," "the acquisitiveness of supranational monopolies...."

In spite of the identical rhetoric used by the host and the guests, there is one fundamental difference here which places Luptak in a completely different position: His association—together with the Brazilian Labor Party—was one of two groups at the meeting which have seats in parliament and, what is more, was the only group which participates in government! Even the internationally most famous guest participant—the French Party of Working People, with its theory of a "permanent revolution," is considered at home to be a completely marginal Trotskyite organization which is

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meaningless within the framework of the French left. It cannot even dream of participating in parliament and collaboration with it is being rejected even by the "true" French Communists. This is in contrast to the Slovak Government Association of Workers, which would likely not be either in parliament or in the government without the assistance of the above worker party. In his introductory speech, Luptak thanked that party for its unselfish assistance: "As the only one, it helped our party in the preelection campaign and provided us with moral, and I would even say specific preelection support."

Far more important and interesting than the slogans and challenges which emanated from this conference is the bare fact that one of the parties of the government coalition of the country which is vying for membership in the EU and in NATO organized a conference of 180 ultraleftist fundamentalists from the four corners of the world who more or less openly cast doubt upon and attacked the basic principles of democratic capitalism and market economy. The conference thus proved that which had long been sensed—the closest partners of one of the Slovak governing parties are associations functioning in the lowest political basement of their own country—frequently balancing on the edge of illegality.

The differing statutes of the host party were also reflected in the atmosphere of the negotiations. Despite the fact that the International Agreement of Working People does not have—and neither did the conference itself have—elected organs with a chairman, a presidium, etc., Luptak acted like he was a guru for the workers of the world for two days. He criticized undemocratic conditions in the West, he dispensed universal advice both to the French and Belgians, as well as to delegates from Senegal or from Burkina Faso. In his closing speech, he then abrogated his recommendations into a challenge to foreign parties to try to get into the parliaments of their countries, because that is the place where laws are made.

"That is the democratic way," he said, and so far this would even be all right. But then came the codicil: "Revolution is the extreme solution," explained the deputy chairman of the parliament. And he did not hide his "revolutionary nature" even from the tape recorders of journalists. "What is a worker to do if he has nothing with which to feed his child? He will take a scythe and chop off someone's head." Apart from the excesses of the chairman, the speeches by his party colleagues were also captivating. Because they were "among their own," they managed to "unfetter" themselves and so the radicalism of the foremost representatives of the workers, which had been suppressed with some discomfort during recent weeks, bubbled to the surface again. Luptak's adviser, Jozef Mazar, a member of the Slovak Radio Council, for example, harshly attacked NATO: "No one is saying what it represents, what methods it uses, what goals it has. In conjunction with NATO, we only hear the words war, death." Stefan Gavornik, the chief of the Slovak National Property Fund, took aim at capitalism as such: "We refuse to recognize the market economy as the sole regulator or model for social life. We reject capitalism, which is based only on market categories and profits and ignores human dignity." The chairman of the fund identified the reasons for Slovakia's misery: drugs, crime, lack of work adaptability, and privatization.

Even the guests flashed a few items of interest. For example, the representative of the Serbian trade unions claimed that the international embargo against his country is "big business" and, apart from others, members of the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] peacekeeping forces were getting rich from it. Two trade union delegates from the United States both agreed that the right to strike is only a formal one, because "every attempt at a strike in the United States is mercilessly suppressed."

Apart from traditional targets, such as capitalism, privatization, NATO, the EU, the International Monetary Fund, the banks in general, and monopolies and entrepreneurs, the United Nations came under heavy fire, as did its social summit, which was taking place at the same time at Copenhagen. Criticism of the summit even found its way into the concluding resolution. And as for a third bit of schizophrenia—Jozef Kalman, the deputy prime minister, who, as the only leading representative of the association, was not present at Kremnicka because he headed the Slovak delegation in Copenhagen, will have "to talk things out" with Luptak; upon his return to Bratislava from Copenhagen, he expressed himself very appreciatively regarding that conference.

In the end, even the "normal" left, which is part of the Socialist International, caught its share in full at Kremnicka. Because these parties "do not pursue leftist policies," Jan Luptak felt that they were "more rightist." As things turned out, at the time the conference was being held, one such "more rightist" from the Czech Republic happened to be staying in Slovakia. Milos Zeman told Slovak journalists that "cryptocommunists were at work at Banska Bystrica." That is a fact. But in this connection it was interesting that some speeches made by "cryptocommunists" were not totally original. For example, the previously mentioned Mr. Mazar: "Clever guys talked us into coupon privatization. And we, being simple people, know today that this was the greatest robbery of the century." One has to wonder where Luptak's first adviser got this information.

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On the occasion of his visit in Bratislava, Milos Zeman even gave one interesting interview to PRAVDA in which he says, among other things: "A government of crazy bank clerks is not exactly something that could save us.... In the Czech Republic, a democratic rightist party is not functioning thus far. There is only a coincidental accumulation of careerists who have come into money and power, they are now claiming to be rightists and are calling themselves the ODS [Civic Democratic Party]." It is certain that not even with this view would Milos Zeman become lost among the "cryptocommunists...." Unfortunately, no one from the Czech Republic participated in the World Conference of Worker Parties.

Academy of Sciences Responds to Budget Cuts

95CH0221A Kosice DOMINO EFEKT in Slovak 30 Mar 95 p 5

[Article by Martina Pavlickova: "Algorithm of Poverty; Report on the State of Slovak Science"]

[FBIS Translated Text] From the announced program of the Slovak Republic government: "In the area of science and technology, the government's new measures will prevent the disintegration of the research and development [R&D] base in Slovakia and ensure its new functionality and stability."

"Concern for the development of knowledge should be one of the priorities of the state. There exists no investment more important than investment in knowledge"—this position of the Permanent Conference of the Civic Institute was stated recently by Frantisek Sebej. However, the position of the Institute is one thing, and Slovak reality is another. We are ushered into it by the Scientific Secretary of the Slovak Academy of Sciences [SAV], Jan Kazar: "SAV received more from the state budget this year than last year, so that the five-year decline has been arrested. But it is still only enough to maintain the status quo. It certainly is not enough to increase scientific work." The SAV budget for 1995 was characterized as a "survival budget" by Democratic Union deputy Viliam Vaskovic, until recently also deputy chairman of SAV.

Of the 6,220 SAV staff members in 1990, only 3,320 worked in this top scientific institution of the country last year. "Some of the people had to leave because some position in SAV were eliminated. Those who are leaving now, however, are leaving for better pay or are going abroad," notes Baltazar Frankovic, deputy chairman of SAV. According to him, all problems are caused by the lack of money. The director of the Materials and Machine Engineering Institute, Stefan Markus, illustrates the situation with a typical example: A very gifted, promising young mathematician left SAV to sell computers in a store. When he met her, she was almost embarrassed to tell him that she is earning more than he does.

But these are not just the opinions of individual people. A warning was sounded also by the international conference, "The Mission of Scientific and Technological Intelligentsia in Modern Society," which took place in October in Bratislava. It even came to the conclusion that "there is a danger of a general brain drain in Slovakia and a contraction of the R&D base to a point which could put the Slovak Republic in this respect at the level of third world countries." However, V. Vaskovic, as a liberal, takes a somewhat more "cosmopolitan" view of things: "Science is not a purely national matter. Scientists serve the entire civilization, whether they are in Slovakia or somewhere else."

Last year the average salary at SAV was just under 6,770 Slovak korunas [Sk]. And that is only because some of the SAV institutes are budgetary, not contributory, organizations, and therefore can earn additional income by taking in orders. SAV Scientific Secretary Jan Kazar: "On the basis of the prime minister's promise that salaries at SAV will be increased by 100 percent, we are asking the government for approximately Sk90 million to increase the salaries of scientific and creative workers by 35 percent on the average. If salaries are not increased, more people may have to be let go. The result, however, would be the demise of some scientific departments. And the brain drain of some creative workers in basic research is continuing as well." It needs to be mentioned that because of the starting salary of Sk4,700 almost no young, promising scientists are joining SAV. Moreover, because of the systematic decrease of experienced staff scientists, in a short time there may not be anyone to guide them anyway. "Scientists are not born, they must be cultivated," says S. Markus.

"The blood circulation has stopped in SAV, it is dying. We have to earn additional money in private firms." That is how Vladimir Britanak from the Theory of Automation and Robotics Institute characterizes the conditions in SAV. Given his expertise, V. Britanak could earn several times as much somewhere else. Abroad even more than 10 times his present "academic" salary. Half of his colleagues have already left. Some went to the Czech Republic, and a few are in Vienna. Most of them work in banks and private firms. They come home on weekends. Vladimir Britanak does not even ask them any more how much they make. But their wives are dissatisfied even so—they have to take care of everything by themselves.

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However, Vladimir Britanak perseveres; he does not want to give up science just yet. Last year, he defended a science thesis. He sent the result to the specialized Dutch journal Signal Processing. The grapevine within the scientific community got to work, and almost as soon as the article was published, Professor Rao from the Arlington University in Texas wrote to Britanak. The work of our scientist interested him so much that he offered to arrange a three-day seminar in Slovakia.

"It is a great honor. Professor Rao is the top authority in this field," says Vladimir Britanak, and enthusiastically describes his graphs and formulas spread out on his desk. But to a layman his enthusiastic comments on the universality, speed, stability, and precision of the algorithm, which he proposed as a design for discrete cosine transinformation, do not say much.

An integrated circuit using Britanak's algorithm could find application in complicated surgical procedures, where it is necessary to transfer the picture taken inside the body onto a computer screen. Or in video telephones, simply everywhere where the immediate transfer of a picture to a computer monitor is important. Some similar algorithms already exist, but reportedly do not achieve the precision, universality, and elegance of Britanak's algorithm.

But there is a problem. Professional programmers, who would introduce the algorithm into practice, have long ago left SAV for more lucrative jobs. And after Tesla Piestany went bankrupt, there is not even a manufacturer in Slovakia now able to produce the integrated circuit with Britanak's algorithm. And so, if after its publication in journals a foreign firm is found that would be willing to manufacture such an integrated circuit, we shall be left with only a warm feeling about the fact that the idea came from Slovakia. "I am not rich enough to be able to have it patented," the scientist shrugs his shoulders.

And the fee would not be even a fraction of the 150 million which are earmarked in the budget for representing Slovakia abroad. Those few thousands for taking out a patent could be one of the few wisely spent monies from the above-mentioned package. At the same time, experts from SAV cannot travel to most of the international conferences to which they are invited, only because there is no money for paying the registration fees. And scientists would certainly represent Slovakia at least as well as the many-headed delegation in Cleveland or the numerous excursions abroad by Matica Slovenska.

For the time being, Vladimir Britanak believes that he and his coworkers who have not left SAV yet will still be needed and properly rewarded for their theoretical knowledge. And if not? "I am still very dedicated to science. But if this trend continues, I will not be able do this indefinitely. I must also think about my family."

After the amount from the state budget for SAV declined last year below the "critical limit" (J. Kazar) of Sk400 million, this year the government has earmarked Sk556 million for Slovak science. But according to S. Markus, this is just an illusory increase, because 38 percent of this sum will go for insurance payments. There will not be again enough left over to buy literature, not to mention instruments, which are essential for scientists. "For three years now no instruments have been purchased, nothing is being modernized. Those who want to work are getting grants abroad and leaving. Given the current trend, they will not want to come back. How could they, I ask you, do research here?" asks SAV deputy chairman B. Frankovic.

And Frantisek Sebej notes: "If the government's financial and personnel policy succeeds in extinguishing science, the result will be a less civilized Slovakia. We shall become unattractive to the world. There will be a labor force here, but not knowledge."

Effect of Transformation on Youth Considered

95CH0216A Bratislava NOVE SLOVO BEZ RESPEKTU in Slovak 3 Apr 95 p 26

[Article by Ladislav Machacek: "Young People on the Fringes?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Anyone who carefully follows the processes of transformation with respect to the political and economic system in Slovakia after 1989 cannot ignore the fact that young people and representatives of the youth movement are no longer in the mainstream of events. The public is beginning to perceive young people as being endangered (AIDS) and at the same time being a group which is a danger to the public and one which is most rapidly succumbing to all of the traps which exist in an open society—intolerance, racial prejudice, drug dependency.

The marginalization of young people and the youth movement has its origin in our totalitarian—both the brown and the red—past. Both in the public mind and also in the self-reflection among young people, the image of the young generation as a group which has an important social mission (one that is innovative, revolutionary, regenerative, redeeming) was formed. Through these traditional glasses, we even view the new reality, in the anticipation that some kind of collectivist revolutionary act by the young generation would help in meeting the challenge of the times, much as had happened in the recent past (collectivization, urbanization, industrialization, research and development, etc.).

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The essence of the systems changes brought about by the market economy and by pluralistic democracy, links the modern prosperity of society primarily to perfect execution and enormous effort on the part of individuals in the competitive struggle in the labor market. Youth changes from being a specific social group of approximately equal age to an age-dependent social aggregate of participants—individuals—having differing social standing and differing starting places for their careers.

The challenge to modernize is perceived particularly as a challenge for the individual and it is defined as individualization. We could understand it as a cultivated personality disposition or ability to take on responsibility for one's own decisions and to come to terms with their risks and social consequences. As a civilizing aspect, it also represents the anticipation that our society will be modernized in this way.

From the sociological investigation (performed in the fall of 1993) by the Sociological Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences in Bratislava and the Sociological Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic in Prague, it is clear that fear and apprehension with regard to unemployment mostly impacts on young people in Slovakia; up to 30 percent of them in the age group of 18 through 24 years have this fear; 12.7 percent of them feel it very strongly and 17.6 percent feel it strongly. Of the Czech sample using the same age group, 11 percent have such fears, including 4 percent who feel them very strongly and 7 percent who feel them strongly. This fact is also reflected in the differing strategies for solving unemployment:

1. In Slovakia, the intention to retrain is linked to periods of resignation and delivering oneself into the hands of labor offices or possibly of social departments.

2. In the Czech Republic, the intention to retrain is linked primarily to the search for short-term employment and to entrepreneurial activities. For young people in the Czech Republic, the alternative of relying on state support is less acceptable (27.4 percent) than it is in Slovakia (67.5 percent).

We have, thus, hitherto not mastered the process of individualization in Slovakia; even young people expect that the state (that is to say, the labor offices) will find them work at their place of domicile, provide them with financial resources intended for survival if they are unemployed, take care of their housing if they sell their own apartment, provide them with essential health care assistance even if they are ruining their health through the consumption of alcohol or drugs, etc.

However, individualization is actually also linked with the risk of failure and marginalization of a certain number of young people. Wherever the economic situation is deteriorating, the social infrastructure breaks down quickly (the volunteer sector, civic movements and initiatives, charitable associations); this structure could mobilize threatened young individuals to help themselves. After all, the state should only have to make sure that the socialization process does not disintegrate through providing appropriate and timely legislative and basic financial support.

The process of transforming the political system is visibly reflected mostly in the pluralization of the youth movement. Representatives of youth organizations are not asserting specific interests and needs of young people in the area of education and professional training, or social needs or housing policy needs in public. Resolutions of the consequences of social modernization for children and young people are expected to be provided only by leftist-oriented youth organizations or by humanitarian and charitable services, whose traditional background is found in Christian-oriented associations and groups for young people and adults.

Youth organizations should do more to question the prepared measures in the state's youth policy. To achieve actual change with respect to the situation, however, is only possible on the basis of amending the legislative provisions covering the interests of young citizens. It is important to have intellectual concepts, strategic programs, and specific projects which create specific conditions even for the mobilization and stabilization of the civic youth movement as platforms for the expansion of self-help on the part of young people.

Youth organizations in Slovakia have successfully mastered the task of transforming the "old" youth organizations and of integrating them into the structure of new youth groupings by making use of sovereign political means, for which they garnered the positive evaluation of experts in the Council of Europe. The challenge of modernization in Slovakia and Slovakia's incorporation into the structures which are uniting in Europe will also be a challenge for the Council of Youth in Slovakia, which should see its mission as being one to strengthen the "civic pride" mostly of those groups of young people in Slovakia which are finding themselves on the fringes of society as a result of the inadequate balance regarding the functioning of social policy and the market economy.

The proven and tested relationships between the Council of Youth of Slovakia and the Slovak Republic's Ministry of Education make it possible once more to resort to serious legislative modification: The amendment of

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the Principles of State Policy in the Area of Children and Youth, dated 1992, and the preparation of a Law on Protecting and Supporting Children and Youth in the Slovak Republic are both finding their way onto the agenda of the day.

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Spokesman Says Conflict With Romania 'Impossible'

LD1505174995 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1600 GMT 15 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Istvan Kulcsar, our foreign political editor, has asked Hungarian officials to react to Romanian Senator Radu Timofte's statements.

[Begin recording] [Kulcsar] What are the views of Colonel Lajos Erdelyi, spokesman for the Ministry of Defense, on the Romanian politician's statement that a Romanian-Hungarian armed conflict is not impossible?

[Erdelyi] Thank God, a conflict of this kind is impossible since neither country is endeavoring to solve their problems by armed force. Hungary's security policy and defense principles fundamentally say that all the disputed issues must be solved through political measures.

[Kulcsar] The Romanian politician also stated that Hungarian troops have been concentrated at the Croatian border with the aim that Hungary might interfere in the south Slav war on Croatia's side.

[Erdelyi] Ever since the south Slav crisis started, the Hungarian stance has been that it must keep away from this internal civil war. No higher alert has been ordered in the Hungarian Army as a result of the latest clashes in Croatia. The troops of the Hungarian Army were and still are in barracks and continue their training.

[Kulcsar] So, you categorically deny that Hungarian troops have been concentrated at the Croatian border.

[Erdelyi] No such troop concentration has happened, we have no reason to order such troop concentration.

[Kulcsar] What is Foreign Ministry Spokesman Gabor Szentivanyi's view of the Romanian politician's statement that Hungary is only prepared to join NATO together with Transylvania?

[Szentivanyi] We consider this completely unfounded. There is no such idea, it is a complete fabrication. It is true, and part of our official policy, however, that Hungary would like Romania to go down the road of European integration, and to be part of the various European integration regions, such as the European Union and possibly also NATO, obviously within Romania's current state borders, that is, Romania and Transylvania and everybody together. So there is no mention of any secession or cooperation with Transylvania. [end recording]

Editorial Criticizes U.S. Policy

AU1505162095 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 15 May 95 p 3

[Editorial by Endre Gomori: "Making It Dance"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On the basis of preceding events, no one could have expected that the U.S. President would "make the bear dance" in Moscow. In recent months, Russian foreign policy, which is based on tsarist diplomatic traditions, has managed, from its position as the Cold War's loser, to force a number of strategic concessions out of the Cold War's victor.

The explanation is to be found in the United States, on the winners' side. It is to be found in Washington's illusion that it is possible to avert the threat of a new Russian dictatorship—or possibly chaos—by traditional diplomatic tools; in the illusion that it is possible to influence from abroad the movement of Russian social forces and their spontaneous and unpredictable grappling. This mistake brought about a situation as though the bear had been the one who was making the others dance in Moscow.

It was part of the precedents that, since Yeltsin's December 1994 performance in Budapest ("the cold peace"), it has been raised to the level of official doctrine that NATO's eastern expansion is part of an international conspiracy against Russia. Defense Minister Grachev must have been following this logic when, just before the Clinton-Yeltsin talks, he uttered a sentence that is otherwise hardly possible to interpret, namely that for Russia, "the military threat continues to exist, and while this is so, we must strengthen and modernize our army." Yeltsin is also using the NATO expansion theory as a domestic political preventative weapon against his extremist and aggressive opposition so that he cannot be maneuvered into a situation where he can be accused of "betraying Russian security interests." The effect of this force is so strong now that even Gaydar, possibly the most significant politician among Yeltsin's democratic opposition, believes that "NATO's extension provides the best argument for our opponents to be able to say that the world is conspiring against us." A Pan-Russian absurdity.

Since Clinton and his government are adhering to their basic illusion, he himself was also forced to follow the logic of this misconception. This is why, just before the Moscow talks, Clinton wrote a letter that, in spite of the denials, indicated the possibility of Russia's NATO membership. Therefore, the absurdity is not only Pan-Russian.

This offer was coupled with the promise of a "special relationship" between NATO and Russia. And finally,

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this was the price of Yeltsin's willingness to join the Partnership for Peace program, which he had formerly refused to do.

This is also why it happened that, in Moscow, the U.S. President supported the amendment to the international agreement on limiting conventional arms, which will facilitate a larger Russian military presence at the northern and southwestern Russian "wings." This concession now affects the Caucasus most directly. However, the sense of threat immediately moved Ukraine to request the homeward bound Clinton's support for NATO's expansion. In the long run, the military gesture made for the Russian wings will not be a source of joy for Norway or Turkey, either.

The warnings of U.S. think tanks close to the Clinton cabinet are added to all these, also seeing links between the U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear balance and NATO's eastern expansion. Therefore, they warned Washington to be cautious: Taking a firm line on the NATO issue would involve the risk that Moscow would not ratify the START-2 agreement limiting strategic nuclear weapons. A NEW YORK TIMES's editorial, which was very effectively timed before the talks, reflected the same way of thinking. For the first time from the liberal side, the U.S. foreign policy that places NATO's Central-European expansion into focus was termed an "old-fashioned approach."

The point of the issue is probably that, for America, the "Russian danger" means nothing other than stalling so as to keep the strategic nuclear weapons in reliable and stable hands. This scenario has a completely different meaning for Germany, for which it is a vital security and power interest to have "western countries" at its eastern border. The meaning is fundamentally different for us: It means being swept into a common NATO-Russian interest zone in which the proportions between the two poles can constantly sway—without, of course, us having any say in it.

The instincts of Walesa, who is caught in the crossfire of often justified left-wing and liberal criticism, operated (not for the first time) correctly when, with unconcealed passion, he talked about sacrificing Central Europe and said that Poland does not want to live in a gray zone.

Only an almost futile question is left at the end: What can be done? There is a bear. And there is someone who is supposed to make it dance. There is also the chain that connects them, which is being pulled, but it undoubtedly is a form of the bilateral "special relationship."

Poll Suggests Fall in Horn's, Bokros's Popularity

AU1505195795 Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG in Hungarian 13 May 95 pp 106-108

[Article by Endre Hann: "The Popularity of Parties and Politicians: A Tight Year"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Increasing uncertainty and the polarization of views on the government parties characterize the mood of the electors. This also means that the spectacular drop in the popularity of government party politicians who are in the forefront of politics was not concomitant with any serious increase in strength by the opposition parties and party leaders. According to the latest Median [public opinion research company] survey, commissioned by HETI VILAGGAZDASAG, there has been an increase in the number of people who know who the finance minister is and his loss of popularity has reached record level.

Although the willingness to vote decreased slightly in the past months, the level of this decrease does not give cause for concern. More than half of the citizens continue to claim that they would definitely vote at "elections held next Sunday," and this proportion is far from the 39-percent low point measured in autumn 1991. At the same time, the proportion of those who, although willing to vote, do not know or do not wish to reveal which party they would vote for is gradually increasing: At the end of April, only 60 percent of the electors had a more or less firm party preference and only two-thirds of these described themselves as "definite" voters.

Among the decreasing number of committed voters, the order of party strengths has hardly changed. The Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] is holding on to its leading position and the second place of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] is also certain, while the Independent Smallholders Party [FKGP], which has lately been called a "bugbear," continues to remain in third place, the strongest opposition party.

All in all, compared with the list results of the first round of the 1994 parliamentary elections, the two coalition parties have not actually lost anything yet: Among the "definite" voters who were able to chose a party, which means not including those unable or unwilling to name a party, the MSZP would receive 34 percent of votes compared with 33 percent in May 1994 and the SZDSZ would get 19 percent as opposed to 20 percent. If elections were held today, among this "narrow" group of voters, the government parties could expect 53 and the parliamentary opposition parties 41 percent. (When interpreting these figures, it also has to be remembered that they represent the views of a

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much smaller proportion of the population than those who voted last year.)

Other indicators show a significant change in the public mood. For example, the Socialists are the clear losers of "negative votes": Today, 7 percent more people say that they would by no means vote for the Socialists than a few months ago. Therefore, the MSZP has now got to second place from fifth in December 1994 on the list of unwanted parties, straight after the FKGP, and more people reject it than they do parties on the "political edges" such as the Hungarian Justice and Life Party or the Workers' Party. The number of people taking a firm stance against the FKGP has also increased, partly because their "forging ahead," as often mentioned in the press, frightens some people.

The gradual decline of the government parties is noteworthy as regards the average attractiveness index of the parliamentary parties. However, while the SZDSZ, taking the opinion of all those questioned into account, is still the "most attractive" party, the MSZP has slipped back from its former second place to fourth or fifth place, colliding with the Christian Democratic People's Party. Popularity ratings given by people who are uncertain about their party preferences show even more markedly the government parties' unfavorable tendency: With its 29-point popularity index, the MSZP is only barely ahead of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (27 points), which is in last place, while the SZDSZ with 36 points is second after the Federation of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party [FIDESZ-MPP] (41 points). Therefore, views on the two government parties, especially the MSZP, are more scattered: Although their most committed followers continue to support them, an increasing number of people are rejecting them.

The popularity of politicians has hardly changed in the past two months. The most visible change is the 27-point increase in people's knowledge of Finance Minister Laszlo Bokros, which is unprecedented in the Median's four years of politician surveys. The 14 percent drop in Bokros's popularity is also an unusual result. Only one other finance minister's, Mihaly Kupa, loss of popularity can be compared to this when, in spring 1992, he lost 17 percent in three months. However, Kupa had started from a high point and it took him six months to reach his negative peak with 25 points. It is certainly noteworthy how quickly the population reacts to measures that affect their pockets and they seem immediately to punish those considered responsible: Social support for Gyorgy Suranyi, chairman of the Hungarian National Bank, who firmly supported the Bokros package, has also significantly dropped.

The decrease in Prime Minister Gyula Horn's popularity is also rather significant: He has dropped from eighth place in February to fifteenth. At the same time, Jozsef Torgyan [FKGP chairman], who is nowadays said to be a "comet," has stepped one place forward without any change in his popularity index, but Horn and Suranyi are now behind him (while Labor Minister Magda Kovacs, Mrs. Kosa, has overtaken him). As a matter of fact, the number of Torgyan's supporters has not at all increased this year, the 46-point popularity index in December 1994 being his best result.

Kelety on NATO Expansion, Russian Relations

BR1505150595 Groot-Bijgaarden DE STANDAARD in Dutch 14-15 May 95 p 4

[Article by "MD": "Hungary Could Be Ready Militarily for NATO Fairly Quickly"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Evere—Hungarian Defense Minister Gyorgy Kelety said the Hungarian Armed Forces "could meet NATO requirements as we now see them within two or three years." The minister met the press in Evere after his visit to NATO headquarters, where he made it clear that Hungary is continuing to strive for membership of the Atlantic alliance as soon as possible.

At the U.S.-Russian summit in Moscow, which passed off disappointingly, President Boris Yeltsin again opposed eastward expansion by the alliance. Were the Hungarians disappointed? "I have repeated here that Hungary wants to apply for membership. I have stressed that this is a sovereign decision by a sovereign country. We do not want to allow ourselves to be forced by any power," Kelety said.

Kelety, who is one of the socialist ministers in the social-liberal coalition, stressed that his country wanted the best possible relations with Russia and was working hard to eliminate "Russian distrust." But he did note that the Russian leaders "say different things about the expansion of NATO depending on the time and the place. Ultimately that is bad for Russia most of all, because it shows how unpredictable Russian diplomacy is. As far as our country is concerned, when Prime Minister Horn visited Russia in March, President Yeltsin did not express any objection to the Hungarian ambition to join NATO. That is therefore our starting point," he said.

Advocate

Kelety is expecting more information about the position of the United States, one of the main advocates of expansion, when he visits that country next week. He also hopes to meet his Russian counterpart Pavel

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Grachev soon, after the cancellation of three meetings since November, on each occasion at the Russians' request because of the crisis in Chechnya.

At NATO the minister consulted with Deputy Secretary General Sergio Ballanzini and the NATO Council. Also important were his talks with Field Marshall Sir Richard Vincent, the president of the Military Committee, about the restructuring of the Hungarian Armed Forces and the compatibility of their equipment with that of NATO armies.

Hungary will shortly launch a call for tenders for the purchase of a radar system, and prefers its communications systems to be connectable to those of the NATO countries. It also wants to make the units designated for cooperation within the Partnership for Peace "compatible."

Of course budgetary constraints play a role. The Army will shortly get Russian equipment worth $300 million, mainly armored vehicles for troop transport. "I must indicate that this purchase forms a repayment of a Russian Government debt to Hungary. If we had $300 million in cash available, then very probably we would have gone and looked elsewhere," the minister said. In any event Sir Richard Vincent agreed with him that this equipment fell outside the realms of compatibility.

Horn Interviewed on Current Issues

LD1405205995 Budapest Duna TV in Hungarian 1600 GMT 14 May 95

[Phone-in interview with Prime Minister Gyula Horn, hosted by Zoltan Csaky; from the "Weekly Courier" program—live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Csaky] Good evening ladies and gentlemen, I am Zoltan Csaky. I greet you and welcome Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn in the studio. In the next hour we should like to hear his views on how Hungary is doing, almost one year after the elections, whether there is an alternative to the government's stabilization package, and we also hope to discuss the priorities of Hungarian foreign policy. [passage omitted]

[Csaky] How do you judge the government's performance in the past ten months?

[Horn] I believe that the picture is varied. By varied I mean that none of us thought, before and during the elections, that so many problems remained for us to sort out. These included various issues—ranging from compensation to privatization—where the previous government had taken decisions but the new government was left with the implementation and ensuring the finances. Ozd, Diosgyoer, the aluminium industry branch—and I could carry on listing these economic spheres in which we found ourselves facing very grave challenges.

That is one thing—there are far more problems than we had expected. I say, without exaggeration, that over three-quarters of the government's work consists of sorting out these unsettled issues.

[Csaky] When did you realize how serious the country's economic situation was? It took eight months before ...

[Horn, interrupting] It took at least two months after the government was formed—and I do not recommend that any future government be formed during the summer—before we obtained reliable figures and information on the basis of various analyses. In truth we do not know everything, even now, since many things are surfacing at present on the basis of various studies, analyses, investigations and so on. So it is not as if we possessed all the information.

I consider it extremely important that this government, properly speaking, does not pose a threat to any social stratum or group of people. It does not distinguish between citizens on the basis of ideology or outlook. It does not keep people in a state of fear—so in this sense I believe that political life became much more stable during this government than previously, under the previous government. That is the first point.

Second, this government does not pose a threat to freedom of the press. The fact that we have our own opinion about the stance of certain press organs, media programs, is another issue—but it is not the task of the government to pass judgement on these.

[Csaky] I imagine you do not wish to give examples.

[Horn] No, I do not wish to give examples.

The other thing which I consider to be very important is that we have begun a process of settling relations with our neighbors, because this is valued highly not just by the neighbors but by the Western partners too.

And finally, the most painful and difficult thing: The current government has been left with tasks which were not tackled by the previous governments—not only that immediately preceding us but the one before that too. I am primarily thinking of the reform which began in this country on 12 March. This is a series of reform measures, a sequence of reform measures, which is not coming to a halt. There is no question of our wishing to torment any stratum by means of our measures. It is necessary to sort out the state of the country's finances, because otherwise there will be no recovery and we will not be able to begin the country's normal development.

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So this is the greatest challenge. Allow me to add—not only is the Hungarian left-wing-liberal government contending with this. Almost everywhere in the West where socialist or social democratic parties enter government, they are the ones who undertake the most unpopular measures. They undertake much more unpopular measures than the right-wing governments.

And another thing: There has been mention of cooperation with the trade unions. I believe in wide-ranging social dialogue. I signed the cooperation agreement with the socialist and social democratic platform of the National Federation of Hungarian Trade Unions. This is the largest trade union, it is the most influential. Even now I believe that no matter what disagreements we may have, we would not be able to extricate ourselves from the problems without cooperation with the trade unions, in a country which is undergoing such transformation. [passage omitted]

[Csaky] It seems that the state—the premature welfare state, as it is referred to by Professor Janos Kornai—would like to withdraw from the welfare system. Looking at foreign examples, this can be accepted to a certain extent, if no vacuum is left behind the state, for alternative pension and health insurance systems have just started to emerge in Hungary.

[Horn] There is no question of the state trying to withdraw from the social sphere. I have no idea where this statement comes from, since the government has no intention of this kind at all. However, two things are actual facts: One of them is that the current system of social provisions, which was established a long time ago and which has been patched up ever since, has not been supported by the performance of the economy. There is no way of maintaining that system any more, because there is nobody who could finance it. So far it has been done mostly at the expense of foreign debts—at least a part of the loans have been spent on this. This system cannot be maintained any more.

The second point is that as a result of the development of a market economy, institutions and systems of the market economy—voluntary insurance funds, etc.—should emerge in this field, too. But this will remain only one part—a smaller part—of the welfare system. I cannot imagine that the state would withdraw from this field. [passage omitted]

[Csaky] Are you not concerned about a deepening and widening social tension? This is a political question, too.

[Horn] Naturally, I am concerned about it. Of course. This is why I consider it important to have continuous dialogue with various strata and groups of society. I will also sit down for talks with representatives of the Association of Large Families. [passage omitted]

[Csaky] To what extent do you have confidence in the parliamentary approval of the stabilization package? [passage omitted]

[Horn] [passage omitted] In my view, the stabilization package's parliamentary approval by the Socialist Party's parliamentary deputy group is not in danger. [passage omitted]

[Horn] Janos Kornai is right in saying that we have to work on medium and long-term programs too. The first comprehensive variant of the modernization program will be ready by next week, commencing tomorrow. The almost 100-page document analyzes the development needs of each sector, ranging from industry through agriculture to tourism and others. Those who prepared this document have involved various professional interest representative organizations. We intend to put this program to a professional debate. The government will also consult the European Union, the London-based European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Council of Europe, and the World Bank.

Why is this important? Because the basis of this program is the government's three-year program, but, of course, it also includes other fields, such as the reform of state finances or the reform of the public administration. [passage omitted]

I would like this program to be debated by parliament this autumn, at the latest.

[Csaky] A viewer from Szeged says: There is a great need for a promising vision of the future in this pessimistic country.

[Horn] Let me tell you one thing. What is in focus—and we are planning to put together a package with our Western partners—is that Budapest has every potential for becoming a financial and trade center of central and east Europe. In order to achieve this, there is a need to reconstruct and develop the infrastructure, and for this we need long-term loans and assistance. That is to say, everything is interrelated. Practically, this is one of the main directions.

The other problem is to put land registration in order. Furthermore, I consider it very important, for example, to carry out the energy-saving reconstruction of the—more than 1 million—apartments built from prefabricated panels. This also requires foreign contribution.

The Integration Development Fund will also have to be established—this will take place this summer. The fund will be established primarily from foreign

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resources, but there is a need for budget funds too. This fund would make sure that new loans are spent only on modernization, on specific development projects—mainly on the development of the infrastructure—and not a penny on the repayment of earlier debts. [passage omitted]

I would like to recall that this country has never managed to implement its modernization programs so far. They have always failed on something. I very much hope that this program will not fail in the following few years. If we manage to solve the problems in the forthcoming one to one and a half years, I am convinced that we will be able to overcome the problems. [passage omitted]

The political culture is no worse in Hungary than in any of the Western countries. [passage omitted] The other factor for success is the Hungarian people's creativity. There are a lot of factors in my hope. Furthermore, there is no power, or great power, which would like to impose its will upon us. The decisions and their implementation depends entirely on us. This country has never had an historical opportunity like this before.

[Csaky] Mr. Prime Minister, let us change subjects and turn to foreign policy, to the priorities of Hungarian foreign policy. Hungarian diplomacy achieved a fine success in Strasbourg at the end of April, where—at Hungarian initiative—the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe confirmed Recommendation 1201 and made it binding for its members. Mr. Prime Minister, are we able to make use of this success?

[Horn] I believe it was a major success, in any case, that Recommendation 1201—whose justification and legitimacy had been disputed, indeed called into doubt—was, in practical terms, given legal force, so to speak, on the part of the Council of Europe. I believe that we will be able, on this basis, to come to agreement with the Romanians and conclude a basic treaty with them.

I should like to emphasize—perhaps for the umpteenth time—that the basic treaty does not constitute a redemption. It will not constitute the end. The basic treaty is a means, a basis on which we can carry on sorting out our relations.

While there is dispute about the basic treaty or the validity—or lack of validity—of 1201, Hungarian-Romanian relations are making very good progress. Not only in the economic and cultural spheres, but in the sphere of politics too. So we have no cause for despair in connection with Hungarian-Romanian relations, either.

And I believe that what was decided in March—in the form of an aide memoire—concerning what the sides supported in certain spheres, ranging from politics to culture, from joint historical research to border crossings, and I do not wish to carry on listing things, all this shows that both sides have the political will. And if this exists, then there is considerable possibility for making progress. That is why I am optimistic about Hungarian-Romanian relations.

[Csaky] Unfortunately I have to contradict this. The Romanian Foreign Minister said the other day in Strasbourg that the date for concluding the Hungarian-Romanian basic treaty is becoming quite remote.

[Horn] Melescanu—well, look, foreign ministers say one thing on one occasion and something else another time. Melescanu was attacked over the decision taken about Recommendation 1201 in the Council of Europe. He was also attacked in connection with the Hungarian-Slovak basic treaty. Look, I do not like judgement being passed in a way whereby someone says something and immediately it is presented as if there has been a step forward, that success is on the doorstep—or as if there was a distancing, and that we have moved far away from the possibility of the whole thing. There is not much sense in seeing things this way.

I believe that at the end of this month or early next month we could turn to the issue of the basic treaty, we could finalize it if we are able to reach agreement with the Romanian leadership—and this is possible. There were very many expressions of doubt—just think back to before the stability conference in Paris—that we would not be able to sign either of the basic treaties by the 20th [March]. We nonetheless signed the Hungarian-Slovak basic treaty.

[Csaky] Yes. Miklos Duray [chairman of Coexistence, an ethnic Hungarian party in Slovakia] says that the treaty exists by virtue of having been signed, but it is not functioning. As for the Slovak language law whose introduction is planned—at the moment it is only a plan—its mentality is in complete contradiction to the text of the basic treaties.

[Horn] Duray is a master of finding the negative side of everything. I do not wish, in saying this, to place him in a category. Naturally a basic treaty—especially if it has not been ratified by the parliaments—does not begin to work right away. I agreed with Meciar in January that we would consult, constantly coordinate on the issues which were considered doubtful by the Council of Europe, thus those Slovak measures—or even Hungarian measures. We also agreed that we would involve experts from the Council of Europe if necessary. That is one point.

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The second: I have no reason to doubt the words of Prime Minister Meciar. He has fulfilled what he undertook in January. By this I mean the opening of new border crossings, and the transfer of water in connection with the Danube water barrage—and in a number of other areas. We are progressing along the lines agreed in January.

I do not wish to quote what I heard a year ago from Hungarians who live along the Hungarian-Slovak border, how much they feared a sharpening of tension, and even greater troubles. I imagine these worries have considerably abated now. We are able to make progress with them, and I should greatly like to make progress with those countries where ties are difficult—for reasons beyond our control.

[Csaky] Another priority in the Hungarian foreign policy is to be integrated into north Atlantic organizations. You have several times stressed our desire to be among the first to join NATO. The North Atlantic Assembly, for the first time since its existence, will hold its spring session in Budapest at the end of May. Does this mean that, in a way, we are getting closer to NATO?

[Horn] We are getting closer almost month by month, as far as intensity of cooperation is concerned. However, it is disturbing that there is almost no week without a statement on the opportunity of our accession to NATO—or on an increasing chance of it—and then next week another report on the weakening chance of it. It is not worth paying attention to these statements. [passage omitted]

Contradictory statements can be made, but the process cannot be turned back. NATO cannot do other than to expand security guarantees to certain states in central and east European which need and request this. Hungary was one of the first—the very first—to express this request.

I am optimistic that, in my hope, the time and the conditions of our accession will be decided in 1995.

[Csaky] Approaching the end of our program, let me read out some of the viewers' questions. (Pal Bencedi), chairman of the Hungarian community in Switzerland, asks: The 75th anniversary of the Peace Treaty of Trianon is approaching. Is the Hungarian government planning to commemorate this national day of grief in an appropriate way?

[Horn] There will probably be a commemoration of this event as well. I have never made a secret of my view that the Peace Treaty of Trianon—which was later, once again, practically confirmed by the Paris Treaty—was deeply unjust and we were punished for our participation in the war to a much larger extent than any other country. This is one side of the question. The other is—and these sides are only valid together—that I consider every view and effort which is aimed at, or demanding, the revision of the Peace Treaty of Trianon to be fatal and harmful. This does not lead anywhere. This would only lead to conflicts, and this would not serve Hungary's interests.

[Csaky] Yes. (Piroska Kalman) asks: We have been promised that the structure of Duna TV will not change. The draft media bill is currently being debated. Will Duna TV remain with the present leadership and program policy?

[Horn] Naturally. I would like to stress that the program structure of Duna TV is entirely up to you people and nobody can interfere with this. It will remain as it is now, and I do not think that any kind of important changes would take place—well, only to the extent that Duna TV's financial situation, its financial support, has become a bit worse, as has happened with others. There might be a need for rationalization, but I do not wish to intervene in these matters. It is not my task. Nobody in the government questions the importance of the existence of Duna TV. [passage omitted]

Reform Aims for Smaller, More Efficient Army

AU1505202595 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 15 May 95 p 6

[Unattributed report on a professional forum on the concepts of Armed Forces reform organized the by Security Policy and Defense Research Center; date and place not given: "Armed Forces Reform: The Goal Is To Have a Smaller and More Efficient Army"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] The staff of the Hungarian Army—including professional soldiers, conscripts, and civilian employees—numbers 90,000 today. This number can be regarded as excessive both because of financial reasons and Hungary's geopolitical situation and its safety level. At the same time, many experts claim that the army's structure is obsolete, and so are its equipment and weapons. [passage omitted]

The reform of the Hungarian Army seems to be inevitable, although several attempts have already been made to reorganize our army considerably. "We have already completed the reform of the reform, but we should finally come to a decision," Peter Haber, head of the Military Department of the Hungarian Defense Ministry, told a forum of experts organized by the Security Policy and Defense Research Center. The results are still to come, because the ability of the army has dropped to the lowest level ever. However, this is not yet the

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bottom line. Peter Haber admits that the medium-term development concept takes into consideration a temporary deterioration in the efficiency of the army, because the first phase of restructuring involves a considerable reduction in army personnel. A real reform cannot be financed today because, according to estimates, such a reform would require about 25-30 billion forints, or a one-time investment exceeding the annual budget of 70 billion forints. [passage omitted]

The basic question of the army reform is what kind of actual threats Hungary should be prepared to face. The basic principle according to which the use of the army is only allowed as a final solution continues to be valid, Jozsef Feher, public administration state secretary at the Hungarian Defense Ministry, pointed out. The reform concept primarily takes into consideration the possibility of a conflict "under the level of war," namely an armed aggression not directed by a government. [passage omitted]

In the long term, until the year 2005, the reform concept envisages a further streamlining of the army: 50,000-55,000 soldiers and 5,000-8,000 civilian employees. Thus, the army personnel would make up about 0.5 percent of Hungary's population. According to some opinions, this is close to the bottom line of maintaining the country's defense capability. However, some experts think that, taking into consideration the current foreign political situation, an army of about 20,000-25,000 men would also be sufficient.

In addition to personnel, the long-term reform concept also covers the army structure, its leadership, combat readiness, mobilization, the system of training and preparation, management, and a more efficient use of human resources. According to Peter Haber, the army would be made up of two parts: along with a few brigades that could be employed immediately or in a very short time, training units would guarantee the preparation of highly trained units and reserves. Given the fact that, in peace time, considerably fewer soldiers will serve in the army than today, in the course of a possible mobilization the army will have to be ready to call up more reserves than today (the army has 195,000 reserves along with 75,000 peacetime soldiers today). The role of professional soldiers on a contract will obviously increase; only a few thousand conscripts sign up for "further service" in the army today. [passage omitted]

The Defense Ministry already submitted its reform concepts to the Parliament's Defense Committee, we learned from Defense Committee chairman Imre Mecs. He told us that the committee discussed the documents and made several modification proposals. They agree, however, on the basic issues: We need a smaller but more mobile and efficient army, and the basic goal of the reform is to create the conditions for NATO membership. [passage omitted]

The Personnel and Weapons of the Hungarian Army

Active personnel: 74,500 (including 53,400 conscripts)

Land forces: 56,500 (including 41,100 conscripts)

Air force, air defense: 18,000 (including 12,300 conscripts)

Seasonal personnel: 269,500

Armored Vehicles:

Tanks: 1,191 units (including 5 T-34, 34 T-54, 1014 T-55, and 138 T-72 tanks)

Armored reconnaissance vehicles: 161 units of FUG D-442

Armored personnel carriers: 502 units of BMP-1 and BRM-1K

Artillery shells: 991 units

Combat helicopters: 39 units of MI-24

Support helicopters: 33 units of MI-2 and 58 units of Mi-8

Combat aircraft: 110 units of MiG-21, 12 units of MiG-23, and 28 units of MiG-29

Transport aircraft: 2 units of An-24, 9 units of An-26, and 3 units of L-410

Training aircraft: 7 units of MiG-21, 20 units of L-39, and 12 units of Lak- 52

Founders Describe Association's Goals, Tasks

AU1305134695 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 12 May 95 p 9

[Interview with Maria Schmidt and Laszlo Toth, founding members of the MPDT, by Lajos Lovas; place and date not given: "Who Are the Civic Democrats?"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Three party leaders, namely Lajos Fur of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF], Gyorgy Giczy of the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP], and Viktor Orban of the Federation of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party [FIDESZ-MPP] will participate in today's debut meeting of the Association of Hungarian Civic Democrats [MPDT].

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There are well-known public figures, political scientists, writers, and historians among the MPDT members, namley Anzelm Barany, Jozsef Debreczeni, Istvan Lovas, Tamas Molnar, Bela Pokol, Maria Schmidt, Gyula Teller, Laszlo Toth, Laszlo Tokeczki, and Gyorgy Domokos Varga. We asked Laszlo Toth and Maria Schmidt about the goals and values of this association.

[Toth] The main goal of our association is to propagate civic values, popularize the institution of civic democracy and present and clarify its mechanism, and represent a political philosophy in which we reject any attempt of exceeding the civic relations, either from the right or from the left. We have nothing to do with the extreme-right populist groupings; similarly, we have nothing to do with the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] either, a party that propagates a democratic socialism in its program. [passage omitted]

[Schmidt] Actually, from the first moments of the change in the regime, we failed to agree on a common system of values and moral requirements, either by disclosing the crimes of the previous regime or by observing the rules governing our own lives. Many people find it more important to know who represents whom than who does what.

[Toth] The MSZP does not represent the leftist values. They try to reach a compromise with the trade unions in order to defend the interests of the former party nomenclature whose members have become entrepreneurs and capitalists, and to preserve some kind of a social stability through this. However, in the final analysis, they are protecting their own positions with this. If we take a look at the history of the Hungarian privatization, we see that most major entrepreneurs originate from the former party apparatus and the KISZ [Communist Youth Federation]. They were in a situation that enabled them to privatize state property and, making use of the various legal gaps, they converted their political power into an economic one. [passage omitted]

[Schmidt] It is not our goal to make the parties get closer to each other. Our task is to show that there are civic values and a civic society that we would like to engender in Hungary, a society that, although not perfect, is still the best that has been found yet. This society functions in the West more or less. The parties that have similar goals can rely on the spiritual ammunition that our association can offer.

[Toth] We would like to create some sort of intellectual and spiritual core and demonstrate that there is another spiritual elite in this country, and that it is not true that there is no alternative. Besides, this is a basically antidemocratic thought, and it means that they must remain in power no matter how bad they are. Both as a private person and an independent analyst, I see the current situation as follows: There are groupings mainly around the MDF, the KDNP, and the FIDESZ that have the possibility of creating a civic center-right force. In particular, the FIDESZ can play an important role as a catalyst. It is very important that these three parties refrain from competing with each other, because this leads nowhere. The party that can create greater intellectual support and a bigger spiritual core, and present a more attractive image to society will become stronger. This party will be the leader of this grouping. Time will tell in what form they will run in the next elections, scheduled for 1998. However, it is in the national interest to replace the current social-liberal coalition as soon as possible, because Hungary's international image is catastrophic. The prevailing economic situation and the emerging corruption affairs show the dubious processes that are taking place deep inside. [passage omitted]

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UN: Heaviest Fighting in Sarajevo Since 1993

AU1605114895 Paris AFP in English
1123 GMT 16 May 95

[By Peter Cunliffe-Jones]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, May 16 (AFP)—Heavy mortar, shell and machine gun fire erupted in Sarajevo early Tuesday in the heaviest fighting since 1993, leaving UN officials wondering if it was the first sign of a Bosnian attempt to push out of the city.

At around 8:30 a.m. (0630 GMT) Tuesday four mortar rounds detonated in the Bosnian Serb's Lukavica barracks, UN officials said. Approximately half an hour later, more widespread exchanges involving mortar, gun, cannon and machine-gun fire broke out across the city.

Reports of casualties were sketchy but staff at Sarajevo hospitals said a 10-year-old girl had been killed and six people wounded so far.

A senior UN official, speaking on condition of anonymity, noted that the initial attack appeared to have come from the Bosnian Army.

"This could be a provocation or a feint. It could be the start of an attempt to break out of the city. Time will tell," he said.

UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) spokesman Alexander Ivanko said the UN in Sarajevo had contacted both warring parties to urge them to exercise restraint.

"Both parties are blaming each other for starting the fighting, but in UNPROFOR's opinion both are equally to blame for the renewed military activity around Sarajevo," Ivanko said.

On the streets of the city centre, the few people to be seen were running or sheltering in the lee of buildings. City authorities urged people to take to shelters with food and warm clothing.

Ivanko said UNPROFOR had contacted Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladic "who has assured us as best he can that civilians and UNPROFOR will not be targeted by the BSA," or Bosnian Serb army.

Ivanko said however that several mortars had landed near UN headquarters.

Mladic had told the UN the Serb shelling was in response to a Bosnian Army offensive. The Bosnian army said it was responding to Serb shelling, Ivanko said.

"Once again the parties have opted for a military solution, once again it is the civilians that become the ultimate victims of this tragic war," Ivanko said.

"The people of Sarajevo have already seen more than enough blood in three years. They should not be put through another harrowing day of seeing shrapnel and bullets tearing people apart," he added.

Most of the fire appeared to be concentrated on confrontation lines, notably in the areas of the Jewish cemetery and Sharpstone.

Witnsesses said that Bosnian Serbs were shelling Breka, north of the city above Kosevo hospital, and that the Bosnian army was shelling Zlatiste, south of the city.

UNPROFOR spokeswoman Captain Myriam Sochacki said that UNPROFOR command headquarters had been moved to an orange state of alert, the second highest state of readiness.

"The greatest weight of the fire is BSA," (Bosnian Serb Army), UNPROFOR senier military spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Gary Coward said.

UNPROFOR Sector Sarajevo commander General Herve Gobillard was to meet Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic shortly after midday to discuss the fighting.

The situation in Sarajevo has generally been described as tense since an often-violated four-month ceasefire between the Serbs and Bosnian government ran out at the end of April.

The Bosnian government has frequently warned that if the international community fails to force the Serbs to lift the siege of Sarajevo, the Bosnian government would have to lift the siege itself.

The UN source, again speaking on condition of anonymity, said that, given, continued fighting in the Treskavica Hills south of Sarajevo and logistical problems to the north, the likeliest route for the Bosnians to try to punch out of the city was west through the heavily fortified Serb-held area of Ilidza.

Doctors at Kosevo named the 10-year-old girl killed Tuesday as Azra Buljubasic. Doctors were struggling to save the life of her 15-year-old brother Nedim, they said.

Mortar and shell fire could still be heard leaving from and landing in the city at 12:45 a.m. (1045 GMT).

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UN Says Sarajevo Airport Talks 'Postponed'

AU1505154095 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 15 May 95

[Report by Fuad Cibukcic on interview with UN Protection Force spokesmen Gary Coward and Major (Vine) in Sarajevo on 15 May—recorded; Coward and (Vine) speak in English, fading into Serbo-Croatian translation]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Cibukcic] Our intention from talking to Gary Coward, UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] spokesman for Bosnia-Herzegovina, was to find out a bit more about the developments on the Orasje and Brcko fronts. This was the answer:

[Coward in English] I don't know.

[Cibukcic] I do not know. The other question was connected to the fate of the UNHCR convoy intended for Bihac.

[Coward] Yesterday a seed convoy, as far as I know, tried for five hours without success to leave Licko Petrovo Selo for the Bihac region. It was turned back. It spent the night in Licko Petrovo Selo. Today it will try again to enter the Bihac region.

[Cibukcic] We were interested in the fate of the Sarajevo airport. This is what Gary Coward had to say about this issue:

[Coward] My understanding is that—on receipt of instructions from the UN headquarters in New York—it is possible that the talks will start tomorrow. UNPROFOR intends to talk with the Serb side and, if there is any progress, the talks could possible start on Wednesday [17 May]. However, this is not definite.

[Cibukcic] To inquire about the developments in the Sarajevo region, we had to telephone the UNPROFOR headquarters, where we spoke to Major (Vine).

[(Vine)] Yes, the situation today is quiet in the city. We have heard only two explosions, one in Dobrinja, and one in Sedrenik, in the northern part of the city.

[Cibukcic] As for the fate of the Sarajevo airport, which is still closed, Aleksander Ivanko, representative of the UNPROFOR civilian sector for Bosnia-Herzegovina, gave a statement.

The talks on the possible opening of the Sarajevo airport for the humanitarian operation have been postponed until further notice. The talks have been postponed until UN headquarters in New York decides on the aggressor's proposals regarding a new regime for the use of the Sarajevo airport. As soon as we get the UN suggestions, we will resume talks with Nikola Koljevic. We expect this to happen by the end of this week, Ivanko said.

Silajdzic on UNPROFOR Instructions to NATO

AU1605122195 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1200 GMT 16 May 95

[Statement by Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic after talks with UN Protection Force Sector Sarajevo commander General Herve Gobillard in Sarajevo on 16 May—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] I can say only what I have already said to Mr. Gobillard and that is that we know for a fact that their instructions are completely opposite to what they should be. They have practically asked that there be no flights over Sarajevo, and not that there should be flights over Sarajevo.

We told them that we know for a fact that their instructions to NATO planes are completely the opposite to what they should be.

You will get a full statement by the 1st Corps.

Silajdzic Asks UNHCR To Review Aid Cuts

LD1505213095 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 15 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic has sent a letter to Sadako Ogata, UN high commissioner for refugees, in connection with a sudden decision by the UNHCR to reduce by 50 percent the humanitarian aid to all areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina outside the aggressor's encirclement. The letter says, among other things:

The aforementioned decision will produce extremely negative consequences for the overall situation on the territory of the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We cannot see any objective reasons for such a radical decision. Living conditions under which the population of central Bosnia live are equally unfavorable and hard. In certain aspects, they are even harder than before. Therefore, we have an impression that the decision to reduce humanitarian supplies is being used to exert pressure on the legitimate bodies of the Republic and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

We are appealing to you to use your authority to change the aforementioned decision. I believe it would be very useful if you paid a visit to Sarajevo in connection with this problem, so that we could examine the newly created situation together, the letter by Prime Minister Silajdzic to Ogata says.

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Banja Luka Bishop Describes 'Ethnic Cleansing'

AU1605123595 Vienna Oesterreich Eins Radio Network in German 1000 GMT 16 May 95

[Telephone interview with Franjo Komarica, bishop of Banja Luka, by Fritz Pesata; date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] Franjo Komarica, Catholic bishop of Banja Luka, has been under house arrest in his see for more than a week, as he confirmed in a telephone conversation with Fritz Pesata:

[Komarica] Yes, we have all been under house arrest here. Unfortunately, our situation is really very dramatic here. We feel deserted by all those who are supposed to accept us as human beings and also to properly defend us and our basic human rights.

[Pesata] Bishop, how long have you been in this situation? How long have you been under house arrest?

[Komarica] In the past few days, practically for a little longer than one week, terrible things have happened here. The churches have been destroyed. They have been completely destroyed. You have also heard that the Franciscan monastery and the pilgrimage church on (?Pribicevac) were completely destroyed and the Franciscans were expelled, and that the nuns were also expelled by force from two old monasteries in Bosanski Aleksandrovac and Nova Topola. On Friday [12 May] a terrible thing happened at the shrine of Presnace on the outskirts of Banja Luka. This is the shrine of Saint Theresa of the Child Jesus. It was completely destroyed and the pastoral center burned out. The priest and guardian of the shrine were burned together with one of the nuns.

[Pesata] That is to say, he was shot and afterward set on fire and burned?

[Komarica] Yes. We buried them yesterday. There is really great panic among the people here. We are left here without churches. We ask all responsible bodies here to really protect us and to tell us what they are planning to do with us and of what we are guilty. So far, we have done everything to live in real peace with our neighbors. Why are all these things happening to us here? Why was it apparently planned to simply expel us as a Catholic community, as the Catholic Church, as a Catholic diocese from this area? Why can the Catholic Church in Austria, Germany, Italy, Europe permit that a diocese, which is completely innocent, is totally destroyed in full view of you at a distance of less than one hour from Austria and of one hour from Italy? We also ask God, we also ask the people, we also ask the brothers and sisters who believe, we also ask our neighbor: Why? What is our guilt?

[Pesata] Bishop, do you see a direct connection between the reconquest or liberation of western Slavonia by Croatian troops and your present situation?

[Komarica] The things that are happening here at the moment are only the continuation of the ethnic cleansing and the destruction of the Catholic churches and houses here, that is, of the Catholic roots here.

Serb Civic Council on Murders of Priest, Nun

AU1505184895 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 15 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Serb Civic Council [SGV] of Bosnia-Herzegovina protests against and regrets the destruction of the Catholic shrine of St. Mary Teresa in Presnace near Banja Luka, and the murder of the priest and nun. The SGV of Bosnia-Herzegovina condemns such vandalism, and calls on the relevant international bodies to raise their voices in defense of life and the protection of religious, cultural, and other monuments on the territory under the control of Karadzic's formations.

Federation Bodies Set Up in Vitez Municipality

AU1505201695 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 15 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Vitez is the third of 12 municipalities in the Central Bosnian Canton in which the process of establishing the interim authorities in accordance with the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation Constitution has been completed.

At today's constituent session, which was attended by the Federation Constituent Assembly Chairman Mariofil Ljubic, the mandates of new deputies have been verified, and the chairman [words indistinct] elected. Sefik Mujkic reports:

[Begin recording] Following the procedure of verifying the mandates of 60 deputies, this session was greeted by the representatives of the military and civilian sector of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force], Federation Assembly Chairman Mariofil Ljubic, Dzevad Mlaco, chairman of the cantonal committee of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA], and Zoran (?Maric), chairman of the Lepenica-Lasva cantonal committee of the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ]. They were unanimous in their assessment that this was a difficult, responsible, viable task in view of everything that had happened to both nations in the Vitez Municipality, and that all the efforts by the Serbian-Montenegrin aggressor to use dirty propaganda to cause a new conflict should be confronted with coexistence and joint work.

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Thanks to the fact that the leading parties had recently carried out all the necessary preparations through dialogue and agreement, there was not much discussion or changes to the statutory decision on the structure and organization, and the protocol on the work and organization of the Municipal Council during the interim period, and these documents were agreed unanimously. The same thing happened with the election of the people for the most responsible positions, and the replacement of the chairman and members of the preceding executive council of the Vitez Municipality. By a unanimous decision of the 52 deputies present, out of the total of 60, Mehmed Ahmic was elected chairman of the Municipal Council, and Franjo Rajkovic was elected senior of the municipality. Then five delegates were elected to the Central Bosnian Canton Assembly, three from the ranks of the Croatian people and two from the Bosniak people. These are Marjan Skopljak and Zlatko Glad from the HDZ, Jozo Drnit from the opposition, Refik Hajdarevic from the SDA, and Husret Kalco from the Social Democratic Party.

That this is a major step in implementing the Federation in the Lasva region is best confirmed by the impressions of Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation Assembly Chairman Mariofil Ljubic:

[Ljubic] I can say that the Municipal Council prepared this extremely well and in line with what the Federation Constitution requires from the municipal deputies and councillors in the Municipal Assembly. This gives us hope that this process will be implemented fully in this region, which has been rather difficult [words indistinct].

[Mujkic] The Central Bosnian Canton is one of the [word indistinct] in the establishment of the Federation authorities.

[Ljubic] I believe that the Central Bosnian Canton has a future in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation. I am sure that it will prosper the fastest in peacetime since relatively strong industry is concentrated here. This is a region that [words indistinct] the conflict between the Bosniaks and Croats, but that has been behind us for a year and a half now. Today's work, such hard work, by the deputies in the Municipal Assembly, gives us hope that the Constitution will be implemented here, and that everything that has been agreed will be put into practice to the satisfaction of the Bosniak and Croatian people. [end recording]

Seselj Meets Serb Leaders, Assails Milosevic

LD1505164395 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1536 GMT 15 May 95

[Item received by fax]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 15 May (SRNA)—Radovan Karadzic, president of the [Bosnian] Serb republic; Momcilo Krajisnik, president of the Serb republic assembly; and Velibor Ostojic, president of the executive committee of the Serb Democratic Party of Serb Lands, held talks in Pale today with a delegation of the Serbian Radical Party [SRS]. They discussed the defense of Serb ethnic territories.

Vojislav Seselj, chairman of the Radicals, said after the meeting that "western Slavonija was betrayed in Belgrade and there was never any serious defense of it."

"Milan Martic, president of the republic of Serb Krajina, ordered that Osijek and other targets be attacked immediately, but Slobodan Milosevic thwarted his orders with the help of his state security which enables him to control the army and police. Milosevic's man, 'red berets' leader Frenki Simatovic, prevented the firing of surface-to-surface missiles at Zagreb," Seselj said.

He expressed the fear that other areas of Serb states could have a similar fate because "Milosevic is ready to reduce Serbia to Ada Ciganlija [an island in the Sava at Belgrade] in order to save his position."

Seselj believes that Milosevic chose this moment to sell western Slavonija to the Croats because he believes that "this blow to the Serbs will be a leverage for toppling the honest Serbs—Milan Martic and General Milan Celeketic."

"What we preserve now will always remain ours; what we lose now will be lost for ever. The whole of Serbia and Montenegro stand behind the Serb fighters,", Seselj said, adding:

"The treacherous regimes of Slobodan Milosevic and Momir Bulatovic are doing everything they can to damage and undermine the position of the Serb people west of the Drina, but the Serbians stand behind the Serb fighters and will do everything to topple these regimes."

Speaking about his visit to Serb Sarajevo yesterday, the SRS leader said that the "war began in Sarajevo and it will end there."

"The Muslims have decided in favor of the war option and will lose Sarajevo. The whole of Sarajevo will belong to the Serbs," Seselj concluded. [passage omitted]

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Serbian Radio on Attacks by Bosnians, Croats

AU1505195495

[FBIS Editorial Report] Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian at 1700 GMT on 12 May carries within its regular 30-minute newscast several reports on the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Correspondent Zeljko Radovanovic reports on the situation on the Sarajevo-Romanija front. He says that two civilians were killed in Novakovici by sniper fire from Donji Kotorac and that "small arms and artillery were used there all day against our defenses and civilian targets. The enemy fired at Dobrinja I and IV, as well as Grbavica and the Jewish cemetery." From Vojnicko Polje sniper fire and rifle grenades were used against Nedzarici and from Sokolovic Kolonija "the enemy targeted the front of our defense line in the Ilidza area," while close to a UN checkpoint the B-H Army, which is referred to as "the Muslims" throughout these reports, "attempted to set up a position." He continues to say that "from their positions in the Treskavica area, the Muslims have targeted the area in and around Trnovo, while cluster bombs and 82-mm mortars have been used to target Hadzici. The Ilijas front, particularly the area of Mrakovo and Podlugovi, has been targeted by 82-mm and 120-mm mortars fired from the area of Vlahinja and Vratnice, but there have been no casualties. Muslim activity has continued into the evening hours."

Slavisa Sabljic reports on the situation on the Glamoc front. He says that in today's attacks by the Croatian Army, which he refers to as "the Ustasha," one girl was killed, while three civilians and one Serbian soldier were wounded. "It started at 1145, when the Croatian Army artillery—Tudjman's guards from Split and Omis, and Croatian Defense Council units from Herceg-Bosna—fired about 30 shells at Glamoc town and the surrounding villages. At the same time, Ustasha artillery fired about 200 different projectiles along the entire separation line on the Glamoc front, attacking Serbian positions at (?Koricina) and Mala Golija." The Serbian side still has no final figures on casualties.

Goran Stojanovic sends a report from the Doboj, Trebava, and Ozren areas. He says that on the Doboj front there was B-H Army "small arms fire along the entire separation line. Heavier antiaircraft gun and rifle grenade fire came from (?Simunovici), Jelah, and (?Jelacev Gaj), aimed at Serbian defense positions southwest of Doboj. Serbian defense positions on the western part of the front were also targeted." Serbs occasionally responded and there were no casualties.

He continues to say that on the eastern part of the Trebava front "there were Muslim reconnaisance activities; from (?Jasenicka Rijeka) and Duboki Potok a group attempted to break through." Moreover, from (?Galica Brdo) and (?Oblic) "the enemy used heavy infantry fire against our positions on the southern part of the front, and antiaircraft guns and machine guns from (?Hrkoji) against positions in the Ciganiste area east of Doboj. Serbian soldiers promptly responded to these attacks, after which the enemy activities stopped." He also says that on the Ozren-Vozuca front there were "Muslim" small arms "provocations, mostly from Banovici and (?Jaruska) against Serbian positions in the Modra Stena area east of Ozren and on the right bank of the Bosna River, south of Doboj. There was heavy fire in the (?Grace) area on the western part and in the Borik area on the eastern part of the Vozuca front." Fire was promptly returned and there were no casualties.

Reporting on the situation on the Majevica front, Lidija Beslic says that in the morning the B-H Army launched "an artillery and infantry attack against Serbian defense positions on Mt. Majevica. There was firing from Snijeznica towards Priboj and from Celic towards (?Brusnica). The attacks were successfully repelled, and there were no casualties among Serbian soldiers. In the afternoon, the front was relatively calm, except for occasional infantry provocations." She cites the Bosnian Serb "Eastern Bosnian Corps" as saying that "Serbian soldiers control all the defense lines on the Majevica front."

Veljko Bosnic reports that on the Bihac-Bosanska Krupa front, in the theater of operations of the "2d Krajina Corps" of the Bosnian Serb military, there was heavy "Muslim" infantry, small arms, and mortar fire "along the entire 60-km long separation line at Bihac." He says that over 30 mortar bombs were fired "from the outskirts of Bihac towards Serbian positions on the Grmec plateau, and further north a reconnaissance group attempted an incursion during the afternoon." On the other parts of the front the B-H Army "used all kinds of small arms fire, directed particularly at Mostobran, near [Bosanska] Krupa, where they also attempted infantry attacks, which were repelled, and the Serbian defense lines remained unchanged. Muslim snipers were active on (?Tecija) hill, targeting the town and outskirts of Krupa."

The studio announcer says that on the Kupres front "joint Croatian Army and Croatian Defense Council units, as well as Muslim forces, launched artillery and infantry attacks towards Serbian defense positions. The soldiers of the army of the Serbian republic have observed the movement of enemy vehicles and that fresh enemy forces have been brought in."

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Serb General on Situation in Posavina Corridor

AU1605081795 Banja Luka GLAS SRPSKI in Serbo-Croatian 10 May 95 p 3

[Interview with Lieutenant General Manojlo Milovanovic, chief of General Staff of the Serb republic army, by G. Serbula in [Bosanska] Gradiska on 9 May: "The War Is Seriously Spreading Toward the Sava River Banks"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The people and the soldiers in the territory of the communes of [Bosanska] Gradiska, Kozara, Dubica and Srb are happy that Lieutenant General Manojlo Milovanovic, well-known for his war expertise and tactical skills, has come to the region with the aim of sharing their destiny with them. We met with General Milovanovic on the border line on the right bank of the Sava and asked him for an interview.

[Serbula] How would you assess the present situation on this front, and what is your message to both the soldiers and the people?

[Milovanovic] The present situation on this, we can say new, front between the Serb republic and the Republic of Croatia has created some new circumstances. Up to now we have been more or less the second frontline on this front, but now since Western Slavonia was occupied by Ustashas, we have suddenly found ourselves on the first front line face to face with the Ustashas. This is a new circumstance that has forced us to take certain measures for the improvement of our front line on the right bank of the Sava as well as in the whole depth of the front. The things we have done in the last several days can be considered a certain guarantee regarding the safety of the population, their property first of all, but also regarding the safety of the army itself. When I say army, I also refer to the members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, because they are integrated into the army. The present situation is good, but I would like to take this opportunity to point to the fact that the war has seriously spread toward the Sava banks and that there can be no rest until certain political solutions between the warring factions have been found. The soldiers are aware of what they will be facing. A characteristic of all soldiers in this world is, however, that they tend to relax if they have not had to shoot for a long period of time. Our enemy is on the other bank of the Sava, and I would like to tell our soldiers that there can be no relaxation. The new situation requires completely new behavior, beginning from the care for one's own safety to the safety of one's surroundings, the safety of the area, its economy and communications as well as all other things related to them. This means that we must have the same behavior here as we have had in all other parts of the Serb republic since the beginning of the war. I mean the areas in which the front line was stabilized a long time ago and where there have been military activities, because it cannot be excluded that similar activities to those in Posavina, Podrinje [region along the Drina River] and other parts of the Serb republic will be carried in this area too.

[Serbula] Will the military situation become more tense, and in which way is it developing in the Serb republic in general?

[Milovanovic] The negotiating process has come to a halt. I would say that the present halt will be difficult to overcome since the Contact Group plan, which the international powers tried to artificially retain, has completely failed. The peace process has reached an impasse. There are practically no talks between the parties to the conflict. I cannot remember the last meeting between the parties to the conflict. The fact that the international community holds meetings between ministers or their deputies, or Contact Group experts, has not had a positive effect on these areas, as you can see. Instead of coming to an end, more fierce fighting is breaking out.

I think that the situation will become increasingly tense in the future unless the international community realizes that it is the parties to the conflict that have to be brought to the negotiating table and not some mediators, tutors, advocates etc.

[Serbula] If this is your assessment of the situation, how safe is the corridor?

[Milovanovic] The corridor and the part of the front in Podrinje, that is Trnovo, are the two most sensitive points on our front. Both parties to the conflict think that they can change the situation to their advantage here. When I say both parties to the conflict, I mean the Croats and the Muslims on the one hand, and the Serbs on the other. Both parties think that the one who dominates the Serbian Posavina will win the war. There have been innumerable Croatian and Muslim attempts to break the corridor since it was created three years ago. We are, however, aware of the fact that the corridor is our survival, and all their attempts and attacks during the last several days have proven that the Serb republic army is able to defend everything in the Brcko region. This is the reason why all of their offensives have been unsuccessful. There is a view among the people who do not have anything to do with wars that there is no victory unless it is achieved in an attack. We have, however, achieved most of our victories by defending ourselves, at least since the beginning of 1995. It is well known that we crushed the Muslim offensive on the Majevica Mountain, where they suffered heavy losses, so that they do not often think of attacking the corridor

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at Brcko now. They suffered a defeat at Brcko too, and at Doboj before that, and recently on the Treskavica Mountain. In all of these actions they suffered heavy losses. I personally think that this is a greater success for the Serbian republic Army than our achievement in the counteroffensive toward Bihac.

[Serbula] You mentioned the Bihac front, which was a current issue at the end of the last and at the beginning of this year. Can you tell us what the situation is like there now?

[Milovanovic] The Bihac front is more or less concentrated on the situation on the Pljesivica Mountain, which Muslims and Croats are trying to occupy. The Croats have promised the Muslims that they will attack the Pljesivica Mountain through Slunj and Plitvice with the aim of merging the forces of the 5th Corps of the Muslim army with the Croatian Ustasha forces.

[Serbula] What is your opinion about the presence and the role of the international forces in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and the former Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Milovanovic] My opinion about the international forces is well known. The international community is present through the UN Protection Force in both the territory of the former Yugoslavia and the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. It has not done anything for the Serbs, however.

The UN Protection Force has during the three years of its presence here done nothing favorable for the Serbs. Just like the Croats and the Muslims, the UN Protection Force has not respected a single agreement except when this was in its interest, or in the interest of one of our enemies. The latest events in Western Slavonia have shown how hypocritical the UN Protection Force is, just as is true of the Croats. They do only what they wish to do, and it is their wish that the Croats have as much success as possible, and that the Serbs suffer as many losses as possible. The UN Protection Force and other international organizations ambling around this territory do not have any justification or arguments to claim that they are neutral or that they are a force that supports peace. Unfortunately, we pay a high price for their arguments and confirmations. The bloodbath between Okucani and Gradiska on the road near the Prasnik forest is the best proof of how the UN Protection Force protects us. Croatian aircraft were shelling [Serb] refugees, and the UN Protection Force was watching. If someone can tell me that the UN Protection Force lodged a protest with the Croatian government, I shall salute him.

UN Observers Monitor 'Heavy Shelling' of Orasje

AU1505123995 Paris AFP in English 1141 GMT 15 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, May (AFP)—Heavy fighting raged Monday round the strategically-vital Posavina corridor in northeast Bosnia, as Bosnian Serbs launched a fresh battle to widen part of a lifeline supply route in the area, UN officials said.

UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) spokeswoman Captain Myriam Sochacki said UN military observers monitored heavy shelling from dawn in the Croat-held Orasje region north of the vital corridor, renewing fighting that has raged for almost a week.

The fighting in Bosnia has for months been reduced to limited tactical battles for key roads and strategic high points and UN officials said Monday that the battle for Orasje appeared to fit into the same pattern.

By 1:15 p.m. (1115 GMT), UN monitors were unable to give details of the numbers of shells fired but said they appeared mostly to be coming from the Bosnian Serb side, a spokesman said.

At its narrowest point, the flat plain corridor, running east-west between mountains on either side, is just five kilometres (three miles) wide. It is of vital strategic interest for the Serbs, enabling them to resupply Serb-held areas in northwestern Bosnia from Serb-held areas in the east.

UNPROFOR spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Gary Coward said the Serbs on Sunday had already launched two infantry attacks, backed by heavy artillery fire, against the Orasje pocket but added, "There have been no indications of any significant progress made by these assaults."

Monitors meanwhile recorded retaliatory shelling of the Serb-held town of Brcko, with multibarrelled rocket launchers, by the Bosnian Croats and Croatians, Coward said. [passage omitted]

However, Bosnian army General Rifta Bilajac said in an interview published Sunday that it was still unlikely that the Croatians and Bosnians would launch a full-scale attack on the corridor, which he said was too strongly defended by the Serbs to be taken. [passage omitted]

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Army 2d Corps: Serbs Reinforcing Brcko Front

AU1605085595 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0800 GMT 16 May 95

[Report by Hamid Deronjic from the Brcko front via the Press Center of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 2d Corps]

[FBIS Translated Text] Brcko, 16 May 1995. There was no peace on the Brcko front overnight. Throughout the night, the Chetniks fired 82-mm and 60-mm mortar shells and flak—irregularly but intensively—at the positions of the 215th Motorized Brigade.

At the same time the traffic along the so-called Brcko corridor has again gained momentum. The aggressor's military convoys moved all night along the Bijeljina-Brcko-Pelagicevo road. This morning, the 108th Croatian Defense Council Infantry Brigade also reported on the movement of the aggressor's heavy vehicles.

Also last night several flights of the Chetnik helicopters were registered over Brcko.

The fact that they are hauling in new reinforcements and equipment confirms the information that the aggressor has suffered heavy losses in men and equipment in the offensive launched on the Orasje-Samac front. However, it also indicates that the aggressor could redirect his offensive to other parts of the Posavina front with the aim of widening the so-called corridor.

The fighters of the 215th Motorized Brigade and the 108th Infantry Brigade are firmly in control of all the defense lines.

HVO Lines Hold Firm Against Serb Attacks

LD1505155695 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1500 GMT 15 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] This morning the Serb aggressors launched fierce attacks along all defense lines on the Orasje-Samac battlefield. They attacked Grebnice from the directions of Bosanski Samac, Novo Selo, and Baktusa and tried to break the defense lines of the Croat Defense Council. The attack was successfully repelled. The command of the Orasje operational zone has reported that one Serb tank was destroyed and at least five Serb soldiers were put out of action.

Another infantry attack from the direction of Obudovac was also repelled. The enemy suffered big losses in manpower and equpiment.

The Serbs fired around 100 120mm and 82mm mortar shells at Vidovice and Vucilovac, from the direction of Jenjici, Lepnica, and Krepsic. There are no reports of casualties and the defense lines are stable.

Serb, NATO Planes Reported Over Bihac Region

AU1505141895 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 15 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The aggressor's attacks have intensified today on the Bihac region. As Mirza Sadikovic reports, this morning the Bihac area, particularly Mt. Pljesevica, was overflown by the aggressor's aircraft. The aircraft had taken off from the Udbine airfield. NATO planes soon appeared in the sky.

According to the information coming from Bihac, the Chetniks have been bringing in reinforcements. Our defense lines are firm and unchanged.

Knin Serbs Demand Fuel From Convoy for Bihac

AU1505152595 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 15 May 95

[Report by Nada al Issa from Zagreb]

[FBIS Translated Text] This is the third day that the convoy of the FAO international organization has been blocked on the occupied territory of Croatia. The convoy carries 250 tonnes of seed potatoes for Bihac. The convoy, as we know, left Zagreb two days ago in the morning, but was halted at Vojnici. Following negotiations between UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] representatives and the representatives of the Knin authorities, the convoy had continued its journey, but not for long, since it was again halted at Licko Petrovo Selo, and then last night turned back to Topusko.

As a condition to let the convoy through, the authorities in the occupied territory of Croatia first demanded that the convoy be redirected via Kladusa. Now they have set a new condition: They want UNPROFOR to give them a certain amount of fuel, and then—they say—they will let the convoy through.

The biggest problem is in the fact that the seeds are perishable goods, so there is the danger that some of the shipment might rot before it gets to Bihac. Also the sowing time is passing.

Because of all this UNPROFOR representative General Peters is trying today to get permission in Knin from the local authorities to get the convoy going to Bihac today, if at all possible. One should hope that UNPROFOR is also aware of the importance of delivering the seeds on time. If not enough is sown now, a humanitarian catastrophe will follow in autumn. Then UNPROFOR and the international community will be to blame. The lives of 250,000 people of the Bihac region depend now on the decisiveness of the international community.

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5th Corps Advances on Mt. Grmec Near Bihac

AU1605092895 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 16 May 95

[Report by Muhamed Mulic from Bihac]

[FBIS Translated Text] The clashes with the joint aggressor have resumed today in the western part of the Bosnian Krajina, particularly on the Grmusa-Srbljani Plateau and around Bosanska Krupa.

Fierce clashes with the aggressor's forces have been under way on this front over the last few days. In a counterattack, the fighters of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 5th Corps have managed to move their defense lines deep inside the territory that was temporarily occupied by the enemy. The aggressor has suffered significant losses in the clashes, including a number of dominant points on the slopes of Mt. Grmec.

Heavy fighting is also in progress around Bosanska Krupa, while enemy sniper and small arms fire has been registered on the other parts of the front.

Following several days of obstruction and bans on the territory of the so-called Serb Krajina, the convoy with 250 metric tons of seed potatoes finally entered Bihac last night.

Serbs Fire Mortars on Mostar, Konjic Fronts

AU1505184795 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 15 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] We have learned from the 4th Corps of our army that today the Chetniks fired two mortar shells at Vrapcici near Mostar.

They also fired sporadically [word indistinct] on the Konjic and Mostar fronts.

Serb Forces Reportedly Attack Gorazde

AU1605110195 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 16 May 95

[Report by Muhamed Hadzijahic from Gorazde]

[FBIS Translated Text] This morning one person was seriously wounded in the aggressor's heavy attacks. Karadzic's Chetniks are directing the fiercest attacks from the direction of (Podgrab) and (?Mastilova Stijena) at the area of (Krec) and Zilici. Overnight and this morning, a number of 105-mm howitzer shells have been fired at these areas, while from (?Gosina) 82-mm mortars have been firing at Hrenovica. [Word indistinct], Orlijas, and Radici have also been exposed to heavy attacks, as have the areas of Hlopoc and Kapaoc, and parts of Vranovina, which are under the control of the fighters of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 81st Division.

Karadzic's Chetniks have been intensifying their small arms and sniper fire against Vitkovici [word indistinct], where another person was seriously wounded this morning.

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UN Says Army 'Largely Withdrawn' From Zone

AU1605161295 Paris AFP in English 1548 GMT 16 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, May 16 (AFP)—The Croatian Army has largely withdrawn from a UN-monitored buffer zone it penetrated in an offensive last week against Serb rebels and has begun to pull out of another, the United Nations said Tuesday [16 May].

Croatian President Franjo Tudjman said during a visit to Bonn Tuesday that all Croatian troops deployed in the buffer zones, in violation of a March 1994 ceasefire agreement, would leave before (2100 GMT) Tuesday.

"A large majority of troops have withdrawn" from so-called "sector south," UN spokesman Alun Roberts told AFP.

Another UN spokesman said that Zagreb's troops had begun withdrawing from an eastern buffer zone near Croatia's border with Serbia.

But Croatian forces have shown no sign of pulling back in sector north, southeast of the capital Zagreb, UN observers in the area said.

Czech Peacekeepers Work Normally in Sector South

AU1605162995 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 15 May 95 p 1

[Article by "ctk, gag": "Croats Lifted the Siege"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Zagreb/Knin—As of yesterday, the Czech blue helmets in all positions can operate as usual. This was reported by General Rostislav Kotil, UN troops commander in Sector South. [passage omitted]

There was relative peace in the area of operations of the Czech battalion, only occasional minor shooting took place. According to General Kotil, all Czech soldiers are fine, and they coped well with the increased tension of the past few days. [passage omitted]

A total of 54 soldiers have been repatriated from the Czech battalion in Croatia this year. Of these, 16 left for breach of discipline. The others ended their mission prematurely because of family or health reasons. "Moreover, some of them cannot cope with the war stress," Jaromir Novotny, head of the Foreign Relations Section at the Defense Ministry, told LIDOVE NOVINY. From the beginning of the battalion's mission until the partition of the Federal Army in 1993, 118 soldiers have been repatriated, and another 100 people—25 for breach of discipline—a year later.

Tudjman Makes Statement on Departure for Germany

LD1605084295 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 0800 GMT 16 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Croatian President Franjo Tudjman has left Zagreb for Germany on a one-day official visit at the invitation of Chancellor Kohl. President Tudjman was seen off at Zagreb airport by Assembly Speaker Nedjeljko Mihanovic, by Prime Minister Nikica Valentic, by Katica Ivanisevic, president of the Assembly's Chamber of Counties, by Ministers Mate Granic, Gojko Susak, and Ivan Jarnjak, by Colonel General Zvonimir Cervenko, representative of the chief of General Staff of the Croatian Army, and by Zagreb Mayor Branko Miksa.

After inspecting the guard of honor, President Tudjman made the following statement:

[Begin Tudjman recording] It can be expected that we will further deepen our relations which have been very good right from the very beginning of the establishment of Croatia. The reasons for that are numerous: our joint interest in resolving the crisis in this part of the world, in restoring peace, in establishing the new world order. More than 500,000 Croats live in Germany; in their own way, they are cementing this friendship and creating a favorable climate not only for the official German policy, but also for a favorable attitude of the entire German public toward Croatia.

I think that not only German, but also the world public, has accepted as normal the news about the liberation of occupied Croatian territories. We will also discuss other issues. I will endeavor to urge Germany to involve itself in the realization of an idea—that the Split-Knin-Zagreb-Europe railway line should be opened under the auspices of the European Union.

We will also discuss many other issues in the sphere of bilateral and multilateral relations. [end recording]

Tudjman Grants Amnesty to 47 Persons

LD1505175695 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 15 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] We have just received a statement from the Croatian president's office on amnesty granted by the president of the Republic of Croatia:

On the basis of Article 98 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia and Article One of the Law on Amnesty, the president of the Republic of Croatia has made a decision to grant amnesty and free from criminal prosecution 47 people who have come under Croatia's

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jurisdiction following the liberation of western Slavonia and who had not committed war crimes.

Proceedings had been set in motion against them in the Zagreb and Bjelovar military courts under suspicion that they had committed the criminal act of armed rebellion under Article 235, Paragraph One, of the Croatian penal code.

SDS Official Under House Arrest in Pakrac

AU1405202995 Knin Srpski Radio Krajina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1900 GMT 12 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] According to SRNA, the Croatian police and UN soldiers for several days now have been holding Veljko Djakula, former Serb Democratic Party president for western Slavonia, under house arrest in Pakrac— so claim the Serbs who managed to leave Pakrac two days ago and cross over to the Serb republic. Stevo Harambasic, commander of the western Slavonia Corps 51st Brigade, and his soldiers are in prison in Bjelovar. According to those who were released from the prison, Harambasic is bravely holding out in spite of constant maltreatment. SRNA reports that the commander of the 51st Brigade said that he would not leave the Bjelovar prison until every single Serb is released from detention camps in Varazdin, Bjelovar, Podravska Slatina, and Daruvar.

Commentary Views Coming HDZ Elections

AU1505104995 Rijeka NOVI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 11 May 95 p 23

[Commentary by Neven Santic: "The Magic Formula Is Recognition of the Supreme Authority"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In May and in June, and then again in the fall, at its Third Congress, the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] will comb through its own membership once more in order to find the winning combinations on all levels; the party leaderships are ready to accept the challenge of the preparations for the new parliamentary elections. Internal elections within the ruling party should therefore present to political rivals the people whom they will have to "fight" on the ground, and offer to the electorate the cadre that will worthily represent the party with their competence before the key election campaign starts. That is why these internal elections are particularly important for Croatia's entire political scene. After they have been carried out, it will be clear whom the HDZ is pinning its hopes on for repeated success in the elections, and which election strategy and political platform they will choose.

The reorganization of the HDZ, as Secretary General Zlatko Canjuga calls these internal elections, has answered at least one question that has been bothering the Croatian political public. There will be no parliamentary elections before fall at the earliest. Other "enigmas" hidden in the elections of the leading people of HDZ units are yet to be revealed. But, will there be any surprises at all? Can we expect radical cadre changes in the ruling party?

Loyalty to the President's Political Program

In political associations that resemble movements rather than parties—and the HDZ is one—there is only one magic formula for "internal differentiation." It boils down to recognition of the party leader's supreme authority. His strategic concepts are not questioned, and his individual decisions are seen as part of the tactics for realizing the predetermined goal that serves as orientation for the membership and sympathizers.

One can suppose, therefore, that the decisive criterion for the reorganization of the HDZ will be loyalty to the political program of President Tudjman, whose position has been additionally strengthened after the liberation of western Slavonia. Just as the previous elections in the ruling party removed from its leadership those who were not prepared to follow the president unconditionally as a warning to all potential "rebels" about what awaited them, the coming elections are intended to additionally improve the cohesion in the party, which should be adequate for the competition with political rivals.

The media coverage of the elections within the ruling party, which is an overture to the parliamentary elections, should be seen in the same light. Starting from Gospic, HRT [Croatian Radio and Television], as the strongest state-owned media, has been giving a great deal of space to the speeches of the president and other HDZ officials, and from the placement and the intonation of those reports, every party member and ordinary citizen can very easily recognize what approach has been decided on in the presidential palace. The same effect is achieved by occasional infusions of "fresh blood," as in the case of former Croatian Peasants Party [HSS] members, Josip Stojanovic and Mirko Madjor, who, on the one hand, are there to confirm the "correctness of the party policy" and, on the other, openly show that nobody is irreplaceable.

That means that all those who believe the internal elections in the HDZ will enable different party factions—whether they are called "technomanagerial," "right-wing," "moderate," or something else—to enter an open discussion are in fact deluding themselves. Open opposition, which could be interpreted as resistance to the middle bloc of the party, which is embodied in the president—who is still, according to all opinion polls,

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the party's main trump card in the electorate—would bring defeat to anybody who attempted it. Advocates and followers of different factions, who are indispensable for movements just as leaders are, know very well that power is what connects them, so they accept coexistence as a necessity. The firm grip on power, and the "media logistics," are there to convince all ambitious HDZ politicians who have let their roots grow on all sides that the possible "excommunication" is too much of a risk for their carriers and for their remaining in power.

Differences and Animosities Are To Be Wrapped Up Nicely

Since all candidates for HDZ posts know the clear rules of the game, real differences and even personal animosities are to be wrapped up in a suitable cellophane of loyalty to the party's middle block. Under the surface, however, there will be a lot of lobbying and fishing for the support of somebody from the party leadership, since by now, even in our politics, there are fewer and fewer naive people who enter the game putting their trust solely in the strength of their convictions and spoken words. Those who are seen to be "strong personalities" in their own surroundings have the advantage here, like Branimir Glavas, whose ambiguous political moves have still not endangered his position and his influence.

The price will be paid by those who will have nobody to back them, like Milan Levar, who was excluded from the Gospic HDZ because of his "mouth," through which he expressed his skepticism about the party and its authority. The hesitant ones will also lose—those are not capable of keeping things under their control where they come from, in particular where the HDZ is in power, or where it has been dangerously infected by the "virus" of Croatian Independent Democrats [HND]; a similar destiny awaits the party leaderships from the municipalities and towns in which they are in opposition, if it is assessed that they are passive and that their work is counterproductive for the party.

Therefore, one should not expect any spectacular changes from the HDZ elections. An occasional dissatisfied individual or group is something every party must expect to find when "purging" their membership. But, the arduousness of approach and the significance which the HDZ itself attributes to the election of the new (old) cadres, of whom it demands optimal characteristics, makes one conclude that the ruling party is not indifferent about the team with which it will enter the coming "hot" parliamentary elections. According to these announcements, all those who might discredit the party should, whether of their own will or that of the membership, be removed on time. Because of the complexity of the HDZ, it is hard to predict whether this will actually be realized. If not sooner, we will know this for sure after the eagerly awaited parliamentary elections.

Croatian Neglect of Banja Luka Region Discussed

AU1605084395 Rijeka NOVI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 11 May 95 p 2

[Commentary by Drazen Vukov Colic: "The Enclave of Oblivion"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is the innocent and peaceful civilians who in a war pay for the noble truth that the loser is entitled to be angry. It is these people who for reasons quite incomprehensible to them suddenly find themselves in the distasteful role of victims "on duty" and despised foreigners in their own homes. In the tragic story [of former Yugoslavia], the Croats from Banja Luka have been carrying the martyrs' cross on their backs for four years already; they have usually been overshadowed by the overall geostrategic politics, and whenever they have come into the focus of media attention—as is the case now, since Karadzic wants revenge for his complete defeat in Western Slavonia—one cannot judge whether the last of those who remained in Banja Luka will be helped or harmed by it. Almost no one has helped them so far, since Banja Luka has practically been a "forbidden city" for international supervisors (the only international organizations that somehow function there are the Red Cross and the UN High Commission on Refugees). Croatian politics has primarily cared for other groups of Bosnian Croats—those from "Herzeg-Bosnia," central Bosnia, and Posavina, and among them there have also been those who—owing to their special military, diplomatic, and political circumstances—have been more important than others. The Croats in Vojvodina have succeeded in politically organizing their self-defense together with the Hungarians, whereas the Banja Luka Bishopric has always been more or less accused of having a "too soft" and "too conciliating policy." It can be said that the "Caritas" has been their only support, which means that they can only pray with their shepherds for the retention of a minimum of their religious freedom.

Within a week, it has now come to a raging revenge, which has shown how much both the Croats and the Croatian Church have already lost in that area. It was not until the present events that the public fully realized the scope of crimes for which the Serbs did not punish anybody, so that also in connection with the latest crimes Karadzic's minister for religious issues made the statement from which it was clear that the criminals in military uniforms had to be rather congratulated

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than imprisoned for their behavior after the "storm in Slavonia." The famous human rights activist, Mr. Mazowiecki, has never succeeded in visiting Banja Luka. Neither the increasingly small and powerless Yasushi Akashi nor the European observers in white "ice-cream vendor" suits have ever been to that town. Even the people who know inner-Serb relations very well claim that Karadzic too—except when he needs a shelter for refugees—is unwilling to interfere with Banja Luka, since he does not want to give rise to discussions about where the proper capital of the Bosnian Serbs should be, or about whether the "Serb Republic" should choose a "socialist" or a "monarchic" future.

All this shows that a "tacit pogrom" is practically going on in the "forbidden city" of Banja Luka, which is now wildly competing with Knin in accusing Croatia, in order to hush up the increasingly unpleasant accusations that Karadzic "has betrayed his Krajina brothers" and to justify the presence of the thousands of refugees it will soon use as cannon fodder. All dignitaries of the church, all Croatian leaders and the officials of the Muslim-Croatian federation have already referred to this situation. Croatian diplomacy has also made use of this sad occasion by requiring in a letter written by Mario Nobilo [Croatian ambassador to the United Nations] to the UN Security Council that the Banja Luka region be open at least for international humanitarian observers. Despite all the bustle and rage, "official dailies" have hardly drawn attention to the recent special meeting of the "Action for Banja Luka," in which things were also discussed that exceeded the discussion about the hypocrisy of international factors, although it has to be mentioned that these factors are now "splitting hairs" in Croatian policy, whereas in general they allow the Serbs to pursue "the policy of sword and fire."

Cynics say that—apart from a public tumult that will at last probably reach international ears—nothing can be one: Banja Luka and the whole region is in all international plans foreseen as a Serb territory. This has been opposed neither by the Croats nor by the Muslims. This town and the whole region have been spared all war events, and important battles—those in which national existence was fought for with weapons—were fought against the Serbs for strategically important or "mixed" areas, with or without the Muslims. This is the logic of a war that includes "ethnic cleansing" and very dubious "human displacements;" [a situation] in which Croatian politicy has never succeeded in proving to the world that the Croatian minority in Banja Luka must have the same rights as the Serbs in Croatia. The thing Croatia must accept now seems to arise from the almost intact postulate that the Serbs in Croatia are "the nation that has participated in the creation the Croatian state," whereas the Croats in the regions with an old or a new majority must be happy that they are alive. No powerful international response should therefore be expected this time either, especially if the cynics ask the question why Croatia did not show before—as fervently as now—that it was worried about the half-forgotten enclave.

Muslims on 'Anti-Islamic, Anti-Bosnian Feelings'

LD1305165895 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 13 May 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Party of Democratic Action of Croatia [Stranka Demokratske Akcije; SDA] and the leaders of Croatia's Islamic community, the Merhamet Society, and the Preporod Cultural Society today issued a joint public statement, following, as they claim, an upsurge in anti-Islamic and anti-Bosnian feelings in Croatia. Nada Al-Isa reports from Zagreb.

[Al-Isa] It took place in Varazdin, 80 kilometers from Zagreb, on Kurban Bayram day. Bosnian Hasan Tanovic was brutally attacked and beaten as he observed his religious holiday. Mr. Tanovic has lived in Croatia for years. This is why the political, charitable and cultural organizations and associations of Bosnians in Croatia say in their statement: We address an open and sharp protest to the Croatian authorities over this [word indistinct] attack. To make things even worse, it took place in the presence of policemen who calmly observed the attack without any reaction whatsoever.

This is why members of our community, the statement says, are confused and scared, as the anti-Islamic and anti-Bosnian atmosphere in Croatia gains momentum. Hasan Tanovic is a well-known charity worker who helped Croatia and its refugees a great deal at the time when the aggression [as heard] was at its worst. [passage omitted]

Stabilization Program Seen as Successful

AU1505101095 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 11 May 95 p 7

[Interview with Zlatko Matesa, Croatian minister without portfolio, by B. Stipic; place and date not given: "Shells Do Not Stop Credits"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Mr. Zlatko Matesa has been working as the Croatian minister without portfolio for a long time. This does not mean, however, that his tasks are not precisely defined. His main task is the PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary] program of the European Union, but Mr. Matesa is also in charge of bringing Croatia into the World Trade Organization (WTO) as well of the Croatian

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relations with international financial institutions, and of Croatian foreign debts. In other words, he is a kind of finance minister of foreign affairs. He has had a difficult job during the last couple of years, because of the restrictions international financial organizations imposed on Croatia, but he can be happy now, since Croatia is receiving credits and words of praise for its stabilization program. Has this been affected by the recent war events?

Economy Is Also a Guarantor of Sovereignty

[Stipic] Have there been reactions by international financial institutions during the last couple of days, after the liberation of Western Slavonia and shelling of Croatian towns? Has anyone withdrawn his credit, or stopped an already started project or threatened to stop it?

[Matesa] There have been no threats. Everybody has shown a human interest in the events. The colleagues from the IMF, the World Bank, the European Bank gave us a ring and asked us what life in Zagreb was like. No one mentioned possible cancellations of credits or similar problems. I do no expect such a thing. After all, the prime minister and his deputy have mentioned on several occasions that the program will not be given up. The program and the efforts in the field of economy have enabled Croatia to behave like a sovereign state today.

[Stipic] Does this mean that France is the only country that tried to stop the signing of the agreement on trade cooperation?

[Matesa] Clearly. As the national coordinator for the PHARE program I can say that the we have not got any signs that Croatia's access to that program will be made more difficult. What is important for the world is the debtor's creditability, that he is able to repay the credits.

[Stipic] If the war spreads, as some "spiritual fathers" fear, would Croatia's creditability not become questionable too?

[Matesa] Not necessarily. It is no platitude when I say that Croatia has many friends in the world today, who understand the political and economic situation very well. There are countries that have been confronted with the same problem, and their economies function normally. Israel is a typical example. Nobody thinks of canceling credits for Israel. What is important is that the country shows its economic power. You have to be powerful in order to be respected by others. Croatia cannot be blackmailed any longer. We can be told that a certain agreement will be singed later on, but this postponement will not significantly influence our global situation and our ability to survive. It is different if you have a strong economy and considerable hard currency reserves.

Words of Praise for Croatian Program

[Stipic] The Croatian delegation came back from Washington with good news. What happened there?

[Matesa] We participated in the spring meeting of the World Bank and the IMF. We heard the words of praise for the Croatian program. The leaders of the International Bank and the IMF said that ours was one of the rare successful programs they had seen. Two, or two and a half years ago they looked at Croatia as a patient whose survival was questionable. The IMF leaders said during the talks about future cooperation that Croatia did not need any further cooperation with that institution, since it had mastered the difficulties in which the IMF could help by means of standby arrangements.

[Stipic] And what does the World Bank say?

[Matesa] We have to talk with them about the EFSAL, that is the credit support for restructuring of companies and banks, which would be the external support of the other part of the stabilization program. The World Bank and the IMF mission will visit Zagreb in the first half of June. The World Bank will also have talks about a credit for the social program, that is for the improvement of funds, especially the pension fund.

[Stipic] What did you talk about in Washington with the representatives of the Exim Bank, the U.S. bank that lends money to foreign trade companies?

[Matesa] We met with Kenneth Brody, the Exim Bank president and talked about their readiness to grant credits for business transactions in Croatia. We also talked about the Croatian debts to the Paris Club, because the guarantor of many debts in the United States of America is the Exim Bank. We are preparing a bilateral agreement that should be signed in August. The bank will then be ready for granting credits for U.S. exports to Croatia. Before we left the United States of America we also talked with the Chemical Bank leadership, which is the agent of U.S. commercial banks for the debts to the London Club.

Capital Market as Soon as Possible

[Stipic] Why have the debts to the London Club not been rescheduled, as was done with the debts to the Paris Club?

[Matesa] The Paris Club was important for us, because its members are two state agencies that grant credits for the exports of their countries. Since investments into the reconstruction of Croatia are very important for us,

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we wanted to enable our economy to import equipment and use these credits as soon as possible. France has announced that it will open medium-term credits up to 150 million francs for Croatia as soon as the bilateral agreement is signed. The London Club is important, because we would like Croatia to enter the international capital market as soon as possible.

[Stipic] Who are the creditors in the London Club?

[Matesa] Commercial banks that granted credits to the former Yugoslavia. It is our aim to reschedule these debts and enable Croatia to enter the financial market in this way. The payment of foreign debts means the strengthening of the international position of Croatia.

What Is the Amount of the Debt We "Inherited"?

[Stipic] What is the amount of the debt Croatia inherited from the former Yugoslavia?

[Matesa] This debt is twofold: The purpose-bound, that is the debt where the contracting party was either a company or a bank in Croatia, and no-purpose, where the contracting party was either the National Bank of Yugoslavia or the former federation. The latter is the problem, because commercial banks tend to require more from Croatia and Slovenia than we should be obliged to pay. Croatia owns the Paris Club approximately $1.3 billion, and the London Club approximately $1.4 billion.

[Stipic] What did Croatia get by rescheduling the debts to the Paris Club?

[Matesa] Rescheduling means that we are allowed to pay later something we should pay immediately. We have rescheduled the debt for the period of 14 years, with a two-year extension. We have also rescheduled the accumulated interest, but in shorter periods of time. This is important, since the debtors—Croatian companies—can "breathe" now. We have agreed on progressive payment of debts, which means that we shall pay less at the beginning and more later on. The major part of the debt has been shifted forward, when the Croatian economy should be able to repay the debt without problems.

Preparations for Direct Investments

[Stipic] What is the amount of the latest credits?

[Matesa] The biggest one is the World Bank credit for reconstruction to the amount of $128 million, there follows the credit for the construction of roads to the amount of $80 million, and then the credit for restructuring that could amount to approximately $150 million. The amount of a credit for the social sector is not known yet. A $40 million credit for the health services has been granted too.

[Stipic] Are all these credits together—the old and new debts—not too much for a country like Croatia?

[Matesa] One of the transition countries with most debts is Hungary, which has approximately $28 billion in foreign debts and 10 million inhabitants. Croatia's debts amounts to approximately $3 billion on five million inhabitants. We can say that Croatia has no problems with the foreign debts. Nobody in the government thinks, however, that the development of Croatia will be based on credits. We are making preparations for direct investments, in which the investor shares the destiny of a project and the risk of an enterprise.

[Stipic] Have any direct investments been announced yet?

[Matesa] According to the National Bank of Croatia records, these investments amounted to approximately $400 million in 1994. We should develop a system for the recording of direct investments. We have just completed the project with the World Bank for the establishment of the Agency for the Promotion of Investments in Croatia. Most of the European countries and Asian "tigers" like Malaysia have such agencies. This agency should have the complete information about direct foreign investments and it should support foreign investors.

How To Spend Should Also Be Learned!

[Stipic] Should such an agency not have been founded a long time already? It was heard some years ago that possible investors gave up their investments, because they were given no support and thus had the feeling that they were not wanted.

[Matesa] We have learned from experiences of others. We have seen that such an agency is useful in many respects. Now we have the opportunity to establish a network of institutions that will help foreign investors. We are also preparing an agency that would grant credits to our export companies. We have been developing our state for only four years, however, so that there are always some other priorities that have to be solved first. We have been granted a credit by the European Bank for the development of small and middle-size companies, because the private economy is the engine of development. We had talks with the IFC in the United States of America; the IFC is a part of the World Bank that works on investments in private economies and it has announced a credit for our small and medium-sized companies.

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[Stipic] One has the impression that today the international financial institutions are setting other requirements for credits than they did 10 years ago. One of the requirements for the credit for highway construction is the introduction of market principles into the public sector. Are they teaching us "to fish" by setting these requirements?

[Matesa] We know how to fish. It is true, however, that they have changed their policy. The studies about how successful the projects were for which they granted credits before showed that only 30 percent of credits have been repaid. Therefore they are now forcing debtors to accept the conditions under which a credit can be spent. They want to be sure that the user will behave rationally. They require that the credit be used according to a firm procedure, and this is what confuses our people. They still think in the old way: Give us money, and we know best what to do with it. There is no such thing in the world any longer.

[Box, p 7]

Restrictions of Imports and the WTO

[Stipic] The new bill of the [Croatian] Trade Law foresees the control of imports and the protection of domestic production, which does not correspond to WTO principles. Will this not be an impediment for Croatia's membership in that organization?

[Matesa] We expect that the group that works on the Croatian membership in the WTO will meet at the beginning of autumn. A kind of control will follow then. I expect that we shall become a WTO member by the end of 1995. Our main aim in foreign trade today is to abandon the duties on imports other than customs duties. The WTO does not require from a country that it ruin its own economic interest but that it harmonize its trade and protection measures with WTO standards. Croatian membership in the WTO is important because 80 percent of the world trade goes through that organization. Everyone who wants an open economy, and we want it, must be a member.

[Box, p 7]

PHARE Program

[Stipic] Croatia's membership in the PHARE Program has been discussed for a long time already. There is the impression that this is something very important for us, but very difficult to achieve. At which stage are the negotiations?

[Matesa] This program is undoubtedly important. It has political import[illegible]ecause it would enable Croatia to come closer to the European Union. In the economic sense, it is an important transfer of technology and know-how. The financial aspect of approximately $5 million per year is significant too. It is a fact that the European Union blackmailed Croatia with this program and with the agreement on trade cooperation, by requiring a certain behavior from it. Croatia is not in a situation, however, to be dependent on that program, although it would very much like to have it. We are now waiting for 29 May [1995], when the Croatian membership in the PHARE Program should be confirmed in the meeting of the European Union foreign ministers.

General Spegelj on Changes in Balance of Power

95BA0232B Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 15-17 Apr 95 p 10

[Article by Krsto Cviic: "The Croatian Bridegroom Was Wed by a Priestess"]

[FBIS Translated Text] London, 13 Apr—Yesterday, on his way back from a trip to the United States, General Martin Spegelj spoke at a working luncheon at the local Institute for European Defense and Strategic Studies. He soberly and thoroughly analyzed the omissions and mistakes of Western policy toward Croatia and Bosnia, especially the attempt to maintain Yugoslavia at any cost, which prevented a timely response to the aggression and prevented curbing it. He warned that all those who hoped and still hope that Serbia will be the "gendarme of the Balkans" will be disappointed. It is neither militarily nor economically capable of that. The Serbs in Serbia may shout for a Greater Serbia, but they are not willing to die for it. He said that he was not too impressed by General Mladic, who had not won a single battle either in Croatia or later on in Bosnia, and instead only exploited his superiority in weapons, in accordance with the principle "Strike at some town with artillery, and then send in paramilitary units to 'finish the job.'" In this war, which is one and the same war against Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the only superiority that Serbia still has is its superiority in weapons, which it owes to its own production, and Russian, Iraqi, and other shipments evading the embargo. Weapons alone are coming to mean less and less in this war, however. In contrast to the maximum of 310,000 soldiers (including both Karadzic's and Martic's forces), Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (without a general mobilization) have 400,000. Serbia cannot mobilize anything more: It has to maintain reserves, in view of Kosovo, Sandzak, Vojvodina, Albania, and Bulgaria. Consequently, according to the general, one should not—when the Bosnian and Croatian Serbs start to lose—fear the direct armed intervention by Milosevic with which Western circles are intimidating Croatia and

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Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to frustrate the lifting of the UN arms embargo "against all warring sides." And what if the Russians intervene? It will then be a general problem, and not just Croatia's or Bosnia-Herzegovina's problem.

The fortunes of war are changing in the field, according to the general. In Bosnia, 1995 has already brought considerable political and military changes in the balance of power, in favor of those who are resisting the Greater-Serbian aggression. The Washington agreements made an important and valuable contribution. He believes that political and military cooperation between the Croats and the Bosnian Muslims will be maintained and expanded to their mutual benefit. It is also important that more and more Serbs are realizing the fateful nature of Karadzic's policy. Croatia will also recover its occupied areas—peacefully if possible, and if not, then necessarily by force. The international community will play a definite role in all of this, according to him, but, he said "It is primarily and above all our own task."

It was striking how General Spegelj—in the English style—sincerely and without evasion stated his views, but even in his answers to direct questions avoided personal criticism of those in Croatia with whose policy he disagreed. This afternoon General Spegelj will visit Lady Thatcher, who has expressed a desire to meet and listen to him. I was also invited. This Easter weekend I am also leaving for a large international academic conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina in Ankara.

RSK Assembly Chairman on Western Slavonia

AU1505171295 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 15 May 95 p 2

[Article by Z.R.: "FRY Has Done Much For Us"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Kragujevac—I know that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has done many things for us that we have asked it to do and that it has done what it could do. I do not know whether it could have intervened militarily as I am not a military strategist. Western Slavonia had been visited by various opposition leaders, Vojislav Seselj, for instance. They held rallies there, demanding that the highway be closed and the work on it stopped, which was all aimed at the destabilization of the situation. Similar attempts were also made from the Serbian republic [Serb-held regions in Bosnia-Herzegovina]. On the other hand, the FRY is striving for a peaceful settlement of the crisis, and we in the RSK [republic of Serbian Krajina] are not in favor of war either. This was stated for Kragujevac Radio by Rajko Lezajic, chairman of the RSK assembly, commenting on FRY's conduct with regard to the Croatian aggression on western Slavonia.

The chairman of the Krajina assembly then said the RSK assembly would convene on 18 May to discuss a report on the aggression on western Slavonia and the help of UN peace forces. The setting up of a commission for the creation of a Serbian federation will also be on the agenda.

The assembly will have to examine the defense strategy and the reasons for the closure of the highway, which the RSK assembly and the government did not know anything about, and which was later used as a motive for the aggression, Lezajic said.

Krajina Serbs Replace Military Commander

AU1605161495 Paris AFP in English 1559 GMT 16 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, May 16 (AFP)—Croat Serb General Mile Mrksic was named the new head of rebel Serb forces in Croatia on Tuesday [16 May], the Serbs' ISKRA news agency reported.

The rebel Serbs' supreme defense council said that Mrksic would replace General Milan Celeketic, 49, who tendered his resignation as commander of the Krajina Serbs' troops to rebel leader Milan Martic on Monday.

Celeketic had said in a letter to Martic that he "no longer had the moral force necessary" to carry out his duties since Croatian government troops recaptured western Slavonia from the Serbs earlier this month.

Celeketic blamed political leaders of the separatist Serb republic of Krajina, of which western Slavonia is a part, for the loss.

The resignation was a first public sign of tension between political and military leaders since Serb forces lost western Slavonia to Croatian Army troops.

The Serb rebel parliament is due to meet Thursday in the Krajina capital of Knin, although some deputies have called for it to be moved to the far eastern edge of western Slavonia, where it began May 2 before it was adjourned due to Croatia's offensive.

RSK Assembly To Meet 18 May in Borovo Selo

LD1605164095 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1620 GMT 16 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Knin, 16 May (TANJUG)—Rajko Lezajic, assembly speaker of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK], has convened the third sitting of the first regular session of the Krajina parliament for 18 May in the village of Borovo Selo.

The assembly is due to analyze the causes and consequences of the Croatian aggression against western Slavonia.

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The RSK parliament will be in session in Borovo Selo as requested by deputies from western Slavonia, which was approved by the majority of deputies, the invitation to the session specifies.

Thus all uncertainties as to where the session would be held, Knin, Vukovar, or Borovo Selo, have been removed.

Kozara, Podgrmec SDS Meet in Sanski Most

AU1405203195 Knin Srpski Radio Krajina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1900 GMT 12 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Coordinating Committee of the Serb Democratic Party [SDS] of Serb Lands for Kozara and Podgrmec at today's session held in Sanski Most strongly condemned the genocide by the Ustasha authorities in occupied areas of western Slavonia. The statement issued at today's session says that the people of Kozara and Podgrmec will never come to terms with the occupation of western Slavonia and other Serb ethnic areas for which many Serb generations paid the highest price, giving their blood and lives.

Furthermore, the committee discussed a proposal of the RS [Srpska republic] government regarding a new territorial organization that provides for 11 districts in the Serb republic and concluded that the procedure be suspended until two Serb states west of the Drina are united.

Serbian Prince Visits Martic, Discusses Slavonia

AU1205120095 Knin Srpski Radio Krajina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1900 GMT 11 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Milan Martic, the republic of Serbian Krajina president, received Prince Tomislav Karadjordjevic, who is visiting the republic of Serbian Krajina, according to the office of the republic of Serbian Krajina's president.

During the lengthy meeting, Prince Tomislav inquired about the situation in the republic of Serbian Krajina and about relations between the Serbian states. He was particularly eager to learn more about the Croatian aggression against western Slavonia and its aftermath. President Martic informed Prince Tomislav about activities designed to save the population of western Slavonia. Speaking about the causes of the events in western Slavonia, the republic of Serbian Krajina president briefed Prince Tomislav Karadjordjevic on measures that would be taken to prevent the suffering of civilians in any part of the republic of Serbian Krajina. They concluded that the population of western Slavonia is in dire need of help and that all Serbian patriots must play their part. Prince Tomislav Karadjordjevic himself pledged to do his best to help them, ends the statement of the office of the republic of Serbian Krajina president.

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Commentary Calls Greece's OSCE Veto 'Illegal'

AU1505172795 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 13 May 95 p 2

[Commentary by Nevenka Mitrevska: "Voting Outside Protocol"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Recently, Greek diplomats have started applying a new tactic in their persistent offensive against the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]. They are strolling around and persuading the world's protagonists that there is no reason for concern, that a Macedonian-Greek dialogue is just about to begin, that there will even soon be an agreement between the two countries, at least on a "small package." Of course, there are no sound foundations for them to fuel such optimism. UN mediator Cyrus Vance, reliable diplomatic sources reveal, has not been able to make Greece promise to lift the illegal blockade against Macedonia as soon as the negotiations begin. At least for now, there are not going to be any negotiations. The aim of Athens' "new tactic" is obviously an old one: On the one hand, it wants to relax the international pressure on it to resume the interrupted negotiations with Macedonia and, on the other, to secure another delay in finding a solution to the whole dispute, at least until the new U.S. election campaign starts.

The attempt of Greek Foreign Minister Karolos Papoulias to increase the blackmail on Macedonia by suggesting that the issue of Macedonia's admission to the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE] should be placed in the same package as the negotiations with Cyrus Vance is just further proof that Greece does not intend to sit at the negotiating table with Macedonia any time soon.

Illegal Veto

Following the announced Hungarian initiative to reach a solution that will be "acceptable for both sides" and thus finally admit Macedonia to its [the OSCE's] ranks, Papoulias's statement looks like a desperate attempt to remove matters from their natural location and transfer the question of Macedonia's admission to the OSCE, which is an exclusively European question, to totally the wrong place: the United Nations. The Hungarian initiative, according to diplomatic sources, is first of all based on the fact that the Greek veto on Macedonia's admission to the OSCE is as illegal in terms of the organization's protocol as the Greek blockade on the southern Macedonian border is in terms of European and international law. It is a fact that not only the Greek veto, but also the whole voting procedure on Macedonia's admission to the European association, has so far violated the defined rules of the game.

This is because the only criterion for a country to become a member of the OSCE, according to the Helsinki documents, is for this country to be European and freely to sign the agreed pledges, goals, and principles of the Organization. Thereafter, it is not a matter of the will of countries that are already members of the Organization as to whether or not a country will join, but it is a right that comes from the country's place on the European continent and from its own free choice to commit itself to the basic documents of the Organization. In the middle of the 1970s, at the founding conference of the CSCE in Helsinki, only Enver's Albania neither attended nor signed the final document. This was Tirana's free choice, because at that time it did not believe that, with the two power blocs, Europe could do anything substantial for its security without reference to the superpowers. Let us also recall that Europe then really regretted the abstention of even such as Albania, believing that its inclusion in the CSCE and the promotion of cooperation could contribute, first of all, to dragging it out of self-isolation and then to a gradual democratization of Albanian society....

Draw the Curtains....

How is it then that, in the case of Macedonia, the whole procedure of "admission" has been so twisted as to put at stake the basic idea of the Organization? It has occurred in a situation where, except for Greece, all the other OSCE members consider that Macedonia fulfills "all the conditions" for admission.

It all started with the vote of the member countries the moment that the independent states created after the collapse of former Yugoslavia (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia) "competed" to join the CSCE. It was a time when the other former Yugoslav republics, including Macedonia, had not yet become members of the United Nations, that is to say they were not internationally recognized as independent. That is why the vote of the CSCE member countries effectively meant confirmation of the statehood of these countries. The admission of the Republic of Macedonia to the United Nations, as we know, was lagging behind, and in the meantime the "Macedonian question" was exposed to dozens of votes within the CSCE. The same situation continued even after it had been admitted to the United Nations in April 1993, probably as a result of inertia and a disregard of the Organization's protocol. Successive chairmen neglected to review the protocol and thus save the Organization itself, and Macedonia, from a humiliating Greek circus.

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However, the "draw the curtains" story of relations between the OSCE and Macedonia does not end here. Although Macedonia has been deprived of its right to full membership contrary to the principles, the CSCE did, in the meantime, start a mission in Macedonia, sent observers to the Macedonian elections, and the extraordinary population census, to the borders with her neighbors, to control the implementation of the embargo against Serbia, and so on. Not to mention its commissioner for interethnic relations, Max van der Stuhl, who has become so much at home with us that his arrivals and departures are no longer noted by the media. In the description of his duties, the CSCE documents specifically say that his mandate is valid only in countries that are members of the Organization.

The announced Hungarian initiative is actually a result of a several months of patient work by the Macedonian diplomatic corps to prove to the OSCE administration the confusion that the whole Organization has been faced with concerning its own protocol. Now, following the encouraging response from Budapest, we can normally expect the "Macedonian case" to be finally resolved at one of the OCSE's regular sessions without a vote. There are no other obstacles to this except the one that has existed so far: The Organization's lack of respect for its own rules.

'Silence' on Gligorov's Reconciliation Call

AU1505154295 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 13 May 95 p 4

[Article by Zorica Darkovska: "What Did President Gligorov Say?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Part of the speech of Gligorov, the president of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], which was made at the central commemoration of the 50th anniversary of VE-Day in Skopje on 5 May has aroused great interest. He said that "nonfreedom, fascism, and Stalinism cannot be equated to freedom and democracy. However, it is time to let the dead rest in peace and to show respect for all the human lives lost. We must do our best to find the graves of those who died, so as to enable their descendants and relatives to express their respect and to care for their eternal homes."

It was precisely here and in his further words that he said that the "wheel of history cannot be turned back, so let all those who died rest in eternal peace. It is our humane task as a peaceloving and just nation" to voice an appeal for national reconciliation, and many discussions have already started on the current topical issue of political rehabilitation, but for whom? The interpretations of what Macedonia's president meant by this and how he put it, namely whether he was only pointing to the humane aspect of the problem or was announcing something else, have made Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski's speech by Lake Treska on 9 May even more important. In part of his speech, he said: "Let us turn toward the future; let us at least for a moment forget about our mythologies and passions; let us stop digging up the bones of our ancestors. Let us stop boasting about things that were the creation and merit of other generations, long before us...." However, for the sake of the truth, it must be pointed out that the prime minister said this in another context, namely the situation in the Balkans as a whole.

Stating these ideas, which were already present in the public, and bearing in mind the interest of some political parties and their activities related to the idea of national reconciliation in Macedonia, we tried to find out the views of some of them. However, it was no easy task. None of the parties that we contacted, either within the ruling bloc or the opposition, was ready "at this stage" to comment on this part of President Gligorov's speech.

Aware of the overall support of VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] for the proposal to rehabilitate and grant other rights to persecuted people who are imprisoned and convicted for their ideas on the independence of the Macedonian nation and its statehood, and aware of VMRO's ideas, we asked the party for its views. But it considers that, owing to the tragic death of Skopje Mayor Goran Nikolovski, who was one of their members, this was not the moment to make any comment.

The Liberal Party, after some deliberations, also said that at this stage it would refrain from any comments on what the state president meant.

The fighters of the NOB [National Liberation Struggle] gave a more or less identical response: They had nothing to say now, but the question was something about which they had a lot to say and therefore it would be discussed within their organization. This will probably be a discussion on the treatment of war invalids, whom they suggested should be treated like other invalids, and on the treatment of fighters in general.

We were only able to obtain a personal, not the party, opinion of PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] deputy Ismet Ramadani, who said that the words of the state president had impressed him as a plea to join European tendencies, where states are free from the burden of the past, from mutual problems and conflicts that they had through history. Ramadani understands all this as an appeal to overcome the burden of the past in the region of Macedonia, too.

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The parties' "silence" at this moment certainly does not mean that they will not come out with their own positions soon. Let us recall the discussions in the previous Macedonian Assembly, when political rehabilitation was first mentioned. The discussions lasted for days, emotion was high, history was confused, and ultimately the draft law was withdrawn from parliamentary procedure. Apparently, better times are expected and certainly a better law, which will be more just and avoid the possibilities of many traitors and quislings who do not deserve to be rehabilitated being rehabilitated in a fast and confused fashion. In the discussions at that time, it was emphasized that such a law must be selective, decisive, and free from policy or party goals. The text that was being offered at the time required rehabilitation in a general sense, although it is a known fact that the ideas of Vanco Mihajlov and Todor Aleksandrov, who are Bulgarian products of Macedonians, were for a long time supported by VMRO.

Miljovski Accused of Fraud Involving Money

AU1605110595 Skopje VECER in Macedonian 15 May 95 p 3

[Article by M.Jovanovski and V.Bogoev: "Party Disputes Over Money"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Liberal Party [LP] leadership has announced that it will submit a complaint to the Public Prosecutor against Minister [of Finance] Jane Miljovski for misusing his official position for unlawful gain. The Liberal Party claims that the money provided in accordance with the election law on members of the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], instead of being transferred to their bank account, was redirected to the Social Democratic Alliance on Minister Miljovski's orders. The sum in question is 8,113,242 denars or around 280,000 German marks—money paid by the order of the State Election Commission to the Liberal Party, which got 104,887 votes at the elections.

Ridiculous Explanations

"Our party has not received the sum to this day, and it was intended to cover part of the election costs. We tried three times to find out what had happened at the Ministry of Finance. The first time we were told that there was no money in the budget. When we reacted and showed that the other parties had received the money, the same ministry gave us the ridiculous explanation that the LP had not received the money because they did not know the number of its bank account. Although this is something that can be easily ascertained, we gave them our bank account number, but the problem was still not resolved and we received another ridiculous explanation—the money allocated to the LP had been transferred to the account of the Alliance for Macedonia," LP secretary and member of parliament Ace Kocevski said.

The LP was not satisfied with this response, which it considered nothing but a media plot, because the money cannot be transferred to the Alliance simply because it has not been registered.

"Finally, when we reached deadlock, the truth was revealed—the money was actually transferred to the SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia]," Kocevski told us.

The fact that the money allocated to the LP was taken by a minister who is also deputy president of the SDSM (if this is proven to be true) certainly represents "affair number one" in the state, particularly because the accusations come from one of the ruling coalition's partners, the LP. This will certainly not end with charges against the minister, it will have larger consequences for the ruling parties....

However, they categorically claim in the Ministry of Finance that the LP's story, in which Minister Jane Miljovski "is charged," is groundless.

Unfounded Charges

"It is absolutely untrue that the money allocated to the LP in accordance with the State Election Commission's decision for covering election costs was transferred to the SDSM account, or to any other party," Stojna Najdenovska, deputy secretary in the Ministry of Finance said, by the authorization of Minister Miljovski. It is true that the State Election Commission allocated the money to the Alliance for Macedonia, because we asked the commission to distribute the money separately to all the parties making up the Alliance, following the defined criteria for distribution. After this had been done, we asked the parties to present their bank accounts so we could transfer the money to them. The LP was late in doing this and therefore, owing to the pressure on the budget and the low inflow of money, we were not able to make the money transfer, Najdenovska added and emphasized that the money allocated to the LP is not in dispute and will be transferred as soon as the budget situation becomes favorable.

SDSM secretary Ljubomir Popovski also denied that the money allocated to the LP had been transferred to his party. "There is money arriving on the SDSM bank account gradually, but only the money allocated to the SDSM," Popovski said.

The view is being expressed in the SDSM that the LP is trying to exert pressure on the Ministry of Finance for

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quicker payment of the money. However, in political circles there is speculation that the LP is using the fact that the money has not been paid for a showdown with Minister Miljovski, particularly because that party was interested in getting this important position.

[Box, p 3]

Money

The Republican (State) Election Commission had to pay a sum totalling 39 million denars to the political parties that have members in parliament, elected in the 1994 elections, and to independent delegates, to cover part of the costs of the elections. The Alliance for Macedonia, that is, the three parties that it consists of, was given 28,286,029 denars. Moreover, the Liberal Party (outside the Alliance) was supposed to be given an additional 1,266,449 denars, the SDSM 186,361, and the SPM [Socialists Party of Macedonia] 392,788 denars. The PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] was allocated 3,835,678 denars, the NDP [People's Democratic Party] 1,392,982 denars, while the seven independent delegates were allocated around 2.2 million denars. The State Election Commission also allocated money to the Democratic Party of Turks, to the SDPM [The Social Democratic Party of Macedonia], to the PCER [Party for Full Emancipation of Romanies], and the DPM [Democratic Party of Macedonia].

MIC Lists Debts to International Agencies

AU1505205695 Skopje MIC News in English 15 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] is recognizing a total debt of $779 million as principal and $439 million as interest to the London Club, the Paris Club and the other international financial organizations and creditors. The debt to the London Club is $272 million as principal and $257 million as interest, to the Paris Club $224 million as principal and $48 million as interest, to the IMF $33 million as principal and $12 million as interest, to the World Bank $133 million as principal and $56 million as interest, to the EBRD [European Bank for Reconstruction and Development] $53 million as principal and $50 million as interest, to the IFC [International Finance Corporation] $14 million as principal and $1.6 million interest, to EuroFima $30 million as principal and $6 million interest, and to the European Fund for Reintegration $6 million as principal and $2 million as interest.

During this year, Macedonia will have to pay: to the IMF $3 million, to IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development] $24 million, to EBRD $6 million, to EuroFima $14 million, to the European Fund for Reintegration $1.1 million and to IDA [International Development Association] $300,000. The regulation of the debt to the Paris Club, this year, of $34 million, has been left until after the completion of negotiations with this creditor, and the regulation of this year's debt to the London Club of $48 million will reach the daily agenda after the regulation of relations with the Paris Club.

Government Issues Decree on Foreign Missions

AU1605081095 Skopje MIC News in English 15 May 95

[Unattributed report: "Decree for Foreign Missions"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] A foreign entity can open a representation in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], provided this contributes to the advancement of the economic relations with foreign countries, the connection of foreign entities with domestic companies and other legal entities, and the increase in the export of goods and services from Macedonia, is said in the Decree related to the conditions for the opening and functioning of foreign representations in Macedonia. Among the persons that can open foreign representations in Macedonia are those that deal with economic activities (production, sale of goods and services), banking-financial activities or insurance. The Decree does not regard as foreign entities the companies and other forms of economic activities that were founded abroad by the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia. This Decree does not allow the opening of representations in the field of arms and military equipment.

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Situation of Presidential Candidates Viewed

WS1605073095 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 12 May 95 p 5

[Article by Marcin Dominik Zdort and Krzysztof Olszewski: "Contenders Look for Parties, Parties Select Contenders; There Will Be No Supraparty Candidates"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The decision of the Union of Labor [UP] to reject Jacek Kuron and to support Tadeusz Zielinski completely ruined the chances for a supraparty candidate to run in the elections. Today Kuron enjoys the support of only the Freedom Union [UW]; signatures supporting [Civil Rights Spokesman] Tadeusz Zielinski will be collected by UP, and Lech Walesa will probably become the candidate of the Christian-National Union [ZChN].

The number of contenders for the presidency has rapidly increased in recent days. More and more parties, increasingly small ones, are coming to the conclusion that since such groupings as the Democratic Left Alliance or UW can afford to field their own candidates, then also their leaders (such as Jan Janowski of the National Party or Zbigniew Religa of the Republicans) ought to run for president. Also from a formal point of view, thus far independent candidates (such as Tadeusz Zielinski) have found parties that will wage their election campaigns.

Zielinski Already Party-Linked

The civil rights spokesman wants to keep up appearances to hold his current office as long as possible. Until recently he kept saying that he could wage his campaign only as a nonaligned candidate, one that does not get involved in politics—it is allegedly for this reason that he gave up the idea of running in the UW primaries. It seems, however, that Zielinski simply did not feel like losing in UW, where his chances of success were very slim. He no longer spoke about being a supraparty candidate when he arrived at the UP congress; he signed a declaration of readiness to run in the elections, and ruthlessly assailed his rivals.

Thus, Tadeusz Zielinski wants to be called a nonpartisan and nonpolitical candidate, but in fact his campaign is to be waged by an electoral committee headed by UP activist Wojciech Lamentowicz; the committee was set up on 7 May by UP—a party whose political philosophy is very clear-cut. It can be suspected that the purpose of the campaign waged by UP activists will be to win over the electorate of Aleksander Kwasniewski, and primarily of Jacek Kuron, rather than the electorate of a rightist candidate.

Union as Union's Antithesis

Jacek Kuron hoped very much that UP would declare support for him in the fight for the presidency in the second part of its congress. It was according to the conception of his election campaign, which was defined by two adjectives: civil and supraparty. UP's support for Kuron was to bridge the gaps that emerged in the past—in this party there were representatives of both "Solidarity" and postcommunists. However, there was something wrong in this plan all along. Both Kuron and UP leaders—Bugaj, Modzelewski, Nalecz—forgot that both parties, UW and UP, were established in strong opposition to each other. As they would say themselves: one union is the antithesis of the other. Karol Modzelewski, an ardent advocate of Kuron's candidacy, seemed to ignore the differences separating both parties in the area of economy. After all, it is the president who exerts influence on taxes, budget, or division of the national income—he places his signature on laws and has the option to veto them. Modzelewski replied that it was Lech Walesa who established a bad precedent of influencing economic issues as president, and that Jacek Kuron would not engage in ongoing political conflicts.

Bidding of Ideas

There were fewer supporters of close cooperation with this party in UW than there were in UP [as published]. Michal Boni, who is campaigning for Kuron, admitted that he is in a state of some trepidation because he does not know how economic issues will be treated in the campaign. Boni was hoping that these matters would not be a major topic of discussions. There remains the question, however, of what will happen if at preelection meetings people ask questions—which is bound to occur—concerning privatization, reform of the social insurance plan, or tax burdens. There are quite fundamental differences between UW and UP in these areas. If Kuron says that the highest tax bracket is too high, he will lose the support of UP; if he says that it should be maintained, and perhaps even increased (which UP is in favor of), UW will not like this at all.

Jacek Kuron will have to decide during his campaign which electorate is more important to him. Since UP decided to endorse Zielinski, Kuron will have to try to outbid him and present better ideas on social justice; also, he will have to prove that the party which he is a member of is not dominated by "blood-thirsty liberals," such as Leszek Balcerowicz and Tadeusz Syryjczyk.

Kuron Still Party-Linked

The electorates of both parties are divided as far as support for presidential candidates is concerned. If they

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want to respect the decision made by their party, UP activists have to campaign for Zielinski. However, it is no secret that some of them will not want to act on this decision and will back Kuron. In UW, in turn, many liberals are saying—off the record, of course—that they will support Lech Walesa. Supporters of Suchocka do not rule out voting for Adam Strzembosz. The same may be done by the rightist electorate of UW—people who consider UW too leftist, and Walesa too radical. This is how one of the employees of the UW National Office explained his ambivalence: "I am trying to encourage everyone around me to back Kuron, because I am bound by the congress's decision to do so. I would feel bad if I did otherwise. On the other hand, I know that I will vote for Walesa because he is the only person who is efficient in opposing the communists. I do not know whether Kuron will not try to head for a historic compromise."

A big problem for UW was the fact that Jacek Kuron began campaigning outside the party. UW members wanted their candidate to be identified primarily with their party, which might improve its rating if Kuron achieved good results in the elections. Nonetheless, committees of support for Kuron started to emerge long before the UW congress made its decision. It is even believed that Kuron began to think about the presidency the moment he decided not to run for the party's leadership, which was after the unification of UW and the Liberal-Democratic Congress in 1994. He wanted to show that he was above all parties.

Promises for ZChN

Much seems to indicate that Lech Walesa is another person who will not be a nonaligned candidate—even though until recently he was in conflict with nearly all parties, which made him fit this role. The president tried to win the support of several rightist parties; today there is probably only one major grouping left—ZChN. It is quite likely that Czarnecki's party—perhaps against the will of Wieslaw Chrzanowski, founder of the party and its former chairman—will late in May or early in June decide to support Lech Walesa, who has recently given various promises to its activists (not only pertaining to the program).

Although he keeps threatening that he will set up his own party and become its leader, the president probably prefers to rely on the already existing groupings to wage his campaign—especially after the experience with the Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms (which, incidentally, has come apart and the leader of the oppositional faction has decided to compete with Walesa for the presidency).

Lech Walesa has now become the most clear-cut politician, one who is in opposition to the government and to the postcommunist coalition; by doing this he is also gaining the support of voters who might otherwise back UW. If it turned out, however, that Walesa's election committees would be set up exclusively by ZChN activists, such a course of events might only be detrimental to the president: ZChN is not very good at winning the sympathy of the media.

Vegetation Far From the Center

Walesa might also lose votes to his former supporter, Professor Zbigniew Religa, leader of the Republicans party, whose prestige is based on his achievements in the area of heart surgery. Aside from Religa, there is also another candidate: Jan Janowski, leader of the Democratic Party, which used to be an ally of the Polish United Workers' Party and which is now vegetating somewhere far away from the center of the political life. It seems that today Janowski would be in a position to do no more than win the electorate of Rafal Szymanski, leader of another Democratic Party. However, Szymanski has not decided to run in the elections.

Only a portion of the divided right wing has managed to field a nonaligned, but not a supraparty candidate: Professor Adam Strzembosz. However, political observers who put his nonaligned character under question believe that the parties that support Strzembosz actually represent the same political ideology and their programs are similar—even though until recently they were often hostile to each other.

Split in UP Possible Over Support for Kuron

WS1505125995 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 12 May 95 p 3

[Article by Arkadiusz Forster in Wroclaw: "Who Will UP Members Support for President? Kuron Splits UP"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Part of the Regional Council of the Union of Labor [UP] in Wroclaw is demanding that party members withdraw from the Social Committee in Support of Jacek Kuron for President.*

Kuron's supporters refused to step down from the Committee yesterday, despite the fact that the UP congress expressed support for the candidacy of Professor Tadeusz Zielinski on 7 May.

Meanwhile, more than half of the founders of the Kuron Committee in Wroclaw are members of the UP Youth Federation. If they do not withdraw from the committee, some of the UP Regional Council members want to file charges against them with an arbitration panel.

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Jerzy Trocinski, member of the UP National Council and Kuron's national Committee, said at a news conference that arbitration panels would be a prelude to getting rid of Ryszard Bugaj or Zbigniew Bujak from the party. He expressed his fears that divisions within the UP could, if it came to the worst, end in a split in the party.

"Just as in Wroclaw, the majority of Kuron committee activists in Krakow, Bydgoszcz, or Bialystok are members of UP," said Trocinski. The UP leaders did not issue any official statement on whether party members are allowed to be active in committees of candidates other than those supported by the congress.

"It is obvious, however, that once a party candidate is appointed, supporting any others would be a breach of party loyalty," says Jerzy Krasniewski, head of the UP Regional Council in Wroclaw.

"If the party presidium decides we cannot be members of the committees, we will suspend our party membership for the duration of the elections, and we will not cease to support Kuron," declared UP members active in the Kuron Committee in Wroclaw.

PSL Dilemmas in Fielding Presidential Candidate

WS1505142695 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 12 May 95 p 4

[Article by Krystyna Naszkowska: "Will the PSL Muster Enough Strength To Fight for the Presidency? Fight or Just Play the Extra?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *A few days before the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] congress, it still remains unknown who will agree to run for president and whom the party will support in the election campaign. Zych lacks the will, Pawlak—the support.*

On 16 May, the National Council is to set the date of an election convention during which PSL is to appoint a presidential candidate. "It will definitely be before 4 June," says Deputy Chairman of the PSL parliamentary club. The Council will not decide who the candidate is to be, but it will coerce potential candidates into issuing explicit declarations.

Three names are already being mentioned within the party: Sejm Speaker Jozef Zych, former Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak, and Senate Speaker Adam Struzik. Professor Tadeusz Zielinski is a feasible external candidate, but, according to the majority of PSL members, the constituency is demanding a candidate from within the party in the first round of elections. "We will definitely not support Zielinski," told us Chairman of the Rural Youth Union Jan Bury. "The Church does not like him, and he does not like PSL."

Zych vs. Zych

None of the PSL candidates have launched an election campaign yet. On the contrary, they are talking of the presidency ever less often.

Zych stands the greatest chance. He represents the so-called healthy center of PSL, and is well known for being reasonable and composed. His strong point is that he has neither enemies within PSL, nor any declared opponents outside the party. Zych is also the only widely recognized PSL politician who has a chance of winning the support of part of the city voters, as he is capable of bridging urban and rural constituencies.

Zych's most serious rival is Zych himself: the Sejm speaker in him who has not yet made up his mind whether he wants to run. "If one does not have the will to fight, he is doomed to failure," say our interlocutors.

PSL vs. Pawlak

Pawlak perhaps has the will, but with each passing day he is losing support. As the PSL members themselves claim, the former prime minister can count on support of 10 percent in the first round, and that would be "a catastrophe for PSL." Pawlak left a bad impression in the final days of his premiership, and his popularity has continually sagged ever since. He also failed to become popular with the media, and one may hardly count on success in the elections without that.

Therefore, even those who had supported Pawlak thus far now increasingly tend to point out his young age, and claim that he still has time to return to the political scene.

Even in very confined circles Pawlak avoids declarations of whether he will agree to run. He often hints at interesting individuals in the second row of PSL benches who could run for the presidential office.

Maybe Struzik, Maybe Jagielinski

Some of the deputies see Speaker Struzik as fit for the job. He is, however, relatively unknown even among the rural constituency, and has no chance of gaining wider support.

Another interesting backbencher whose name is being dropped is Deputy Prime Minister Roman Jagielinski. PSL is indebted to him for getting rid of former Chairman Roman Bartoszcze. As a very dynamic agriculture minister he is popular with the rural communities and parts of the cities. He is very ambitious and, unlike Zych, likes to compete. Jagielinski, however, is a controversial figure and has enemies within the party.

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We Have a Chance If We Fight

Despite all odds, PSL has a chance of fielding a candidate who can make it to the second round of elections. If there are many other candidates, PSL may net more than a dozen percent of votes. Unlike other parties, it boasts a stable constituency. Approximately 40 percent of its supporters live in rural areas. The majority of that community will vote for a PSL candidate. Some will probably vote for whomever the Church supports.

"If a PSL candidate made it to the second round together with a rightist candidate, the left would have to support our man. They would not have a choice," says Henryk Siedlecki, a PSL activist from the agricultural circles. "It all depends on whether PSL really wants to win, or merely take part in the elections."

ZChN To Support Either Strzembosz or Walesa

WS1605122795 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 15 May 95 p 2

[Aarticle by Jerzy Sadecki: "Czarnecki and Kwiatkowski in Krakow; A Choice between Strzembosz and Walesa"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "I am appealing to Solidarity and center right parties colleagues not to multiply their candidates in the presidential elections, but to choose two from among them: Strzembosz and Walesa," Christian-Democratic Union [ZChN] Chairman Ryszard Czarnecki said on 13 May in Krakow. "Election of Kwasniewski as president would be an act of moral rehabilitation of the Polish People's Republic [PRL]."

The ZChN chairman emphasized that the "telephone directory," as he referred to the list of expected rightist candidates for president, "is a gift to the left wing." He wants to hold talks with [Union for Real Politics Chairman] Janusz Korwin-Mikke to persuade him to give up the idea of running in the elections; he also calls upon other right wing candidates to do the same. He also appealed to all parties, leftist and rightist ones, to wage a positive campaign and to avoid brutalizing it.

Ryszard Czarnecki believes that only five candidates stand a chance of success in the presidential elections: Walesa, Strzembosz, Kwasniewski, Kuron, and a representative of the Polish Peasant Party. He said that the fact that the Union of Labor had nominated [Civil Rights Spokesman] Tadeusz Zielinski as a presidential candidate was "a wonderful gift for the right wing." The most difficult part of the presidential elections will be their first round. If a rightist candidate successfully passes to the second round, he is bound to win, the ZChN chairman believes.

"If the winner were Kwasniewski, the triangle of powers controlled by the left wing—the government, the parliament, and the president—would be closed. It would be an act of the moral rehabilitation of PRL," the ZChN chairman said at the Krakow seminar entitled "Poland 1995—Vectors of the Future."

Tomasz Kwiatkowski, new head of the Chancellory of the President of the Polish Republic, who also took part in the seminar, said that if the communists won, it would mean destruction of the middle class that is emerging right now, as well as imposition of higher taxes. Kwiatkowski voiced hope that the Sejm speaker would announce the calendar of the presidential elections at the nearest date possible, that is, on 22 August. The president will not try to impede this process.

Before deciding whether to support Strzembosz or Walesa, Czarnecki's party will try to establish who has a better chance against Kuron and Kwasniewski, who presents a better program, and who, after being elected, will find a better way to stop recommunization, and who will guarantee Catholic identity and national interests.

Kazimierz Barczyk, chairman of the Chief Council of the "Polish Union," declared that the St. Catherine Covenant intends to endorse one presidential candidate. On 17 May it will discuss this with Adam Strzembosz, and on 31 May—with Lech Walesa.

At a news conference held on 13 May Ryszard Czarnecki reported that ZChN had set up an Institute of Protection of the Good Name of the Poles; the institute is of a supraparty character. Its purpose is to react to cases of libeling our country abroad. According to Czarnecki, the Polish diplomatic service is not capable of doing this; they react "sluggishly or do not respond at all" to evident falsities, such as cases of writing about "Polish concentration camps" or publishing captions like "an uncouth president." The countries where the institute will initially set up its branch offices will be Great Britain, Germany, Sweden, and Norway.

The right wing is alarmed by "coordinated and precisely made attempts to subordinate the media to the left wing, by attempts to gag electronic media and the press." Tomasz Kwiatkowski, on the basis of his observations ("I can see who is meeting whom, I can see Mr. Jurkowski discussing financial matters with Solorz") believes that PolSat may be used in the presidential campaign by the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD]. This television station may be "one of the sources of financing the SLD candidate."

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Polish-Russian Trade Issues Viewed

95EP0082B Warsaw GAZETA BANKOWA in Polish 12 Mar 95 No 11, p 17

[Interview with Aleksander Gudzowaty, director, PHZ Bartimpex SA, by Ireneusz Chojnacki, under the rubric "Views"; place and date not given: "A Russian Lesson. 'Russians Perceive Us as a Country With the Same Economic Background, Which Has Nothing To Impress Them With'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Chojnacki] What did the creation of Bartimpex Inc. hinge on?

[Gudzowaty] I can say that I started Bartimpex Inc. out of fear. When I lost my job in Kolmeks I was almost 52 and began to fear that I would not be able to support my family.

[Chojnacki] At the time, you bet on the Russian market and Bartimpex Inc. began to grow by leaps and bounds. What were the factors in this? Was it your personal contacts or the potential which this market offers?

[Gudzowaty] It was a product of many phenomena—my training, skills, and character, if nothing else, my persistence, luck, the quality of compromise, and so on. Contacts are not the main advantage because contacts can be established. It is important to reinforce rather than loose them. This is what is difficult. When we organized Bartimpex Inc. we ourselves did not know where to begin and how it would end. Experience gained in Kolmeks and previously in Textilimpex made the task easier for us, but we did not have any substantial connections. A changing of the guard has occurred in Moscow, and our present-day partners are not "those people."

[Chojnacki] Was the market potential of the East unimportant? After all, the size of contracts of Bartimpex Inc. was and is, at least in part, a product of the demand generated by the enormous Russian market.

[Gudzowaty] The question which suggests that the post-Soviet market offers windfall opportunities is erroneous. For now, this market mainly offers difficulties. There are new people, continuous organizational changes in the trade sector, unbalanced demand, difficult access to capital, as well as tremendous competition from companies in rich countries which can afford a higher "start-up cost." However, the size of this market holds out a promise, and if one takes this view of Russia it is indeed a market of great opportunities.

[Chojnacki] What is the quotation of Polish stock values in this market? Are we a desirable partner or not?

[Gudzowaty] Our stock is doing poorly. The Russians observe us and in many cases regard Polish changes as a harbinger of the events to come in their country in a few years.

The Russians perceive us as a country with the same economic background, which has nothing to impress them with. Only the rate of economic growth and the beginnings of stabilization make a certain impression, but this is not much. The presence of the economically developed world is so aggressive that we should acquire a new image if we want to be present in Russia.

[Chojnacki] Are closer political ties between Poland and Russia needed to this end?

[Gudzowaty] A good political climate is certainly very helpful. If nothing else, it can promote the development of joint investment projects and, in a more general sense, legal regulations which guarantee a more rapid development of economic cooperation. However, if we were to wait until politicians come to love one another, or finally understand that one does not get to choose neighbors, economic life would certainly grind to a halt. Fortunately, business is like water: It gets into every crack, and in this manner, holds its own.

[Chojnacki] It is hard to believe that entrepreneurs, yourself included, expect nothing from politicians.

[Gudzowaty] If politicians do not interfere with doing business I will be satisfied. Unfortunately, some politicians chasing after electoral points hamper the natural development of trade.

[Chojnacki] For example?

[Gudzowaty] Let the Yamal-Western Europe gas pipeline be a case in point. Some argue that this pipeline means making Poland dependent on Russia and that, as a result, it threatens the energy security of the country. To me it is just buffoonery. A pipeline buried underground at a safe depth, with grass and rye growing over it, a pipeline built mainly (85 percent) with Russian money, a pipeline 52 percent of which is supposed to be the property of Poland, a pipeline which delivers to Poland gas and fees for the transit of this gas—is this supposed to be a threat to Poland? Finally, this pipe is supposed to deliver gas to us and to Europe across the Odra. Just to make it funnier, on 9-10 December of last year the Council of Europe designated this a high-priority investment project. This looks rather like Russia becoming dependent on Poland, and yet it is obviously we who are afraid of dependence.

[Chojnacki] Are the politicians to blame for Russia's private concerns, which already operate in hundreds of millions of dollars, bypassing Poland?

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[Gudzowaty] They certainly have no money to spend specifically in Poland. They may be apprehensive about Russian investment projects along the Vistula, even small ones, being taken away again as interfering with our independence.

[Chojnacki] Why "again"?

[Gudzowaty] Recently, the Russians have learned that one of the companies in which Russian capital has a 35-percent interest (Gas Trading—note by the GAZETA BANKOWA editor) which has been set up in Poland in the image and after the likeness of 16 other companies established in 14 different countries of Europe threatens the security of our state.

I know this for sure, and I will ask why Russians should invest in Poland if their capital poses a danger.

[Chojnacki] Do you not think that Russia is still pursuing an imperial policy in keeping with the pattern "politics first, economics later," and that Polish apprehensions arise specifically from this?

[Gudzowaty] I suspect that Russia has inherited a little bit of the traits which are covered by this definition. A state that large which is aware of its international standing has a hard time avoiding behaviors which could indicate special significance being attached to political interests. However, Russia's openness to the inflow of foreign capital, and then without any preconditions, liberalization of foreign trade, and the overall ease of investing are changes which are hard to ignore.

[Chojnacki] Therefore, would it be sound for the Polish economy to readjust itself to the needs of the Russian market if it comes to this?

[Gudzowaty] Quite recently, Polish-Soviet economic cooperation was geared toward the Russian market. It is easy to understand Polish companies which long to sell a lot and at high prices in that market again. The best arrangement is the one whereby the heavier the product the higher the price is. We have gone through one collapse already, and this is enough. Becoming interdependent again is unfavorable for both Poland and Russia.

[Chojnacki] However, the enormity of the Russian market is lucrative. Certainly, even now dozens of people must be thinking of ways to break into it.

[Gudzowaty] I believe that, as a country, we should develop sectors in which it is possible to effectively compete against Western enterprises. This could certainly be foodstuffs processing. However, as long as we export only surplus agricultural products, as we do now, this will not work. We simply must ensure a permanent presence in the Russian market.

[Chojnacki] What does "permanent presence" mean?

[Gudzowaty] In the case of Russia, permanence means continuity, which we are unable to maintain even in the exports of foodstuffs because we just do not have foodstuffs. Everybody who thinks otherwise is making a mistake.

Bartimpex has had very large Russian contacts for foodstuffs, and even Russian funds in Poland, both last year and this year. However, we have been unable to buy foodstuffs in our country. On two occasions, we have tried to get the supreme authorities of our country interested in this matter but, to no avail. Polish foodstuffs have to be competitively priced by now, and the same is the case with other goods.

[Chojnacki] It is hard to argue with this. However, in order to be present in Russia on a permanent basis one should feel well there. As far as I know, Polish entrepreneurs are simply afraid of that market.

[Gudzowaty] Certainly, not all of them are afraid because a few large Polish companies continuously make good money in Russia. Small and medium-size companies which are coping are also numerous. One has to be afraid of the Russian market, just as any other. The difference, perhaps, is that one must also come to love this market. Anyone who wants to make money in Russia should grasp and respect the enormity of that country. Russia is somewhat like a forest: There are enough mushrooms for all who want to look for them and know how.

[Chojnacki] Could a jungle be a more fitting comparison? After all, it does happen that partners disappear before the invoices are paid.

[Gudzowaty] The exact copy of our country. However, in an absolutely serious vein, the certainty of obtaining payments for goods or services sold in Russia is indeed a problem. This is due to the fact that those who want to make purchases do not necessarily have money. Many Russians count on trade credit, or on selling the goods obtained and only then paying. Since there are swindlers everywhere, they are making their presence known in Russia, just as everywhere else. Thus, it is necessary to ensure that your partners are reliable in making payments, and there is no ready solution for that.

[Chojnacki] It is easy for you to talk about that because the position of Bartimpex Inc. as the intermediary settling for the importation of natural gas is ideal from the standpoint of payments.

[Gudzowaty] Am I supposed to be ashamed of this? Besides, this stage of Bartimpex SA activities is virtually over. This was a good solution at a time when we

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needed to respond to Polish debts and when our partner viewed goods as money. However, this is coming to an end. We are thinking about new arrangements because we have never expected this situation to last. Our potential permitting, we invest, for example, in Siberia. However, time will tell how successful we will be in meeting new challenges.

* * *

Aleksander Gudzowaty, 55, graduated from the Department of Foreign Trade of the Lodz University. He is the principal shareholder of the Bartimpex Inc. Foreign Trade Enterprise whose volume of sales topped 11 trillion old zlotys last year and which paid about 530 million old zlotys as income tax.

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Possibility of War With Hungary Viewed

LD1505173995 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1600 GMT 15 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Our Bucharest correspondent, Tibor Bogdan, reports on a statement by the chairman of the Defense and National Security Committee of the Romanian Senate:

[Bogdan] Radu Timofte, chairman of the Defense and National Security Committee of the Romanian Senate, does not rule out the possibility of a Romanian-Hungarian military conflict. Asked by (ASIS) news agency, the senator, who is a member of the Social Democracy Party of Romania, the leading government coalition party, said that immediately after the Croatian attack on the Serb enclaves, Budapest concentrated its troops along its Croatian border. And what is more, the concentration of troops was certainly not against the Croatian invasion but to support the Croats.

If the war escalates as a result of the withdrawal of the UN troops, Romania will not be able to remain an outsider any more. In this situation, should another Romanian-Hungarian incident happen, escalation of war will become unavoidable, the chairman of the Romanian Senate's Defense and National Security Committee said. He also added that, according to his special information, it is also a big problem that Hungary wants to join NATO only simultaneously with Transylvania.

Tinca Discusses Military Ties to Hungary

AU1305134795 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 9 May 95 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Defense Minister Gheorghe Tinca by Reghina Varvici; place and date not given: "The Negotiation of a Treaty Is Not Like a Sports Competition, With Cheering and Booing From the Spectators"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Varvici] The Hungarian parliament has approved joint Romanian-Hungarian military activities both in Romania and Hungary. What is it all about? The Romanian public has been somewhat surprised by this development.

[Tinca] I would not call this development surprising, because, if you recall, when I met with Mr. Gyorgy Keleti, Hungary's minister of defense, in Gyula [in 1994] I suggested to him such joint military activities as part of a list of 10 bilateral actions. I am especially referring to the possibility that a Romanian military subunit should carry out joint drills with a Hungarian military subunit in Romania and Hungary. This training would have more of a symbolic value, since it would indicate the start, on the military plane, of a process similar to the one began several decades ago between France and Germany. To tell you frankly, I was not fully convinced that the Hungarian side would easily accede to this idea. At the time, I was still under the impact of the overall attitude of the previous Hungarian Government. The press also noted my list of proposals. Later that year, I and my Hungarian colleague had another meeting, this time in Bucharest, where he came with positive answers to all 10 proposals and even presented five extra ones, thus putting together a list with 15 joint actions. The press again took note of these actions and brought it to public knowledge. I and Mr. Keleti met again in Debrecen and Oradea in 1995, when we put together a list of actions to be further discussed by our general staff experts who will then put the final touches to and fix concrete dates for these activities. Indeed, that meeting of experts took place in Bucharest, at the end of last March. At our last meeting in Oradea, which took place in the first part of March 1995, Mr. Keleti told me about the way in which the Hungarian side plans to act with regard to the stipulated 15 bilateral activities. The Hungarian parliament's endorsement of the project is part of this procedure. There is going to be a joint exercise on the Danube, as stipulated in the bilateral cooperation plan. Aside from that, there will be joint drills by a Romanian and Hungarian infantry platoon in Hungary and Romania; a Hungarian infantry platoon will participate in a ground exercise in our country; and a Romanian Army tank company will partake in firing drills in Hungary. All these activities are within the framework of the Partnership for Peace [PFP] scheme. I am convinced that Mr. Keleti will brief me officially on the results of the deliberations in the Hungarian parliament.

[Varvici] You are right, the press did report on these actions last year. Nevertheless, in the present circumstances, the news from Budapest came as a surprise to a certain extent. Have we discussed this matter in our parliament?

[Tinca] Maybe the reporting was not thorough enough. I must tell you that the initiative to undertake this kind of actions as well as other, maybe less spectacular ones, was also praised by other countries that are interested in seeing that the good neighborly relations between Romania and Hungary consolidate and that the two countries move convincingly toward eliminating the misunderstandings between them. If you recall, at our meetings in Gyula and then in Bucharest, we told the press that Hungary's integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures goes through Bucharest and Romania's integration goes through Budapest. It is in this light that our proposals were seen by other countries, which actually tried to encourage us along these lines. To implement these actions, we do not necessarily need—in keeping

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with our legal procedures—to lump all these four activities together. As you know, we need parliamentary approval for the entrance of foreign military units in our country. We will ask for parliament's approval when the matter of the arrival of the Hungarian units arises. Regarding the participation of Romanian units in military drills abroad, it must be endorsed by the country's Supreme Defense Council, after briefing the parliament. These procedures will be initiated for each particular case, and the decision will be taken as a function of all concrete data for each action. As a matter of fact, the Senate Defense Commission wants to be briefed by the ministry on the ensemble of the Romanian-Hungarian bilateral military relations. I believe that such a briefing will take place, in due course. This would not be the first hearing of the kind: There was one (in the Senate) in connection with sending a unit to Angola and another (in the Chamber of Deputies) in connection with the situation of the military aviation, just to give a few examples. Therefore, everything will be taken care of in due course.

[Varvici] Mr. Minister, what significance to you attach to these actions, in the broader context of the Romanian-Hungarian relations? Can they help to overcome the existing difficulties in the process of concluding a basic treaty between the two countries?

[Tinca] From the very start, we conceived the list of proposals as having potentially positive effects in two spheres: First, it should have a positive impact in the military sphere of the relations between the two armies, the security of the two countries, and the stability and security in the region in which we both live. Second, we believe that, by proving our desire for reconciliation—in this respect, I mentioned the French-German example—we are conveying a very articulate message regarding the extremely positive direction that we want to follow in the overall sphere of our relations with Hungary. I believe that the actions currently under discussion still have this potential and will bear a positive impact. I believe that the outcome of these actions will also reflect on the interconnection between military relations, on the one hand, and the overall political relations and the basic treaty between our countries, on the other. The negotiation of a treaty is not a sports competition with cheering and booing from the "spectators." After all, we are talking here about an extremely important instrument for the future of two countries with a certain regional and continental stature. Regional stability depends on the relations between these two countries. Each side is free to promote its own interests that it considers legitimate. To this end, each side is obviously trying to use its trump cards and the tactics that it deems best. There is nothing new or abnormal in this. The winner will be the more farsighted one, whose interests and positions coincide with the long-term interests of the relations between the two peoples and states and of stability and security in the region and the whole continent. As a matter of fact, despite of what the "spectators" say, the gain must be a common one, that is of both sides and of the region in which we live and are going to live for many centuries to come. By continuing our course on the military plane, we hope to contribute to consolidating the perennial values of the relations between states and to overcome ephemeral tactical considerations. As a matter of fact, we should keep reminding all concerned that the two countries have specific common interests and that, in the last instance, these interests will lie at the basis of the relations and treaties between them.

Melescanu Sees Separatism as 'Threatening' Europe

AU1505175295 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 12 May 95 p 1

[Interview with Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu by Mugurel Radulescu; place and date not given: "The Council of Europe Is Not a Supreme Legal Court"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Upon arrival from Strasbourg yesterday, where he had been attending a meeting of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu said that, in addition to submitting the ratification instruments of the framework convention for the protection of minorities, he expressed his support for work on an additional protocol on cultural rights. Therefore, on the basis of an adequate judicial framework "all type of discriminations that might arise on the issue of minorities will be eliminated together with the tendencies of separatism, one of the illnesses threatening Europe..."

Melescanu said that "we must resist the temptation of turning the Council of Europe into a sort of supreme legal court that judges everybody or sometimes into a forum of arguments in which each of us tries to promote his own ideas as European standards. "

Melescanu also answered the questions of ADEVARUL:

[Radulescu] Could you tell us whether attempts have been made to have some paragraphs included in the additional protocol which refer to the collective rights of minorities?

[Melescanu] No, in fact everybody referred to two essential elements, namely, that we are talking about individual rights and mainly about the cultural rights of all citizens.

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[Radulescu] What are the principles that will be taken over from Recommendation 1201?

[Melescanu] In no way have I seen anybody raising directly or indirectly the issue of taking over certain provisions such as Article 11, which refers to rights to territorial autonomy on ethnic criteria, because it would be at variance with the spirit of the additional protocol itself, which wishes to ensure the protection of each person's right, regardless of language, religion, etc.

[Radulescu] Mr. Minister, does Romania intend to request that Hungary be monitored, because of the forced assimilation of the Romanian minority in that country?

[Melescanu] The new element here is that the monitoring process is now applied to all states and mainly that it will be applied according to the standards to be adopted; thus, from this point of view, nobody is exempt in any way from the monitoring process.

Herzog Addresses Joint Parliament Session

AU16051052

[FBIS Editorial Report] Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian at 0634 GMT on 16 April carries a 52-minute live relay from Bucharest of a joint session of the Romanian Parliament that is being addressed by Germany's President Roman Herzog, currently on a state visit to Romania.

Roman Herzog delivers his speech in German with subsequent translation of the speech in its entirety into Romanian.

Herzog begins by recalling the Romanian revolution of 1989, the fight Romanians waged for "a better future for your country." He praises Romania's efforts to achieve integration in European and Atlantic structures, congratulating the Romanians on the first results of the reform process, saying that he wishes "to encourage you. You have made the first steps toward Europe." "We are aware of the importance of the statement when we affirm that the success of our reconstruction after the war is due to a great extent to the circumstance that after a relatively short time NATO offered us security. You also aspire to enter this transatlantic community of values, through a consensus of all parties that represent all political sides and social structures."

Herzog speaks of the importance of the country's constitution and recalls that "the dignity of man appears for the first time in 1949 in a German constitution, the supreme legal asset." He says that "in Romania, a new constitution was adopted after the historic chance offered by the collapse of communism in East Europe. In your constitution human dignity is sanctioned as a supreme legal asset. In your constitution Romania is defined as a social and democratic rule-of-law state, in which the rights and freedoms of citizens and the free development of human person are guaranteed. It is not accidental that Romania granted these values a constitutional rank. Through its constitution and the policy promoted after its endorsement, Romania has aligned itself to Europe's principles. Here, these goals will also be completely achieved only through historic evolution. In my position as a judge at the Federal Constitutional Tribunal, I had the opportunity to make a contribution to the implementation of democratic freedoms and the free development of human personality. The fundamental premises for this, both in the public life as well as in the political life, is the wish to compromise, the willingness to listen and weigh carefully the viewpoint of those who think differently. To grant the adversary the right to have his own viewpoint, is the fundamental element of any democratic society. To meet the opponent's viewpoint with correctness and understanding and, in case of defeat, to respect the vote of the majority, is a fundamental element of the democratic rule-of-law state."

Herzog goes on to say that in Germany "the laender are the constructive elements of our federation. The towns and communes have contributed to the unification of Germany precisely the way the laender have done. Due to this method of ensuring construction, starting from the foundations and going upward, we could achieve a situation in which each citizen has made a contribution to it. Only in this way could all forces be released throughout the country. Never in Germany did a citizen have as great an opportunity to contribute as an individual, through his creativeness and his diligence to solving the problems of the collectivity, as after the endorsement of the Constitution in 1949. In fact, this is also valid especially for the communal self-administration, equipped with sufficient financial means, on whose basis local problems can be optimally solved by the citizens themselves, who are more familiar with the local situation. The concrete cooperation of interested citizens strengthens the political commitment, which has a positive effect on the state as a whole. If Germany is considered today in Europe as an attractive community, this is based on the opportunity each individual has had to contribute to this community."

Herzog continues by talking about the German minority "that has lived for centuries in your country and has made its own contribution to the economic and cultural development of Romania. These people are good citizens of Romania, have a rich and distinctive cultural heritage, preserve live memories of Germany, and have connections with it. I see the German minority as a positive factor in German-Romanian relations."

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He mentions that "the process of European unification, put into motion by the European Union, is based on the understanding of the fact that Europe will be able to survive in the next century only if on the one hand it respects its cultural diversity and develops its various aptitudes, and on the other hand it unites its forces. It seems to me, looking at Romania's history, that this viewpoint is not so new, it was just lost in the era of the unfortunate nationalism. European cooperation, expanded in the European Union, over the current borders, is based on the experience accumulated by West Europe, according to which the peaceful cohabitation of various groups of peoples, based on the defense of human rights and respect of minorities, represents the basis for the prosperity of a community in its entirety. In this respect, the German minority in Romania is not a remains of the past, but a possible nucleus of current German-Romanian relations and of the future European unification."

After recalling Germany's support of ethnic Germans and expressing hope that the "heritage of the German minority is preserved and used" properly, Roman Herzog mentions that "the cohabitation of various peoples in Transylvania and Banat has a long tradition. Some of the decisions made in the Chamber of Deputies and Senate, such as the establishment of the Council of Minorities prove that you wish to establish a constructive dialogue between minorities and the majority. I wish for the members of the Senate and of the Chamber of Deputies the courage and wisdom to include minorities in the process of reforms also through draft laws that are adopted."

After praising current cultural exchanges between the two countries, Roman Herzog concludes by saying that after 1989 "the German-Romanian relations have developed most positively. Recently many political meetings have taken place and my visit here is a new link in this chain, showing the importance that we grant Romania and proving Germany's firm willingness to support Romania's integration in the European institution." "For us there has never been any doubt of the fact that Romania belongs to Europe. Therefore, Germany has supported Romania according to its own power in various areas on the path of integration in European and Atlantic structures and will do this also in the future. Ensuring peace, stability, and wellbeing on the entire European continent is the great challenge with which we Europeans are confronted. German-Romanian relations are part of this broad process."

'Reforms Have Their Price'

LD1605082695 Berlin DDP/ADN in German 0558 GMT 16 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Bucharest (DDP/ADN)—German President Roman Herzog has promised Romania German support on its way into Europe and the European institutions. In a speech to both houses of the Romanian Parliament in Bucharest today, Herzog did, however, also say that Romania still needs to make great efforts in order to complete the comprehensive process of adaptation. "Great sacrifices will have to be made in order to build a fully developed market economy and a dual system where the rights of each individual are respected," Herzog said.

"Reforms have their price," the German president said. However, reform leading to a market economy must not be undertaken without ensuring that its negative social consequences are cushioned, Herzog added. Otherwise it will cause social tension which would ultimately threaten the whole process, he said. Parliament has a special responsibility for this, Herzog said. The president did, however, encourage Romania to continue the accelerated privatization of its economy.

Herzog stated that economic cooperation between the two countries is already close. Not only imports and exports have developed in a satisfactory manner; Germany also, by a long way, heads the list of countries that have set up joint ventures with Romanian partners, Herzog said.

The German head of state expressed understanding for Romania's wish to complement the political, economic and social development of the country, and the continuation of reform with a security policy framework. But this question cannot be decided "today or tomorrow," Herzog said. "However, we think it is important that Romania is given clear prospects for its chosen way toward Western security structures," Herzog stressed. We must remember that Romania is also a bridge to the important NATO partners in southeastern Europe, he added.

Herzog also addressed the issue of the German minority in Romania, which, he said, has made its own contribution to the economic and cultural development of Romania. The Romanian Germans are good citizens of Romania and represent a positive factor in bilateral relations. It is important to preserve the inheritance of the German minority and to make use of it, Herzog said. "If a state succeeds in solving minority problems in a constructive manner, these minorities become an asset", he added.

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Sole Artillery-Manufacturing Plant Shuts Down

AU1505200095 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 12 May 95 p 1

[Unattributed article: "The Only Artillery Manufacturing Factory in Romania Stops Activity"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The only artillery manufacturer in our country, a specialized unit of the Resita Mechanical Factory, closed its gates yesterday. According to statements made to the press by Colonel Adrian Marinescu, engineer and general director of the Resita factory, the major cause is the lack of firm orders for the factory's products for this year and even for the future. Thus, the factory is currently in a situation of serious financial blockage, with important debts to banks and even its own employees, who have not yet received salaries for April, the source quoted also mentions.

It is noteworthy that after 1989, the Resita factory reduced its activity by half and of the employees who were retained, 40 percent have constantly been technically unemployed [working only when there is a contract to be fulfilled].

The Resita factory is now left with 71 employees, who are in charge of guarding its assets, the rest having become unemployed in accordance with Law 51.

Funar Warns of Action 'To Outlaw' UDMR

AU1505202295 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 11 May 95 p 3

[Article by Claudiu Harcioaga: "Gheorghe Funar Turns Into A Chinaman!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Following his return home from a recent visit to China, Gheorghe Funar insisted on sharing his experience with journalists. Thus, in the opinion of the PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party] leader, "as many Romanian localities as possible should become twinned with Chinese towns, because we could learn a great deal from them. Especially since China is ready to cooperate with Romania. This is why Nicolae Vacaroiu should extend the four-day visit that he is to pay to China in June and President Ion Iliescu should invite his Chinese counterpart to pay an official visit. I was impressed by the Chinese pace and construction work."

Also yesterday the PUNR president asserted that he will "take action" to outlaw the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania], but he did not go into any concrete details. The PUNR assesses as positive the talks held two days ago with a delegation of the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania], but is angered over the fact that the PDSR postponed the signing of the "additional protocol on cooperation at local level."

As to Mr. Funar's possible plans to run again for Romania's presidency, "this is an issue to which no one is giving any thought, as it is too early."

PD Leader: Rulers Ruining National Image

AU1505195995 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 10 May 95 p 3

[Article by "R.C." on statements by PD president Petre Roman: "The Rulers Have Made a Laughing Stock Out of Romania"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The PD [Democratic Party] favored the revalidation of [Council of Europe] Recommendation 1201, in an effort to try to clean the disgrace caused by the Romanian authorities and ruling political forces, who after having accepted that recommendation when our country was admitted to the Council of Europe [COE], now sing a different tune and went back on their word," Mr. Petre Roman stated to us yesterday. The document sanctioning Romania's admittance to the COE contains direct reference to Recommendation 1201: "All Romanian authorities declare to be ready to observe and to implement this recommendation." Mr. Petre Roman also showed that "on the basis of that document President Ion Iliescu went to the COE, where he was welcomed in a way that he very much liked, and he was allowed to make a speech for which he had been hoping. Now he comes and tramples everything underfoot, together with the same political factors. Our problem was to try to save the situation. What they did is impairing our national dignity by their going back on their word given two years ago."

The initiative to revote Recommendation 1201 came from the [COE] socialist parliamentary faction, which the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania—ruling party] has been wishing to join. "As a member of that faction in the European Parliament, the PD considers that it is entitled to point out the real situation in the domain of the observance of ethnic minority rights in Romania. We have done this on numerous occasions. As soon as the socialist faction will be offered a genuine picture of the factual situation regarding the observance of ethnic minority rights in Romania, especially those of ethnic Hungarians, Romania's image will doubtlessly change for the better. We have been telling everyone and proving that after December 1989, despite certain serious blanks in decentralizing local administration and offering genuine local autonomy, the process of observing the rights of ethnic minorities, especially those of the ethnic Hungarians, has evolved in a very positive direction. There are numerous and quite

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eloquent examples that could be given to prove it. The mistake was made by the PDSR, which associated itself with xenophobic and anti-European voices, a fact that led to the deterioration of its image in the eyes of the social-democratic parliamentarians at the COE.

"Unfortunately some of the opposition parties, and especially the PNTCD [National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party], have joined the disinformation campaign regarding Recommendation 1201. No one claims that this recommendation could serve as a basis at all for the things inferred by the ethnic autonomy claims of one part of the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania]; Recommendation 1201 does not impose any ethnic criteria whatsoever. The entire campaign waged against the PD is a propaganda-type maneuver of the dirtiest kind. By this they expect to influence the man in the street, who does not know what Recommendation 1201 actually is. Nevertheless, the most serious consequences appear at the COE, where Romania is considered a country that does not keep its word," concluded Mr. Petre Roman.

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Federal

Defense Minister Warns of 'Ustasha Daggers'

AU1505204195 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 15 May 95

[Report by Zeljko Avramovic]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Studio announcer] The title of the international scientific symposium that will be held over the next three days in the Central Club of the Yugoslavia Army is: 50 Years of Victory Against Fascism. Opening the symposium on behalf of the Yugoslav Committee for Marking the 50th Anniversary of Victory Over Fascism, and on behalf of the Federal Government, Federal Defense Minister Pavle Bulatovic warned that certain peoples from the previous Yugoslavia, who wholeheartedly accepted the fascist ideology even before 1941, are today still applying some of the already tested methods of treating Serbian people in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.

[Avramovic] The international scientific symposium entitled 50 Years of Victory Against Fascism began with the sounds of the state anthem "Hey Slavs" and a tribute to the victims of World War II. At this symposium, 210 scientific workers from our and other countries will present the same number of scientific works that shed light on the fascist ideology and the resistance that our peoples put up against the greatest evil of this century. The participants in the symposium were addressed by Defense Minister Pavle Bulatovic on behalf of the Federal Government. Speaking about the ideology, the system, and the organization founded on the fascist principles, he said:

[Begin Bulatovic recording] The fascist hand made, among other things, soap from human bodies and gloves from human skin. The participants in the heroic victory over fascism may not need any reminder of those days, but the young people need to know about that monster, the circumstances, and the people who destroyed it. Not because of hatred and revenge, but because of respect for the victors on the one hand, and prevention of similar things from happening on the other. [end recording]

[Avramovic] In war, nothing except a battle lost can be half as melancholy as a battle won, Minister Bulatovic continued, citing Wellington. The obligations of the victors are greater than those of the vanquished, as they deal with the entire development, with economic, democratic, cultural, and every other prosperity, that is, the future.

In a year when such an important anniversary is being celebrated, some peoples from the previous Yugoslavia, who wholeheartedly accepted the fascist ideology even before 1941, are today still applying some of the already tested methods of treating Serbian people in the former republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. There are Ustasha daggers at work again. Pits are again being filled with Serbs. Torture chambers, camps, and pogroms have come to life again. I hope, Minister Bulatovic continued, that reason will prevail and that a political and just solution to this crisis will be found. [passage omitted]

Military Prosecutor Charges 59 With War Crimes

LD1505153995 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1328 GMT 15 May 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Doboj, 15 May (SRNA)—The military prosecution office in Belgrade brought criminal charges against 59 people who took part in the killing of 200 members of the former Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] and in the detention and torture of another 140 JNA members in Tuzla on 15 May three years ago.

SRNA learned from officials in the command of the Serb army in Doboj that charges were brought against Tuzla Mayor Selim Beslagic; Izet Hadzic, president of the Tuzla-Podrinje canton; and Sead Delic, Nihad Livadic, and Zeljko Knez, officers of the Tuzla garrison of the former JNA.

Enver Delibegovic, commander of the Tuzla territorial defense headquarters, and Budimir Nikolic, former head of the security service center in Tuzla, are also charged with taking part in the crime. The indictment charges them with genocide and war crimes against wounded and sick people, prisoners of war, and civilians as well as assault on military personnel on duty, under Articles 141 to 145 and Article 206 of the FRY Criminal Law.

The facts on the basis of which the charges were brought are contained in the statements of surviving witnesses.

Arrest warrants have been issued against all those who gave the orders and perpetrated the crimes, in the territories of the FRY, the [Bosnian] Serb republic, and the republic of Serb Krajina [in Croatia]. Detention terms have also been set. [passage omitted]

Bank Governor Upbeat on Economic Prospects

LD1605170095 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1640 GMT 16 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, May 16 (TANJUG)—Yugoslavia's economic situation is not as difficult as many people claim, as the process of its recovery is underway however hard and slow it may be, Yugoslav National Bank governor Dragoslav Avramovic said Tuesday.

Yugoslav economy has come out of the troubles of the past few months with a wounded but still strong

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currency, so there are good grounds for recovery, Avramovic told the Union of Yugoslav Banks.

Banks are often unjustly presented as the principal party to blame, he said, noting that the situation in the banking sector was not at its best as the banks' reserves and balances are strained in the difficult external conditions.

Serious moves must be taken to face the problems ahead, Avramovic said.

The governor expressed hope that Yugoslav economy would continue growing not only for a few months but years.

Serbia

Milosevic, U.S. Diplomats Discuss Peace Process

LD1605163395 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1523 GMT 16 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 16 May (TANJUG)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic today received Ambassador Robert Frasure, the U.S. representative in the Contact Group.

The talks focussed on ways to improve the peace process and on efforts to stabilize the regional situation, a statement issued by the Serbian President's office says.

Rudolph Perrin, U.S. charge d'affaires in Belgrade, took part in the talks.

Milosevic Refuses To Meet Slavonia Refugees

LD1505162295 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1501 GMT 15 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Laktasi, 15 May (SRNA)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Krajina Prime Minister Borislav Mikelic refused to receive a delegation of the Serb refugees from western Slavonia three days ago, the republican headquarters for refugees in Laktasi said today.

The delegation was received by Colonel General Momcilo Perisic, Yugoslav Army chief of staff, and Bratislav Morina, head of the Serbian Commission for Refugees, who offered to find accommodation for 500 refugees in a reception center in Visoki Decani, in Kosovo. The delegation rejected the offer.

It was said at the meeting that 11,094 refugees have fled from western Slavonia to the [Bosnian] Serb republic, that some 500 refugees have fled to Serbia through private channels, and that 3,000 refugees will be housed in eastern Slavonia and Baranja on Wednesday 17 May.

Refugee Situation

AU1505205495 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 11 May 95 p 8

[Article by D.B.-V.D.: "Stop in Sid"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Will the refugees from western Slavonia, after they enter the Serbian parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina, cross into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia? The answer should be sought in Sid, where, according to information that we received yesterday, a "stop" will be put to it. However, the Sid police station has not been authorized to give any information on that and are referring everyone to "higher authorities" in Sremska Mitrovica. However, Mitrovica is not authorized to deal with this either, but, as we were told by the deputy chief of the police, an "appropriate department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia in Belgrade."

We could not learn anything more about this from the office of the Serbian commissioner for refugees either (Bratislava Morina is holding a news conference on this today), nor from the Serbian Ministry for Serbs Outside Serbia ("they are all in the field, call us tomorrow"), nor from the UNHCR. It is unlikely that the Yugoslav authorities will change their stand on the issue, although that is not completely clear, either. This was indicated in a way by a statement of the Serbian commissioner for refugees at the beginning of May: "I think that the best thing for the people is to remain in the Serbian republic [Bosnia-Herzegovina] and the free parts of the RSK [republic of Serbian Krajina]. If that does not happen, if the people leave their country, all the casualties will have been in vain, and a country without people will have no authority," Bratislava Morina said.

Naturally, the statement by the Okucani mayor, Aco Dragicevic, drew the greatest attention when he said that if the FRY does not open its border to the Slavonia Serbs in 48 hours, the column of refugees will, and probably somewhat strengthened, "set off for Belgrade." According to some reports from Banja Luka, there is growing dissatisfaction among the Serbs, among both the "domestic" Serbs and their "guests." After the Serb-Serb (Serbian) conflict, there is a new Serbian disagreement looming, this time between the Serbs from the two Krajinas.

The same Banja Luka sources speak of considerable dissatisfaction among the Slavonia refugees, mainly because, as stated, the general lack of hospitability, which the majority of them call more directly betrayal. Why were they not protected by the army of the Serbian republic (its supreme commander, Radovan Karadzic, was allegedly attacked and jeered at by passers-by in

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Knin recently)? There is a good number of those who, in addition to considering this to be an attempt to avoid "disturbing the public," are linking the ban on entry to Yugoslavia to the claims that Mladic's army is benefiting from this. Immediately on their entry, all able-bodied men must report to the military secretariat and the closest unit. In this way the army of the Serbian republic, as estimated, would be increased by 3,000, or even 4,000, men.

Further 'Limited' Action by Croatia Expected

AU1505173095 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 12 May 95 p 4

[Article by B. Cani: "Croatia Is Hoping To Provoke FRY Intervention"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade—"It is particularly worrying that the tensions in Croatia are not easing. On the other hand, the peace efforts by the international community and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are having less and less influence on events." This was stated by Ratomir Tanic, adviser to the president of New Democracy at a news conference yesterday.

Commenting on "speculations about the casualties in western Slavonia and this war in general," Tanic said that these were "inappropriate." If 10 people had been killed, it would have too many, let alone thousands, he said.

For the representatives of New Democracy it is very important that the FRY is still holding the course of its peace option, despite the undisputed ethnic cleansing carried out by the Croatian side. "Croatia does not intend to respect the peace process. When the signing of the Z-4 plan was in sight, Croatia started the military operations," Tanic said. Asked whether the FRY was obliged to respond, according to the Vance plan, Tanic said: "Yugoslavia was not the guarantor that military action would lead to a military counteraction." After all, he said, "Croatia would be happy if it could provoke military operations by the Yugoslav side so that it could then say that Yugoslavia does not respect agreements."

Tanic expects the repeat of limited military-police operations by Croatia, but is convinced that it will pay a very high political price for it very quickly.

Montenegro

Sandzak's Ljajic To Negotiate With Belgrade

AU1205125195 Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian 8 May 95 p 20

[Article by Perica Vucinic: "A Cautious Step Forward"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Negotiations between the representatives of the Serbian Government and the Sandzak branch of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] should start in Belgrade in approximately 10 days. The initiative for the negotiations came from the Sandzak SDA Headquarters in Novi Pazar after the Sandzak SDA fraction led by Rasim Ljajic, its secretary general, asked the New Democracy (ND) leadership two months ago to mediate in negotiations with the Serbian authorities.

The forthcoming dialogue between the leading national party of the Sandzak Muslims and the Belgrade authorities is only the first step that the two sides will take to get to know each other. "The aim of the talks is the normalization of relations, the creation of conditions for a more ambitious political dialogue and the testing of the Serbian Government's intentions," Ljajic told VREME. The first meeting, probably with one of the Serbian deputy prime ministers, will be dedicated to concrete issues of daily life, such as how to halt police repression in Sandzak, what measures to take to enable the private economy to function normally, how to create conditions for the work of Muslim cultural associations, and how to improve the situation in the educational system and the media. "It is not our intention to burden the first meeting with political demands, because this would make the talks more difficult," Ljajic said, judging that a failure of the dialogue would harm the Muslims, since they would in that case continue to emigrate from the Sandzak region.

Although it was presented as very modest, the political step made by Ljajic and his followers in the divided Sandzak SDA will not prove to be so small, because the problems that they want to discuss are not small, either. The brutal police campaign for the search of weapons in remote areas of Sandzak has already been going on for two years; no less brutal are the inspections of private businessmen in Sandzak towns by the finance police, which are carried out continuously. "Why are there the most rigid inspections in Subotica, Pristina, and Novi Pazar?" This is a rhetoric question asked by people who want to remain anonymous. Owners of private companies in Novi Pazar say that they have "caught the rhythm" of financial inspections: They always occur before people are to receive their pensions. Apart from claiming that the finance police are very rude, they also complain that the customs authorities do not allow them to import goods or raw materials from Turkey. More than 70 percent of all commodities come to Sandzak from Turkey and, according to SDA estimates, 60 percent of the Sandzak population live on private business.

Ljajic's Wing

Ljajic says that the educational program, apart from being catastrophic in general, is also unpleasant for Mus-

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lim children. As an example he took the culture and civilization textbook for the fourth grade of elementary school, in which Muslims are not mentioned as inhabitants of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, not even as a national minority. He also pointed to a statement made by a geography teacher in the eighth grade, who said that "the creation of phantom nations—like the Muslims—has proved to be a disturbing factor." Regarding culture, the SDA negotiating delegation will insist that conditions be created for the work of cultural and artistic associations.

The wish for dialogue expressed by Ljajic's SDA wing is a test of the intentions of the Serbian authorities, but, apart from the important issues to be discussed, it is at the same time a test of the power that this wing has in its own territory, in Sandzak. The initiative for the talks with the official Serbian authorities, therefore, came very cautiously: It was made after SDA headquarters in Sarajevo had given the green light and after the talks had been supported by international political players. It is no coincidence that all this is going on at the time when Muhamed Filipovic's [Bosnia-Herzegovina Government's special envoy to Serbia] visit to Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic has still not been forgotten and when Nijaz Durakovic [Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency member] is announcing the possibility to return to Belgrade. "If Muhamed Filipovic can come here to talk to Milosevic, why should not we who live here do the same," the SDA secretary general said, but denied that Filipovic participated in the preparation of the dialogue.

The caution, the careful selection of the time and the necessity to have a suitable support were dictated by relations within the Sandzak SDA. The open conflict between the party wing that follows the runaway chairman Sulejman Ugljanin and the other, loyal to Secretary General Ljajic, culminated in January 1995. The "Coordination Body," which Ugljanin established in Ankara after he had proclaimed a state of emergency in the SDA hoping to influence the policy in Sandzak from exile, tried to deprive Ljajic and his assistants of the legitimacy by a decree. By refusing to accept it, Ljajic became the leader of the fraction and came to the surface of political life in Sandzak. In the imbalance in the party, Ljajic became increasingly important, but his importance was not yet strong enough to protect him from Ugljanin's curse and charisma. The effort that he aimed at in achieving contact with the Serbian authorities is exactly what was expected of Ljajic whenever it was mentioned that he was the leader of the more realistic and constructive fraction within the Sandzak SDA.

Ugljanin's Wing

The rival wing, incorporated in the Coordination Body, was still working on internal activities. In a well organized campaign, the Coordination Body succeeded in collecting a large number of signatures for the petition by which it was required that Sulejman Ugljanin and all those who were accused of arming the Muslims in Sandzak be allowed to return to Yugoslavia. The Coordination Body succeeded in motivating both business and social associations of the Sandzak Muslims for the campaign, but their resourcefulness stopped at that point.

At the time when this article was written, the only Coordination Body member whom we met in Sandzak was Fevzija Muric, the manager of the "Merhamet" Company of Novi Pazar. "I do not know on whose behalf this delegation intends to negotiate," Music said, adding that the Serbian authorities have decided to accept "the softer negotiators," since the attitude of the Coordination Body is that no bilateral negotiations can start before Milosevic has recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina. He also says that under that condition the basis for negotiations is "The Memorandum on the Establishment of a Special Status for Sandzak" passed by the Muslim National Council on 6 June 1993. The Memorandum represents an extensive Muslim program, by which it is foreseen to establish a Sandzak assembly as the legislative body, (which would proclaim a constitution, too), a governor and government as the holders of the executive power, "including the police under Muslim control and independent courts in Sandzak." The document, which, to judge from the empty lines left for the signatures, should have been signed by the representatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the cochairmen of the Conference for Former Yugoslavia, but was not. The only signature below the text is that of Sulejman Ugljanin.

Having definitely dissociated themselves from the runaway leader and his vain political program, Rasim Ljajic, Zevdzo Huric, Smajo Polimac and their followers have decided to keep clear of bad business. The constructive policy that they have announced is still risky for them. The negotiations with the Serbian authorities should make their legitimacy more powerful and their wing stronger than Ugljanin's, but if the dialogue is not successful, this would mean an end for them in the patriarchal Sandzak. But if certain results are achieved, this would, on the one hand, encourage investors and villagers, who have suffered most because of the permanent search for weapons, and strengthen Ljajic's position on the other, which is likely to happen.

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Kosovo

Former Prime Minister Arrested in Pristina

AU1405163995 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 14 May 95

[Article by Milivoje Mihajlovic from Pristina]

[FBIS Translated Text] Jusuf Zejnulahu, the last prime minister of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo and the first prime minister in the illegal government of the phantom Republic of Kosovo, was arrested in Pristina yesterday. According to Albanian sources, Zejnulahu was arrested at 0500 yesterday. The police unofficially confirmed today that he was arrested on the basis of a central warrant that the Yugoslav authorities had issued following the illegal Albanian assembly meeting in Kacanik.

It has been learned unofficially that Zejnulahu will be tried according to Article 136 of the Yugoslav Criminal Code—that is, for the criminal act of associating for the purpose of hostile activity.

Jusuf Zejnulahu returned to Pristina two years ago after heading the so-called government in exile of the phantom Republic of Kosovo and staying in Slovenia, Croatia, and the Arab Emirates. Zejnulahu was not arrested after immediately returning to the province. A few months ago he had been appointed director of the Pristina branch of the Belgrade Gama Bank.

Vojvodina

Novi Sad Hungarian Publishing Company Attacked

LD1505212095 Budapest Duna TV in Hungarian 1900 GMT 15 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Ten unknown perpetrators broke into the Ujvidek [Novi Sad] headquarters of the Forum publishing company, which publishes Hungarian-language books in Vojvodina and prints the MAGYAR SZO. They beat up the two receptionists who were there. The receptionists, who were injured in their faces and legs, said that the attackers first swore at the mother of Hungarians [as heard] and then at the Forum, which publishes such papers. The Belgrade opposition paper NASA BORBA is also printed by the Forum. The Ujvidek police have begun investigating the incident.

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